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Preface 
 
At the time when Japan was experiencing robust economic growth and Europe 
was accelerating its integration, a number of researchers noticed the importance of 
investing in their bilateral economic relationship, which was formerly obscured by their 
respective „special‟ relationships with the United States. When their trade frictions came 
to the surface, their trade relationship began to attract more attention.  
In the meantime, world trade entered a new phase with the creation of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. As the successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), the WTO became a new arena for member countries to make trade 
agreements and solve trade frictions with their trade partners.  
 In this thesis, we will investigate the relationship between the EU and Japan in the 
WTO. The thesis will look closely at social forces and investigate how various social 
forces have influenced the position of the EU and Japan, as well as the WTO. On top of 
that, we will also analyse how the function of the WTO has influenced the EU and Japan, 
and their relationship in the multilateral trading system.  
Trade conflicts have often been seen as trade tensions between national states. In 
fact, the WTO deals only with member countries (with the exception of the EU). However, 
trade tensions may well break out not between national states but between individual 
sectors, such as agriculture and steel, which sectoral interests then turn to their national 
states for support. This indicates that even trade friction is not simply antagonism 
between national states, but between national and transnational fractions of classes. States 
have been utilised by transnationally oriented dominant groups which intend to integrate 
their countries into emergent global capitalist structures.  
 This thesis therefore raises questions about liberal trade theory concerning its 
serious gap between theory and actual practices, and suggests an alternative approach to 
structural issues of the state-centric approach to world politics. While we consult neo-
liberal institutionalist theory to investigate the role of the WTO and its influence upon the 
EU-Japan relationship, we will analyse the interaction of various social forces within the 
EU and Japan from a neo-Gramscian perspective. In this way, we will try to direct 
attention to relations between social interests in the struggle for consensual leadership 
rather than concentrating solely on state dominance.  Focusing on the role of international 
organisations and social forces, the aim of this thesis is to investigate how the EU and 
Japan have developed „coordinated action‟ and „joint negotiating stances‟ on particular 
trade issues, notably on agriculture and steel trade. Furthermore, as our central research 
iii 
 
questions, this thesis investigates what has been the overall effect of the WTO on the 
development of the EU-Japan trade relationship, as well as how the WTO has provided an 
impetus to promote certain patterns in EU-Japan relations. Through this thesis, I aim to 
contribute to the understanding of the roles of social forces in the interaction in 
international organisations.  
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1. Introduction 
1-1. The EU-Japan relationship in the WTO 
 As the 21
st
 century was approaching, the international economy was at a historic 
turning point. Concerning the international trade regime, the conclusion of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round led to the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. With the birth of the new organisation, the 
world economy became even more integrated and interrelated. Economically and 
politically, global society was evolving into a more fluid and multipolar international 
order. As a result, the world has become interdependent at an unprecedented level. That 
interdependence has generated a number of challenges for the international trading 
system. As two of the world's major economic powers, the European Union (EU)
1
 and 
Japan have an important role to play in the management of this system.  
A close look at today‟s international trade negotiations in the WTO reveals a 
particular relationship between members. Since the establishment of the WTO, the EU 
and Japan have started an intense relationship on some trade issues at an unprecedented 
level. Their relationship is particularly intense on agriculture and steel issues, although 
they seem to have different agendas and interests on both trade issues. In order to find out 
why the EU and Japan have intensified their relationship, we need to address the 
following two points.  
 First, analysing the relationship between members in the WTO, the role of the 
international organisation needs to be addressed. Second, we need to pay more attention 
to various actors involved in trade negotiations. Since its establishment, the WTO has 
been dealing only with states. Because of this nature, so far, the international patterns of 
relationships between bureaucrats and international firms have been largely neglected and 
have not been thoroughly researched or understood. However, in today‟s international 
trade, various interests of domestic forces are involved. They first create the domestic 
consensus by influencing the negotiation stances of each member country and try to 
extend their position to the international level. Therefore, in our context, it is necessary to 
focus on various actors and the role of the organisation which may have an affect on 
today‟s relationship between the EU and Japan.  
 
                                                 
1 I refer in this thesis to the „EU‟ for all events after the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty in November 1993. The EEC, established in 1958, changed its name and became 
the European Community with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
November of 1993. Therefore, for the time before 1993, both „EEC‟ (European Economic 
Community) and „EC‟ (European Community) are going to be used interchangeably. 
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1-2. Analytical framework 
Trade conflicts have often been seen as trade tensions between national states. In 
fact, the WTO deals only with member countries (with the exception of the EU). However, 
even when some members have conflicting interests on one trade issue, they may 
coordinate their negotiating stances on other trade issues. Thus, as we will see in later 
chapters, trade tensions may well break out not between national states but between 
individual sectors, such as agriculture or steel, which then turn to national states for 
support. 
In this sense, there is a view that even trade friction is not simply antagonism 
between national states, but between national and transnational fractions of classes. States 
have been utilised by transnationally oriented dominant groups which intend to integrate 
their countries into emergent global capitalist structures.
2
  
William I Robinson asserts, “fierce competition in the globalisation epoch takes 
place among dense networks of transnational corporate alliances and through struggles 
within every country and within transnational institutions”.3 As their interests are global, 
transnational capitals must take an active political and economic interest in each country 
and region in which they operate. They may turn to any national state to gain competitive 
advantage as part of their corporate strategy. If, as William I Robinson asserts, 
“globalisation is not a „national‟ project but a class project without a national strategy, or 
rather, with a strategy that seeks to utilise the existing political infrastructure of the 
nation-state system and simultaneously to craft transnational state structures”, 4  an 
exclusive state-centric focus may fail to capture the essence of the EU-Japan trade 
relationship. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the state-centric approach, we will 
analyse the issue from a neo-Gramscian perspective, which focuses on social forces. 
Thus, focusing on the role of the international organisation and social forces 
within the EU and Japan from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the aim of our analysis is to 
investigate how the EU and Japan have developed „coordinated action‟ and „joint 
negotiating stances‟ on particular trade issues, notably on agriculture and steel trade. 
Furthermore, as one of our central research questions, we investigate what has been the 
                                                 
2 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, „Introduction: Neo-Gramscian perspectives in 
international political economy and the relevance to European integration‟ in Andreas 
Bieler and Adam David Morton (edt.), „Social forces in the making of the new Europe‟, 
(New York, Palgrave Publishers, 2001), P16, 17 
3 William I Robinson, „Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nationstate to Transnational 
Hegemony‟, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, „Images of Gramsci‟, (New York, 
Routledge, 2006), P174, 175 
4 William I Robinson, „Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nationstate to Transnational 
Hegemony‟, P174, 175 
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overall effect of the WTO on the development of the EU-Japan relationship, as well as 
how the WTO provided an impetus to promote certain patterns in EU-Japan relations.  
1-3. Hypothesis 
Thus, I will use the above characteristics of the neo-Gramscian perspective as an 
analytical device for the analysis of the relationship between the EU and Japan, in order 
to look at the condition of hegemony in today‟s world. I will investigate how, after the 
US-centered hegemony, the EU and Japan may be forming a new hegemony (or 
supremacy) in today‟s world order. Moreover, my interest focuses on how social forces 
may mould a new consensus domestically, and then affect the rule-making of an 
international organisation. We also pay attention to the question of how an international 
organisation such as the WTO has been able to contribute to the creation of general 
conditions for transnational capital.  
Taking into account the above central questions, the main hypothesis will be: By 
creating the conditions for the hegemony of transnational capital, utilising and 
strengthening the system or function of the WTO, elite capitalist social forces within the 
EU and Japan have joined forces beyond national boundaries and attempted to create new 
international rules and norms in favour of their interests. In other words, depending on the 
trade issues, various social forces within the EU and Japan, with the same or similar 
interests, have effectively utilised the international organisation and significantly 
contributed to the creation of general conditions of hegemony by influencing the trade 
policy of each government. In this sense, thanks to the creation of an international 
organisation, such as the WTO, cooperation between such elite social forces in different 
countries is facilitated by moulding a new consensus at the international level, thus 
contributing to the creation of “new hegemony” in the world economy. Once such a 
consensus is made at the international level within an international organisation, new 
international rules or norms may even override domestic rules and will start functioning 
as the global standard. Through empirical research on the EU-Japan relationship in the 
WTO, the above hypothesis will be examined in the thesis.  
 
1-4. The EU-Japan trade relationship: a brief overview 
 When the WTO was established in 1995, Japanese Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was 5218 billion US dollars, the second largest after the United States (US), 
whereas the total GDP of the EU was a staggering 8407 billion US dollars, surpassing the 
US. Their economic size makes them important trade partners to one another. In the same 
17 
 
year, total trade between them amounted to 144 billion US dollars.
5
  
 There are two solid sides to the Japan-EU-US triangle: the relations between 
Europe and the US and between the US and Japan. The third side, the relations between 
Europe and Japan, is poorly developed with regard to trade and investment as well as 
knowledge. There are a number of explanations for this situation. One is that Europe is 
very much preoccupied with its own development and restructuring. Another is Japan‟s 
US-focused bilateralism in its foreign and security policy which does not leave much 
room for developing other relationships. 
 The political relaunch of the EC in the mid-1980s culminated in 1987 with the 
adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) and the acceptance of the programme to 
create a Single European Market (SEM) by 1992. Japan's interest towards the EC 
dramatically increased since the SEM programme (or the 1992 programme) launched in 
1987. Prior to the programme, Japan's attitude to the EC was ambivalent, since the 
credibility of the European Commission (the executive branch of the EC) as an 
international negotiation counterpart, was often questioned. Coordination of trade policies 
among EC member states was far from perfect. As a result, the Japanese government 
tended to prefer dealing with individual member states, giving Brussels only a secondary 
role.    
 The 1992 project was as much a political as an economic project. Its architects, 
particularly the European Commission, viewed the creation of the internal market as a 
means to justify more integrated political structures and stronger EC institutions to 
regulate it. A politically unified EC would be a more powerful international actor because 
the „politics of scale‟ would provide it with more clout than could be wielded by its 
Member States acting alone. The 1992 project was designed to enhance the EC‟s 
„supranational‟ power, or its power to define and pursue collective interests which 
transcend national boundaries, authorities or interests.
6
  
 Realising the impact of the SEM programme, Japan changed its attitude towards 
the EC. The two most important implications of the programme for Japan were: (1) the 
                                                 
5 Atsuko Abe, „Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational 
Relations‟, (London, Athlone Press, 1999), P3 
6 John Peterson argues that the US bilateral trading relationship with Japan contrasted 
sharply with its relationship with the EC. By the late 1980s, the Community accounted 
for nearly a quarter of US exports, while Japan took only about 12 per cent. The EC 
remained a critical market for American goods in high-growth, expanding industries. 
Nearly 45 per cent of American exports to the EC were high technology goods compared 
with only 29 per cent of US sales to Japan. / see Park, „Trading Blocs and US-Japan 
Relations in Pacific Trade and Cooperation‟, International Trade: Regional and Global 
Issues,  (The Macmillan Press, 1994) P66 
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programme made the EC the biggest single market, including the automobile sector; and 
(2) it increased European competitiveness in the international economy.  While this large 
single economy encouraged Japanese producers to increase business with the Europeans, 
European protectionism alarmed the Japanese. Driven by both business opportunities and 
a fear of 'Fortress Europe', the end of 1980s and the early 1990s found a rapid increase in 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the EC. At the official level too, the 
Japanese government indicated its anxiety over the possible exclusive effect of the SEM 
(„fortress Europe‟). 
 Therefore, the deepening integration of the European Union was an important 
factor for EU-Japan relationships. The SEM granted the EU significant leverage in terms 
of international trade policy, because it could determine conditions of access to the largest 
unified market in the world. The expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, along with the 
introduction of the Euro as a common currency in 1999, enabled the EU to further 
increase its weight as a trade entity.   
 The changing bilateral economic relationship between the EU and Japan has been 
researched by many scholars. For example, Albrecht Rothacher analyses the development 
of European Community (EC)-Japan economic relations since the early post-war years.
7
 
William R. Nester's work, 'European Power and the Japanese challenge' approaches their 
relationship by analysing the individual policies and policymaking from the view point of 
competition between them.
8
 Atsuko Abe's 'Japan and the European Union' was an 
attempt to analyse EU-Japan relations from various IR perspectives, focusing on the 
impact of Japan's decision-making on the bilateral relationship.
9
  
 A number of scholars often characterised the EU-Japan bilateral trade relationship 
as confrontational (see Chapter 2). However, particularly since the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, it has been frequently observed that the EU and Japan have coordinated 
their negotiating stance on particular trade issues, notably agricultural and steel issues. 
Such coordination of negotiating stances seems to be increasing and being consolidated at 
an unprecedented level in the history of their past trade relations. However, while 
considerable research has been conducted on EU-Japan bilateral trade relations, such new 
developments of the EU-Japan relationship in the WTO have not yet been thoroughly 
investigated.  
                                                 
7  Albrecht Rothacher, „Economic Diplomacy between the European Community and 
Japan 1959-1981‟(Aldershot, Gower Publishing Company, 1983) 
8  William R. Nester, `European Power and The Japanese Challenge‟, (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1993) 
9 Atsuko Abe, ‟Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational 
Relations‟ 
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1-5. The WTO as an international organisation 
The WTO is the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading 
system. The WTO is unique both in the context of its contractual obligations and in the 
enforcement mechanism built into its system for resolving disputes. At the end of an 
integrated dispute settlement process that covers a wide range of trade-related policies in 
the areas of goods, services, and the protection of intellectual property, the organisation 
provides member countries with multilaterally authorised trade sanctions. In contrast to 
other international economic organisations, the WTO has an enforcement mechanism 
which is an effective way of sanctioning member countries that are found to be in 
violation of the institution‟s rules and that refuse to change their illegal behaviour.10 As a 
result of major changes agreed in the Uruguay Round, the dispute settlement process in 
the WTO has become much more automatic by prohibiting individual countries from 
blocking the process.
11
 
 The important role played in the world economy by the GATT/WTO is widely 
accepted. Since its creation in 1947 the GATT has grown in membership from an initial 
set of 23 countries to a roster that now includes more than 150 countries. The expanding 
GATT/WTO membership reflects the success that this organisation has had in facilitating 
tariff reductions. Through the eight rounds of trade-policy negotiations that have been 
sponsored by the GATT, culminating with the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 
and the creation of the WTO, the average tariff rates on industrial goods have fallen 
substantially. The past success of the GATT/WTO justifies its role as an international 
organisation.
12
 
Along with its dispute settlement process, the WTO is an organisation devoted to 
developing and administering rules to counter protectionism in the global trading system. 
Although the WTO‟s dispute settlement procedure is concerned explicitly with the 
function of rule observance, by far the greatest amount of energy within the WTO is 
devoted to rule making.
13
 
 An important research question here is whether the development of formal rules 
helps or hinders the process of global liberalisation when those rules are not entirely 
                                                 
10 Richard Blackhurst, „The capacity of the WTO to fulfil its mandate‟ in Anne O Kruger 
(ed), „WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1998), P47 
11 Blackhurst, „The capacity of the WTO to fulfil its mandate‟, P32 
12 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, „The Economics of the World Trading System‟, 
(Cambridge, the MIT Press, 2002), P1-11 
13 David Vines, „The WTO in relation to the Fund and the Bank‟, in Anne O Kruger (ed), 
„WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
P79 
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consistent with the domestic political concerns of major players. As the trade policies of 
the large trading nations in Europe, the United States, and Japan are in large part driven 
by domestic concerns over trade issues, there are significant questions as to the degree to 
which international norms or rules can be negotiated that go against those domestic 
interests.
14
 Therefore, for both the EU and Japan, rule-making in the WTO is of great 
importance.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In today‟s world trade, trade negotiations involve many diversified actors within 
the state. Each actor has its own goals for agenda setting, rule-making and decision-
making within the WTO. Under these circumstances, conventional state-centric IR theory 
is not enough to analyse the issue. In order to analyse such complexity of world trade 
issues, and the EU-Japan relationship in the WTO, a neo-Gramscian perspective, 
particularly its 1.) notion of hegemony, 2.) focus on social forces and 3.) attention to the 
role of international organisation, may give us a useful insight into the ever changing 
spatial and territorial structure of power in the global political economy.
15
 
 
2-1. A Neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony and the post-war economy 
„Hegemony‟ was a concept used by Gramsci to analyse the relation of forces in a 
given society. A hegemonic order was one where consent, rather than coercion, primarily 
characterised the relations between classes, and between state and civil society.
16
 
Developing Gramsci‟s ideas internationally, Robert W. Cox has demonstrated that it is 
possible to conceive of new forms of state, hegemony, and the formation of „historic blocs‟ 
on a world scale. While conventional IR theory considers hegemony as a single 
dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states, the 
neo-Gramscian perspective developed by Cox broadens the domain of hegemony. 
According to Cox, hegemony is „‟the articulation and justification of a particular set of 
interests as general interests. It appears as an expression of broadly based consent, 
manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, 
which is initially established by social-class forces occupying a leading role within a state, 
                                                 
14 Anne O Kruger, „An Agenda for the WTO‟, in Anne O Kruger (ed), „WTO as an 
international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998), P403 
15 Adam David Morton, “Unravelling Gramsci”, (London, Pluto Press, 2007), P112 
16 Stephen Gill and David Law, „Global hegemony and the structural power of capital‟ in 
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but is then projected outwards on a world scale.
17
 
Cox argues that a US-led hegemonic world order, labelled Pax Americana, 
prevailed until the early 1970s. It was maintained through the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates and institutions such as World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Moreover, it was based on the principle of “embedded liberalism”, which 
allowed the combination of international free trade with the right of governments to 
intervene in their national economy in order to ensure domestic stability via social 
security and the partial redistribution of economic wealth. (Although there is a view that 
the postwar order may be better understood in terms of the dominance of a protectionist 
form of regulation of the market economy.)
18
 
Gill and Law named four elements as the key international elements in the post-
1945 regime of accumulation which generated uniquely rapid economic growth 
throughout the industrialized capitalist world. First, the construction of a US-centred 
economic, security and political structure for the non-communist world, ensuring peaceful 
conditions at the capitalist core. The second, closely related issue was the ability of the 
US to maintain the growth of global aggregate demand through its balance of payment 
deficits, partly generated by heavy overseas military expenditure. The third element was 
the substantial congruence of ideas, institutions and policies among the leading capitalist 
nations, in a system of “embedded liberalism”. This involved the emergence and 
consolidation of the ideology of the mixed economy. Along with the rise of the Cold War, 
this was important in the reconstitution of the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic form of 
rule in the West and in Japan. A fourth element was the cheap and plentiful supply of raw 
materials, especially oil.  
 In order to cement this order, as Gill and Law termed the word, a new 
international historic bloc of social forces, centred in the US, came to be the socio-
political centrepiece of the post-war alliance in the “West”. The leading elements in this 
constellation sought to internationalise New Deal principles and to extend opportunities 
for exports and/or foreign direct investment, both in manufacturing and extractive 
industries.
19
 
The concept of an international historic bloc means much more than an alliance 
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of capitalist interests across national boundaries. It implies that elements of more than one 
class were involved and its basis was more organic and rooted in material and normative 
structures of society, that is „in the governmental and social institutions and civil societies 
of a number of countries, including weak states…[hence] the alliance of social forces it 
comprises is seen as “”natural” and legitimate by most of its members‟.20 
The forms and functions of the US-led hegemony, however, began to alter 
following the world economic crisis of the 1970s. This overall crisis, both of the world 
economy and of social power within various forms of state has been explained as being 
the result of two particular tendencies: the internationalisation of production and the 
internationalisation of the state, which led the thrust towards globalisation.
21
 
Since the erosion of pax Americana principles of world order in the 1970s, there 
has been an increasing internationalisation of production and finance, driven, at the apex 
of an emerging global class structure, by a „transnational managerial class‟. Taking 
advantage of differences between countries, there has been an integration of production 
processes on a transnational scale with transnational corporations.  
Jong H. Park argues that among the changes during that period, there was a shift 
of activity in both economic and international economic policy from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific basin countries. This shift started with the emergence of Japan as a Pacific and 
world economic power and the remarkable success of industrialisation in East Asian 
countries. At the same time, the rise of a unified Europe (Europe 1992) accentuated the 
split of the Atlantic basin. Thus, the world economy was seen to be heading towards a 
tripolar economic order dominated by the three big economic giants; the US, the EU and 
Japan.
22
 
 Among various actors in the multi-layered trading environment, the United States 
is a very important factor in EU-Japan relations. Not only the United States' position in 
the international political economy, but also its special relationships with both the EU and 
Japan, make it inevitable that European and Japanese decision-makers weigh the 
influence of the United States in dealing with each other. Furthermore, as hegemonic 
stability theory argues, the United States played a significant role in establishing today's 
environment of the international political economy, as well as the establishment of 
international organisations. According to Donald C. Hellmann, one international 
relationship, the US-Japan alliance, has totally overshadowed all others in the post-war 
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period.
23
Atsuko Abe argues that misunderstanding and indifference, which dominated 
EC-Japan relations until the end of the 1980s, were partly due to the role of the United 
States in the world structure. As a result of both the EC and Japan emphasising their 
respective bilateral relationships with the United States in their foreign policies, they 
obscured their importance to each other.
24
  
 
2-2. Neoliberal Institutionalism  
 Keohane's work, "After Hegemony" provided the most compelling theoretical 
justification for the existence and role of international institutions in world politics. 
Neoliberal institutionalism has developed to be the main alternative to realism for 
understanding international relations. 
  With trends such as the increasing prominence of “non-state actors” including 
multinational corporations, nongovernmental organisations and international institutions, 
the importance of the neoliberal paradigm has made neorealism a less powerful 
explanation of international relations.  
 The main element of neoliberal institutionalists is an emphasis on non-state actors, 
including international institutions. Through this emphasis, neoliberal institutionalists 
focus on the importance of cooperation as well as confrontation in international politics, 
in contrast to realists‟ and neorealists‟ emphasis on military force and coersion.  
 However, both realists and neoliberal institutionalists also share the view that 
states are critical actors in world politics. Neoliberal institutionalism takes a broader view 
of various actors and includes "sets of governing arrangements" that involve "implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge."  
 In other words, international institutions are a broader category of actor than 
organisations, which they subsume. Thus, for neoliberal institutionalism, world politics is 
institutionalised, although to differing extents in different issue areas and regions. Almost 
every area of global cooperation has been formalised into an international institution, and 
many of them have expanded their membership, such as the World Bank, IMF, the WTO, 
and the EU. What we have seen on specific issue areas in the WTO shows that the 
institutions have grown to reach many issue areas that were once considered purely 
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domestic.  
Neoliberal institutionalists assert that in which condition countries create and join 
international institutions is key. Keohane's theory argues, that a country, being rational, 
will only demand and join international institutions if those institutions can provide net 
benefit for them relative to the reversion point. Benefit can be considered as reduced 
transaction costs, increased information flow, and reduced uncertainty. In providing these 
functions, international institutions help states negotiate mutually beneficial agreements 
that they otherwise would not be able to arrange.  
 Such international institutions with their enhanced function mean that the 
institutionalisation of world politics is becoming increasingly legalised, and this 
legalisation is having important effects on international cooperation.
25
 
 In the institutionalised and legalised world politics, trade relations are an area of 
“complex interdependence”. Complex interdependence seems to prevail, and 
institutionalised cooperation is becoming the norm. Interdependence means mutual 
dependence, not necessarily symmetric, which brings benefits for all parties involved. 
Even in situations where everyone gains from cooperation, some actors will have a 
greater ability than others to influence the shape and content of the cooperative 
arrangement. In the institutionalised world politics, there is no single hierarchy of power 
resources, and states vary in their capacities to influence outcomes by issue areas. The EU 
and Japan can be influential in one issue area, but less powerful in other issue areas. 
Examining a particular issue area can demonstrate the importance of distinct power 
resources for different transnational and non-state actors.  
 Realism and neorealism have generally focused on conflicts among states and 
especially on the use of military force and capability. However, realists also agree that 
countries can at times cooperate, and alliances and balancing are important forms of 
cooperation central to realist theory. Neoliberal institutionalism has gone further and tried 
to explain institutionalised cooperation sustained policy coordination among states often 
guided by norms, rules, and practices codified in treaties, agreements, or international 
organisations. In such arrangements, countries often relinquish a substantial degree of 
sovereignty and autonomy over important policy areas. For such institutionalised 
cooperation to exist, countries must comply with the norms and rules embodied in the 
institutions. And they must generally comply both when they benefit and are adversely 
affected. A distinctive point about the evolution of neoliberal institutionalism has been the 
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move from cooperation to institutionalised cooperation or global governance.  
 Such arguments of neoliberal institutionalism on cooperation are correspondent to 
our research. As we will see in chapter 2, the EU and Japan also positively contributed to 
institutionalised cooperation through GATT and later the WTO. The substantial reduction 
in tariffs through successful GATT trade rounds also provides strong evidence for the 
neoliberal institutionalist theory about the role of institutions in fostering cooperation.  
 However, in the era of institutionalised cooperation, a question remains, to what 
extent and under what conditions countries comply with the rules, norms, and practices of 
the international institutions to which they belong .
26
 In order to answer this question, 
what is crucial is the role of non-state actors, not only in international institutions but also 
in private sectors.  
 
2-3. Private actors 
 Helen V. Milner asserts that neoliberal institutionalism points out the growing role 
of private sectors in world politics, but it has not carefully assessed the costs and benefits 
of such cooperation. Who benefits from international cooperation and global governance 
is an important issue that early work on neoliberal institutionalism did not address. In 
neo-Gramscian perspective, attention is given to social-class forces and processes and 
how these relate to the development of states in contrast to conventional state-centric 
approaches in IR.
27
 
In conventional state-centric approach, the state tends to be viewed as a unitary 
actor, often with little reference to the importance of domestic politics. This means, that in 
relations with other states, governments adopt a united front, based on an agreed 
consensus concerning the national interest of the state. In reality, domestic political forces 
all have an interest in the nature of the international regimes which directly affect their 
interests. Such conflicting domestic forces may mean that the concept of „national interest‟ 
is highly problematic. As in much realist writing, there is also a tendency to overlook 
transnational social forces, and the role of non-state actors.
28
  
In the area of trade, depending on the issue, banks or large multinational 
enterprises are just as important as states.  Steven McGuire‟s work, for instance, provides 
the best illustration of the relationship of firms and states in the development and conduct 
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of international trade policy.  He notes that “International trade matters are less and less 
about „trade‟ as conventionally defined.  Rather they are about the complex interplay 
between corporate strategies and government regulatory regimes.” 29 Jan Aart Schlote, 
Robert O‟Brien and Marc Williams point out the cases where non-state actors have even 
bypassed the government authorities and have sought direct contact with the WTO in 
order to interrogate and lobby the multilateral institution itself.
30
 
In the neo-Gramscian view, the state is not unquestioningly considered as a 
distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a form of social relations 
through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed. Therefore, hegemony is first 
consolidated domestically within the state, and then it may go beyond a particular social 
order, and further move on a world scale and develop into the world order. Once it moves 
on a world scale, it could connect social class forces across different countries.
31
  
Such view is particularly important in our context, as Bernald M. Hoekman and 
Michel M. Kostecki argue that the foreign trade policy-making process is generally torn 
by conflicting objectives of national interest-groups, as well as by external considerations.  
Industry associations, labour unions, regional authorities, consumer lobbies and different 
government departments all interact in determining the policy outcome.
32
 Stephan 
Woolcock argues that because of the diverse interests of various actors, participating 
governments in multilateral trade negotiations are often pulled between contradictory 
pressures and may spend more time to negotiate internally than with their trade partners.
33
 
In this sense, transnational capital is not simply represented as an autonomous 
force beyond the power of the state but instead is represented by certain classes or 
fractions of classes within the state. There are contradictory and heterogeneous relations 
internal to the state, which are induced by class antagonisms between nationally and 
transnationally based capital and labour.  
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Today, capital is so internationally mobile, especially between the major capitalist 
economies. Following the neo-Gramscian focus on social-class forces as the main actors, 
the transnational restructuring of capitalism within globalisation led to the emergence of 
new social forces of capital and labour.  
Transnational social forces are supportive for the global economy. The 
transnational managerial class, other elements of productive capital such as 
manufacturing industry, import-export businesses, financial capital such as banking, 
insurance industry have been supportive of this transnationalisation of capital. Thus, 
transnational capital has been more and more supported and promoted by forms of elite 
relationship that have forged common perspectives between business, state officials, and 
representatives of international organisations, favouring the logic of capitalist market 
relations.  
In contrast, nationally based capital, engendered by national production systems, 
may oppose an open global economy, due to their reliance on national or regional 
protectionism against global competition.
34
 Yasusuke Murakami and Yutaka Kosai assert 
that the deepening of interdependent relations on many levels and the trend toward 
internationalisation of goods, money, corporations and other economic entities that 
transcend national boundaries is coming into conflict with the political tendency to give 
priority to national interests, and this is the cause of all manner of friction among 
nations.
35
 Thus, there are significant divisions between transnational and national capital 
in terms of their stances toward global economy. 
 Taken into this point, which is addressed in our research, particularly in the 
agricultural and steel issue, is the importance of focusing on particular issue areas to 
understand the key players and their power resources in a world of complex 
interdependence.  What we will attempt in the following chapters is to find out who are 
the main actors and what kinds of resources they can use to realise their goals and how 
they utilize the institutions. In this sense, private sectors as non-state actors are becoming 
more and more important in numerous issue areas of world politics and the governance in 
a globalised world.  
 Today multilateral trade negotiations are facing great difficulty to proceed with 
trade liberalisation. Every WTO trade round faced delays and teetered on the edge of 
collapse and in some cases ended in dramatic failure.  Early members of the GATT were 
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developed countries, which tended to share a preference for lower tariffs for industrial 
products which they exported, and for higher tariffs for textiles and agricultural goods, 
which were produced more cheaply abroad. As a result, the international trade regime 
remained asymmetric, tolerating high subsidies and barriers to trade in agricultural goods. 
The Uruguay Round extended it to cover services, foreign direct investment, intellectual 
property rights, and more importantly it started to deal more intensively with trade 
liberalisation in agriculture. In the case of agriculture, represented by the formation of 
Carins Group, WTO members are divided on this issue area.  Our following chapters 
illustrate the point that when institutions are used for cooperation on multiple issues, 
gradually expanding membership may create a bias against deepening cooperation.
36
 
 Classical liberal trade theory suggests that international trade liberalisation should 
be considered as a public good that is easily provided because everyone's optimal strategy 
is to liberalise. If it is so, why are the WTO trade negotiations stalled, and why are some 
member countries adamantly against agricultural trade liberalisation? Our research will 
show that there is a clear gap between theory and practice.  As in the liberal trade theory, 
if trade liberalisation is a public good, why does the EU not abandon its market-distorting 
export subsidies, and why does Japan not open its rice market? What is behind the gap 
between the theory and practice is the increasing influence of private actors or social 
forces.  
 Some WTO members often face strong domestic lobbies in agriculture, textile, 
steel and other sectors, creating pressure for trade restrictions.  Given these political 
constraints, countries may be either unwilling or unable to sustain processes of economic 
liberalisation by themselves. While some countries continue to fully implement their 
market-opening commitments, others could slow or halt theirs. But their counterparts may 
find this unacceptable, and react by reneging on their own commitments.
37
  
 The importance of domestic actors and its influence upon multilateral trade 
negotiations has been neglected or given less attention, since the WTO is the organisation 
which dealt only with states (with exception of the EU).  However, as our empirical 
research will show, in today's complex trade negotiations, the role played by domestic 
actors is becoming increasingly important. 
  
2-4. Two-level approach 
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 A close observation of private sectors gives us the answer to the issue which the 
state centric approach did not address. In the case of the EU-Japan relationship, the EU 
countries and Japan share similar national interests in some trade issues. However, the 
question remains, who decides what the national interests are?   
 Since the WTO now covers a number of cumbersome trade issues, some trade 
issues have become very sensitive to the national interest of WTO member countries, 
because in some trade areas, domestic industries are politically influential and becoming 
increasingly vocal to shape the trade policy or 'national interest' of the state.  Negotiators, 
trade officials and politicians are not able to ignore the pressure from domestic industry. 
In this sense, the states' negotiation stances or trade policy are now deeply interwoven 
with the demand of various private actors.  
 Putnam pointed out the linkage between international negotiation and domestic 
consensus building.
38
 Putnam warns that unitary-actor assumption is often radically 
misleading, since the state-centric literature is an uncertain foundation for theorizing 
about how domestic and international politics interact.  He cites Robert Strauss's 
comment on trade negotiations during Tokyo Round: 
 
 "During my tenure as Special Trade Representative, I spent as much time 
negotiating with domestic constituents (both industry and labor) and members of the U.S. 
Congress as I did negotiating with our foreign trading partners"
39
 
  
 Unlike state-centric theories, Putnam's two-level approach recognises the 
inevitability of domestic conflict about what the ''national interest' requires. According to 
him, the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-
level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressing the 
government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.  
 In this sense, in order to predict the direction of the EU-Japan relationship, it 
would be very important to investigate their relations to private actors or various social 
forces from the two-level approach by focusing on the linkage between domestic and 
international negotiations. In today's world politics, interests of various actors or social 
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forces are interwoven. Adding to the difficulty of investigating each actor, in the case of 
the EU, research is required to look at policy coordination within the EU toward the WTO 
trade negotiations.  
 Putnam asserts that a preliminary Level 1 agreement (at a national level) cannot 
be amended at Level 2 (at the international level) without reopening the Level 1 
negotiations.
40
 This indicates, so long as the agricultural industry remains powerful and 
influential within the EU and Japan and their negotiations stances remain unchanged, we 
can predict that the EU and Japan somehow will maintain a positive relationship with 
each other. Based on this cooperation, the EU and Japan also may continue their joint 
effort to fight against US unilateralism. However, multilateral trade negotiations have 
been experiencing great difficulty in recent years. Many of the members casted doubt on 
multilateral trade negotiations and started to conclude bilateral trade agreements, 
represented by FTA, with specific trade partners. As agriculture remains the main obstacle 
in the WTO negotiations, it is necessary to investigate if the EU and Japan, as two of the 
biggest stakeholders on the issue, can cope with domestic voices and contribute to the 
progress in the WTO trade talks. Or will the politically influential agricultural industries 
within the EU and Japan still not allow their negotiators to make any concessions on the 
issue, even at the expense of collapse of multilateral trading system? Whether acting 
jointly or individually, the EU and Japan's position in the WTO heavily depends on the 
Level I agreement, which is the national level of discussion.  
 
2-5. New constitutionalism 
Now we look at the role of international organisations in connection with 
transnational corporations and international capital mobility, monetary and information 
flows and communications links. Transnational corporations lobby their parent 
governments in order to obtain policies favourable to their operations overseas; such 
lobbying also takes place with regard to host governments, as well as international 
organisations. However, in comparison with domestic networks, international networks 
generated between business, state officials, bureaucrats, and members of international 
organisations, have not been thoroughly researched or understood.
41
 
In his detailed analysis of the role of the Trilateral Commission, Stephen Gill has 
greatly contributed to the understanding of this process as part of the changing character 
of the US-centred hegemony in the global political economy and international governance 
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framework. Gill locates the global restructuring of production within a context of 
structural change in the 1970s, when there was a transition from an international historic 
bloc of social-class forces during the post-Second World War period towards a 
transnational historical bloc. This linked interests and identities beyond national 
boundaries and classes and created the conditions for the hegemony of transnational 
capital.  
Gill recognises the current transnational historical bloc as supremacy but not 
hegemony. The term “supremacy”, which implies the form of rule based on economic 
coercion, is used when a situation of hegemony is not apparent and when dominance is 
exercised through a historical bloc over split opposition.
42
 According to Gill, the politics 
of supremacy are organised through two key processes: the new constitutionalism of 
disciplinary neoliberalism and the spread of market civilisation based on market 
efficiency, discipline and confidence. 
New constitutionalism is an international governance framework, which 
separates economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make 
governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces but less responsive to 
democratic forces.
43
 Such a framework leads to a political and legal reconstruction of 
capital through the agency of a neo-liberal transnational historical bloc. This is a political 
integration of interests derived from various social classes and nations which co-ordinate 
national, regional and global dimensions of accumulation.
44
Thus, new constitutionalism is 
regarded as the move towards the construction of legal or constitutional devices to 
remove new economic institutions from democratic accountability.
45
  
The business and government leaders of different countries intend to establish 
the general conditions of the existence of the international order, although they do not 
share the interest on all issues. In order to establish such an international order, 
international organisations accept a framework of thought that serves the interests of 
capital and exerts influence and sometimes even pressure on national governments.
46
 
Due to the need of creating such general conditions for transnational business 
transactions, an international organisation needs to act in accord with the national 
government. Therefore, the role of the international organisation becomes more and more 
important. In the area of world trade, Gill‟s new constitutionalism gives a useful 
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perspective to the question of how the WTO has been playing a central role to provide 
general conditions for transnational capital.
47
  
 
3. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 examines the EU-Japan economic relationship inside and outside the 
GATT/WTO framework. The timeframe is set from 1952 when Japan applied for GATT 
membership to 1995 when the EU and Japan attempted to solve their first trade dispute in 
the WTO on Japan‟s liquor tax system through the WTO trade dispute settlement system. 
With this timeframe, the chapter analyses both confrontational and cooperative issues 
between the EU and Japan and examines how the establishment of the WTO influenced 
their bilateral trade relations and their relationship in the WTO today. 
 Chapter 3 examines the EU-Japan relationship on WTO agricultural trade 
negotiations.  As agricultural trade is one of the most important issues for the EU and 
Japan, the details of their individual positions and their differences are also going to be 
examined. The chapter also explains the EU and Japan‟s joint strategy on farm trade 
negotiations. As for the timeframe, the analysis is conducted from the GATT Uruguay 
Round (1985-1995), through the Seattle Ministerial Conference (30. November -3 
December 1999) and the Doha Ministerial Conference (9-13 November 2001) to the two-
day meeting between the five major farm traders (Australia, Canada, the EU, the US and 
Japan) held in Nara, Japan in July 2002. This timeframe enables us to see the 
development of the EU-Japan relationship and its effect on WTO agricultural trade 
negotiations.   
 Chapter 4 analyses the EU-Japan relationship on steel trade in the WTO. Their 
relationship on steel issues is, in the first place, framed by the increasing protectionism of 
the United States especially since 1997 to which the EU and Japan felt the need to reply 
with their lawsuits in the WTO Dispute Settlement System. Steel trade disputes had often 
been put to the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. Because the nature of the steel trade 
issue is relevant to the GATT/WTO, the chapter conducts separate investigations on each 
steel dispute in which the EU and Japan have taken part. The timeframe is set from 1997, 
when steel trade led to tensions between the EU, Japan and the US (concurrent with the 
outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997), until the end of 2003 when the WTO ruled 
against US safeguard measures on its steel imports. This timeframe allows us to 
investigate three different trade measures introduced by the US, and the EU-Japan 
relationship to these trade measures.   
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 Finally Chapter 5, the conclusion, is a brief summary of the findings in an attempt 
to assess the EU-Japan relationship before and after the establishment of the WTO, and 
the EU-Japan relationship on agricultural and steel trade issues. The findings of the 
research from each chapter will be analysed in relation to the hypotheses of chapter one. 
A final analysis will be made of the role of elite capitalist social forces from the EU and 
Japan in utilising the WTO to create capitalism to facilitate the common interests and a 
“new hegemony” of transnational capital.   
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The EU-Japan economic relationship inside and outside the 
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Introduction 
 It is broadly acknowledged that the EU and Japan have deepened their 
relationships on a variety of trade issues in the World Trade Organisation.
48
 This chapter  
analyses the relationship between the EU and Japan before the establishment of the WTO. 
This retrospective investigation will allow us to evaluate the growing role of multilateral 
trade negotiations in the EU-Japan trade relationship which was initially predominantly 
bilateral. In the first part of this chapter, I will give an overview of this initial period 
which was marked by many confrontational issues and bilateral dispute settlements.  
  In addition to each trade dispute between the EU and Japan, it will be observed, 
how various domestic social forces influence trade policy of each side. Having a close 
look at how governments and private sectors are interacting and shaping trade policies or 
negotiation stances in bilateral/multilateral trade negotiations is also the objective of this 
chapter.    
 
 
 
Part 1. Europe and Japan outside the GATT/WTO framework  
1.     Overview 
1-1. Japan‟s entry into the GATT and European opposition 
 Post-war relations between Europe and Japan started on the wrong foot as was 
clearly illustrated by Europe‟s negative attitude towards Japan‟s GATT membership. 
When Japan applied for GATT membership in 1952, it faced strong opposition from the 
United Kingdom and British Commonwealth countries such as Australia and South 
Africa.
49
 Other European countries were also concerned about a repetition of „Japan‟s 
pre-war dumping offensives of low-wage products, its pirating of intellectual property, the 
misleading information given about the origins, contents, or quality of its goods, and its 
export subsidies‟.50 These negative experiences made all European states rally against any 
concessions to Japan.
51
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US policy towards Japan made a striking contrast to the strong European 
resistance. The US allowed Japan almost unlimited access to its domestic market until the 
late 1960‟s and strongly promoted Japan‟s membership of international economic 
organizations such as the GATT and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). American motives were a mix of „Cold War concerns about 
building up Japan as the “workshop” and economic anchor of East Asia and the Pacific, 
and spreading the burden of tolerating Japanese neomercantilism‟.52  
The United States offered tariff concessions to the Europeans in exchange for 
their granting Japan Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status. MFN was the first article of 
the GATT which regulates that a country should not discriminate between its trading 
partners, and it should not discriminate between its own and foreign products.
53
 Although 
European states strongly insisted on their rejection of Japan‟s accession to GATT and 
MFN status, the United States succeeded in persuading two-thirds of GATT members to 
sign the treaty, and Japan became finally a GATT member in 1955.
54
 West Germany, the 
other vanquished nation, had already been allowed to enter the GATT in 1951,
55
 However, 
even after Japan became a GATT member, fourteen countries including European 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and later France, 
refused to extend MFN treatment to Japan. These countries invoked Article 35, which 
provided for the non-application of the GATT agreement between particular parties. 
Citing Article 35 of the GATT was the first discriminatory measure against Japan to be 
adopted by Western European countries after the war.
56
  
Among the European countries which originally rejected granting MFN status to 
Japan, Germany became the first to extend MFN status to Japan, although the German 
government acknowledged its action as risky.
57
 Japan resented its unfair treatment and 
demanded immediate change when a GATT meeting was held in Tokyo in 1959. However, 
it was only in 1962 that Britain finally abandoned this protection, and Article 35 was 
replaced by each country‟s own restrictions at the end of 1988.58 
 GATT membership was important symbolically as it showed that Japan had once 
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again become a member of the international community. It was also an important step in 
the broadening of Japan‟s export frontiers.59 However, European discriminatory attitudes 
towards Japan left a tense atmosphere in Euro-Japanese relations.
60
  
 
1-2. The economic rise of Japan and European concerns in the 1950s 
In 1955, when Japan was allowed to join the GATT, its exports accounted for 
only 2.4 per cent of total world exports, and its exports of industrial products amounted to 
just 4.2 per cent of total world trade of industrial products. This export share was much 
lower than in the 1930s. For example, in 1938, Japan‟s share was approximately 5.8 per 
cent in world exports. Japan‟s economy in the 1950s was still weak, and its Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita and wage level were much lower than those of the 
developed countries. Japan‟s exports were dependent on labour intensive products and its 
imports were predominantly industrial raw materials, fuel and foodstuff.  
On the other hand, several Japanese industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, 
expanded their capacity and increased rapidly their world share.
61
 For instance, the 
Japanese shipbuilding industry became number one in 1956 with 20 per cent of total 
world orders. High investment and improved industrial equipment enhanced the 
productivity of Japanese industries, and Japan‟s flexible industrial structure allowed to 
increase the export of manufactured goods.
62
  
 The country‟s lack of natural resources made it imperative for Japan to be heavily 
involved in international trade. To fuel a modern economy, Japan has always had to 
import large quantities of raw materials. To pay for these raw materials, it has similarly 
been compelled to export large quantities of manufactured goods.
63
 
At the same time, such a rapid recovery of Japanese industry from the defeat in 
the Second World War was increasing European concerns about Japanese trade policy. 
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European countries were concerned that Japanese exports of cheap products would 
swamp their domestic markets.  
Simultaneously, the GATT made a good start by aiming at lowering tariffs 
through multilateral negotiations. At first, GATT rounds of trade negotiations focused 
only on lowering tariffs on import goods in recognition that removing trade barriers was 
the most effective way to expand world trade. Negotiations produced excellent results and 
made industrial countries‟ tariff rates on manufactured products fall remarkably. Through 
the success of lowering tariffs under GATT leadership, the world economy had 
successfully expanded. By the 1960s, European economies were booming and Japanese 
exports benefited directly from the expanded European market. This experience made the 
Japanese conscious of the importance of the European market as Japan‟s export 
destination. In the 1960s, the EC countries and Japan started to deepen their involvement 
in international trade politics. In the 1960s, Japan became a member of the main industrial 
countries by joining the OECD and signing a number of treaties of commerce with 
European states.
64
 Simultaneously, the Japanese economy started to grow rapidly.  
 
1-3. Growing trade frictions since the1960s 
 International trade conflict appears often as the result of a change in the balance of 
economic power among nations.
65
 This theory applies also to Euro-Japanese economic 
relations in the 1960s. In the context of Japan‟s economic impact upon Europe, Europeans 
perceived Japan‟s economic success since the 1960s as a threat to their industries, not 
only in their domestic market but also in important third markets.
66
 
 Despite the wide range of discriminatory practices of GATT members, Japan‟s 
exports increased at a higher rate than that of the whole world. This implies that a 
majority of GATT member countries imported Japanese products in spite of 
discriminatory trade impediments.
67
 
 Under these circumstances, Europeans started to perceive Japan‟s exports as a 
threat during the second half of the 1960s when Japan‟s economy rapidly roared past 
those of Italy, Britain, France, and Germany, and Japanese products began outselling 
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those of their European rivals everywhere.
68
 In1965, Japan achieved a trade surplus with 
the United States. Since 1968, the EC had never had a trade surplus with Japan, while its 
deficit was steadily growing.
69
 As the trade surplus widened through the 1960s and 1970s, 
trade conflicts occurred more frequently.  
 Trade problems between Europe and Japan were further aggravated after the oil 
crises in 1973 and 1979.
70
 A massive rise in the price of oil and the cost of other raw 
materials forced Japan to export even more and triggered huge Japanese trade frictions 
with both the United States and Europe.
71
 The industries which particularly felt the 
impact of Japanese exports were textiles, shipbuilding, steel, automobiles, and electronic 
products which were sensitive sectors for European countries.
72
  
 After the two oil crises, Europeans blamed Japan more frequently for trade 
imbalances.
73
 When Japan‟s surplus with the EC reached 5 billion dollars in 1978, the 
Community called for substantial action to reduce the Japanese trade surplus.
74
 As for the 
balance of visible trade, relatively sound Japanese economic performance after the oil 
crisis was in striking contrast to the worsening economic situation in Europe. Europe 
regarded Japan‟s economic success as a consequence of its protectionist trade policies and 
practices.
75
 Such trade frictions, triggered by the oil crises, was the most urgent problem 
of Japanese trade policy in 1970s.
76
  
 
1-4. The trade imbalance between Europe and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s 
Their trade frictions continued in the 1980s.
77
 The Japanese export boost came at a 
moment, when world trade and economic growth had slowed down and European 
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countries were suffering from inflation and high unemployment rates.
78
 As their trade 
imbalance became politically sensitive, tension between Europe and Japan mounted. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, trade relations between the EC/EU and Japan had often 
been characterised by conflict and tension. The root of these trade conflicts must be seen 
in the persistent trade deficit which the EC/EU continued to have with Japan. The 
EC/EU‟s trade deficit with Japan increased remarkably in the 1980s and 1990s. The EC‟s 
trade deficit deteriorated by 42 per cent between 1986 and 1992. The EC‟s deficit with 
Japan was a major element in the EC‟s chronic trade deficit with the rest of the world, 
amounting in the 1990s on average to more than half of the EC/EU‟s overall external 
trade deficit.
79
  
The long-term structural trade imbalance between the EC and Japan was 
determined by Japan‟s export promoting and import reducing measures. In 1992, Japan 
belonged to the EC‟s five largest export markets; it had ranked only eleventh in 1980. 
Japan‟s propensity to import appeared to be low compared with European countries. In 
1990, for example, its per capita imports were significantly lower than those in the top 
four of the EC. While Germany, France, Britain and Italy had imports per head amounting 
to 4,460 dollars, 4,150 dollars, 3,890 dollars, and 3,160 dollars respectively, per capita 
imports in Japan were significantly lower with 1,900 dollars. Japan also compared 
unfavourably, when imports as a proportion of GDP are considered. In 1990, the 
merchandise imports to GDP ratio was 8 per cent in Japan. In the EC, on the other hand, 
merchandise imports (including intra-EC trade) amounted to 24 per cent in 1988. Since 
formal trade barriers, with the exception of agriculture, were low in Japan, Europeans 
considered that informal trade barriers must have played a part in bringing about such a 
comparatively low import propensity. 
Behind the EC-Japan trade imbalance were Euro-Japan structural differences in 
export/import relations. Japan‟s share of EC imports rose from a mere 1 per cent in 1958 
to 4 per cent in 1975 and reached 11 per cent in 1992. As an export market, Japan had 
been less significant for the EC. While Japan was, after the US, the largest import source 
for the EC, it ranked only fifth in 1992 as an export market after the US, Switzerland, 
Austria and Sweden although its share of EC exports had been increasing over the years.  
 In 1992, the EC provided 14 per cent of Japan‟s imports; the main non-EC 
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suppliers of Japan‟s imports were the US and China who met 23 and 7 per cent of Japan‟s 
import demand respectively. The US had been by far the largest external market for Japan 
where some 28 per cent of all Japanese exports went. The EC represented the second 
largest export market for Japan with nearly one fifth of all its exports being sold in the 
European domestic market in 1992.
80
  
 The trade relationship between the EC and Japan was, in quantitative terms, fairly 
interdependent. But Japan appeared to be relying more on Europe for both its exports and 
imports; the EC, on the other hand, seemed to need Japan for meeting its import demand 
but had so far not been able to direct a sizeable proportion of its total external exports to 
reach Japanese customers.
81
 
 
2. The main complaints of each side and their respective countermeasures 
 The cause of the trade imbalance was perceived differently in Europe and Japan. 
Europe, which was affected more negatively by the trade imbalance, argued that the 
Japanese were responsible for creating the trade imbalance. Europe pointed out two main 
factors which it believed resulted in a European disadvantage in trade with Japan. Japan, 
on the other hand, refused to accept these arguments. Mutual recriminations were 
followed by a number of retaliatory countermeasures.  
 
2-1. European perception of Japanese unfairness – 1.) Closed nature of Japan‟s market 
 Interventionist Japanese policies were seen as a major factor behind the success of 
key sectors, such as automobiles and electronics.
82
 Policies to protect and promote infant 
industries may be justified for a developing country, and thus were acceptable for Japan 
in the 1950s and 1960s.
83
 
 However, in the late 1960s, Japan‟s balance of payments began to turn positive.84 
After this period, Japan‟s trade partners strongly requested the removal of the remaining 
                                                 
80 About Japanese exports to the EC, see: Jean Macron, „Japanese Export to the EC‟ in 
European Economic Studies, „Euro Cooperation‟, (The „Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P49-
65 
81 Klaus Heidensohn, „Europe and World Trade‟, (London, Pinter, 1995) P108, 109 
82 On Japan‟s industrial promotion in the automobile sector, see: Hiromichi Mutoh, „The 
Automotive Industry‟, in Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno and Kotaro Suzumura (eds), 
„Industrial Policy of Japan‟, (Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 1988), P307-331 
83 Yoko Sazanami, Shujiro Urata and Hiroki Kawai, „Measuring the costs of protection in 
Japan‟, (Washigton DC, Institute for International Economics, 1995) P1-3 
84 Ryutaro Komiya and Motoshige Itoh, „Japan‟s international trade and trade policy, 
1955-1984‟, in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds), „The Political Economy of 
Japan Volume2‟, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988), P190 
42 
 
import quotas and reduction of tariff and NTBs.
85
 Broadly speaking, two types of 
measures, tariffs and non-tariff measures protected domestic producers in Japan. Different 
types of restrictions were applied to different sectors.
86
 
 Japan reduced tariff rates after the conclusion of the Kennedy Round (1964-1967). 
With the intention of reducing the trade surplus, in 1972, Japan reduced tariff rates on all 
(with few exceptions) processed agricultural products, manufactures, and mining products 
by 20 per cent. As a result, Japanese tariff rates were reduced substantially, and the 
tendency toward tariff escalation was mitigated.  
 As compared with other industrial countries, Japanese tariff rates were as high as 
the United States, the UK and the EC before the start of the Kennedy Round. They 
declined however more than any other country‟s rates between 1968 and 1975, especially 
between 1973 to 1975. Finally, they decreased to a level lower than those of the United 
States, the EC and the UK by the middle of the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the major 
trading partners generally agreed that Japanese tariff rates were reduced to the lowest 
level among major industrial countries.
87
  
 While Japan‟s import tariffs had been declining, Europe argued that Japanese 
import tariffs were merely replaced by complex NTBs.
88
 Since becoming a GATT 
member and until the beginning of the 1980s, the Japanese had repeated their claim that 
there were no serious trade barriers impeding foreign products in Japan. It was argued by 
William R. Nester that the essence of Japanese neo-mercantilism was the targeting of 
strategic industries for development by protecting them from competitive imports and 
assisting their conquest of the global market.
89
  
 Facing European criticism since the end of the 1960s, Japan had pursued policies 
of reducing NTBs in an attempt to promote imports.
90
 In 1982, when the Japanese 
government for the first time officially acknowledged the existence of NTBs,
91
 it started 
to review the rules regarding import procedures, standards, and testing which had been 
subject to foreign criticism.
92
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 In relation to the NTBs, Japan‟s ‘Keiretsu’ system became a particular target of 
criticism from foreign exporters. Keiretsu are the industrial conglomerates which are 
related through cross shareholding and exchanging goods and services within the same 
group. A major Keiretsu traditionally had three sectors: production, distribution and 
capital. Keiretsu created a peculiar distribution system. Keiretsu tended to purchase 
within the group, even if the products were more expensive or of inferior quality. Keiretsu 
transactions within the group generally accounted for 30 percent of total transactions 
which were made by Keiretsu. The big nine trading firms which accounted for over half 
of Japanese import and export were particularly notorious for their discriminatory 
purchasing practices.
93
 Foreign exporters vigorously criticized this Japanese peculiar 
distribution system as a NTB for foreign products.
94
 
 There were two main effects of the Keiretsu system; first as a barrier to imports, 
second as stimulation for innovation. In the absence of imports, Japan was a test market 
for Japanese firms (where also reduction of prices as a result of economies of scale could 
be achieved) which subsequently exported the tested products at competitive prices to the 
rest of the world.
95
 
 
2-2. European perception of Japanese unfairness – 2.) Japan‟s export strategy 
 Critics of Japanese trade policy contended that, by insulating domestic industries 
from foreign competition, and by providing them with a platform from which to export 
aggressively, the Japanese government enabled domestic firms to gain valuable ground in 
the global race for industrial leadership.
96
 
 From the 1950s until the late 1960s, the Japanese trade policy strategy consisted 
of the promotion of exports.
97
 This was done through subsidies, provision of low-interest 
loans for promising export industries, preferential tax treatment of income from exports 
and exploration of new export markets. Such governmental measures resulted in low 
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costs and strong incentives for export industries.
98
  
 Foreign competitors had frequently accused the Japanese government of 
artificially stimulating exports. The main attack was on government export promotion and 
market expansion programmes, official export financing and tax policies. Western trade 
interests argued that such programmes, by increasing the competitiveness of Japanese 
exports, had hampered the export prospects of US and EC products. It was pointed out by 
Radha Sinha that the Japanese export stimulation programmes were well organised but, 
on the other hand, Japan was not the only country with such programmes. All the major 
competitors (the US, West Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Canada) had similar 
programmes. In fact, the UK, France and Italy had more rigorous programmes than those 
of Japan.
99
 
 It was argued that the real problem was the fact that Japan‟s exports destroyed key 
European industries. Peter J. Katzenstein pointed out that Switzerland, the EC‟s biggest 
trade partner, maintained a more balanced trade, while the EC‟s trade relations with Japan 
was almost always confrontational. He argued that Japan adopted a strategy that aimed at 
the domination of global markets, while Switzerland searched out profitable market 
niches for selling high quality, customized products.
100
 The fact that not only the EC, but 
also the majority of Japan‟s trading partners had a deficit with Japan, led to the 
assumption that the problem might lie with the Japanese side, not merely with the lack of 
the EC‟s competitiveness.101 
 An even more serious factor for the EC was the fact that Japan had been 
particularly successful in exporting „sensitive‟ products such as motor vehicles and 
consumer electronic equipment. Japan‟s increasing import penetration of EC markets and 
its low level of intra-industry trade had, not surprisingly, led Europeans to suspect 
Japanese „dumping‟ of industrial products on EC markets while at the same time 
restricting access to their own markets.
102
 
 Masamichi Hanabusa argued that because Japanese exports were concentrated in 
terms of sectors and countries, their impact was felt all the more strongly by specific 
industrial sectors or specific importing countries in Western Europe. In fact, in the 1970s, 
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60-70 per cent of Japan‟s total export to EC markets was machinery and equipment and 
about half of these exports consisted of five items, namely TV, radio receivers, tape 
recorders, automobiles and ships. Hanabusa pointed out that in the case of the exports of 
the EC member countries and the United States, such concentration was not apparent.
103
  
 Facing the concentration of Japan‟s exports, national governments, as well as the 
Community, were obliged to protect their interests. Exports concentrated in specific 
industrial sectors strengthen protectionist tendencies in the importing country. According 
to Hanabusa, it was often one industrial sector that had suddenly been placed under strong 
competitive pressure from actual or prospective concentrated exports coming from 
outside Western Europe that spearheaded protectionist campaigns. The active campaign 
against Japanese exports to EC markets in 1976 was believed to have been closely 
connected with the depressed state of the shipbuilding industries in EC countries. Fast-
expanding Japanese automobile exports to the British market were an important element 
underlying trade tension between Japan and Britain in 1976-77.  
 It was evident that this problem of concentration of Japan‟s exports on certain 
specific products had contributed significantly to the sour atmosphere concerning 
Japanese imports in various Western European countries. The resentment of threatened 
industries was often psychologically aggravated by the fact that many of them felt they 
had never had a chance to build up a market share in Japan in the 1960s while they were 
licensing technology to Japanese firms. It was often pointed out that in order to avoid 
further trade conflicts with Western Europe, it was crucial for Japanese exporters to avoid 
concentration on specific exports, once the Japanese share of the market for these 
products had reached a high level. Japan needed to spread the impact of their exports over 
a greater diversity of products.
104
 
 
2-3. Japan‟s perception of European unfairness – 3.) Japan as a scapegoat 
 Facing European criticism, most Japanese were convinced that they were made 
scapegoats for Europe‟s own internal economic problems.105 In 1977, the Vice Minister of 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Masuda Minoru stated: 
„Europeans find it politically convenient to blame Japan for their recession and 
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unemployment problems…‟106  
 In early 1981, the French government said that each Japanese car imported created 
five unemployed.
107
 This comment was followed by the blocking of Japanese cars at Le 
Harve. However, Japanese cars represented hardly 3% of the total French market, as 
compared with a share of over 25% for other imported cars. The Japanese car industry 
concluded that the French accusation was made due to the approaching presidential 
campaign. 
 The Japanese pointed out the fact that imports from Japan accounted for only 
4.6% of the Community‟s total imports from the non-EC area, while imports from the 
Community accounted for 5.6% of Japan‟s total imports in 1980.108 Japan argued that the 
Japanese market was also more open than the European one in terms of tariff rates and 
quotas. Japan argued that the troublesome trade surplus was not the result of exotic NTBs 
of a conspiratorial character, but the product of Japanese technology, efficiency and 
marketing.
109
 
 The struggle of European firms to penetrate the Japanese market resulted in the 
EC‟s concept of „balance of power‟. Mounting trade tensions drove the EC since the mid-
1980‟s to seek „reciprocity‟ in its trade relationship with Japan, which became „a guiding 
EC principle‟. In September 1986, the European Commissioner for External Relations, 
Willy De Clerq made the following comment regarding „reciprocity‟ at the GATT 
Uruguay Round: “The Community feels that many of the present tensions affecting world 
trade find their origin in the fact that concessions negotiated between the various 
contracting parties have in reality not resulted in effective reciprocity. It is therefore 
essential that the Ministerial Declaration should establish the objective of achieving a 
genuine balance in the benefits accruing to contracting parties from the GATT”.110 
 The EC sought to put „reciprocity‟ as „a condition of access to the newly 
integrated markets in service, investment, government procurement and other areas not 
covered by GATT‟. The Japanese government reiterated that the Japanese market was the 
most open in the world and vehemently protested against the EC‟s concept of 
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„reciprocity‟. Japan regarded the EC‟s call for „reciprocity‟ as „Japan-bashing‟.  
Japan also disagreed with the EC‟s view of Japan‟s alleged protectionism. On 
tariffs, EC tariff protection was higher than in the US and Japan, even including the full 
implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments. NTBs, such as variable levies in 
agriculture, VERs in industrial sectors (e.g., those imposed by the Multi Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) in textiles and clothing or by the EC car agreement in Japan), quotas on imports 
from centrally planned economies, anti-dumping measures and technical barriers to trade 
have played a significant role in protecting the EC market.
111
 
 
2-4. European countermeasures - Anti-dumping duties 
Japan‟s increasing import penetration of EC markets resulted in European 
suspicion that the Japanese were „dumping‟ industrial products on EC markets. Usually, 
manufacturers who sell off products below cost in foreign markets, do so on a very 
limited scale to shift marginal production or old stock. However, Japanese export 
strategies differed from such cases. The Japanese perceived that reducing the price in 
foreign markets was a useful strategy to obtain market shares. Japanese products sold 
below cost drove European counterparts out of the market. This aggressive Japanese 
export strategy gave the EC no other alternative than to impose regulations against 
Japanese dumping.  
 The EC‟s Anti-Dumping Regulation stated that a product was considered to have 
been dumped if its export price to the Community was less than the „normal value‟ of the 
product in its domestic market.
112
 If the EC came to the conclusion of a dumping act by 
its trade partners, the „dumping margin‟, calculated by the price difference, might be 
imposed on the imported product. In the past, such EC anti-dumping measures were 
aimed at low-value added goods and semi-finished products from developing countries. 
In the 1980s, however, the EC‟s use of anti-dumping allegations was also directed to 
high-value added goods, mainly the products imported from Japan. Between 1980 and 
1982, there were only 8 cases in which the EC conducted anti-dumping investigations 
against Japan and other newly industrialised Asian countries. Between 1986 and 1988, the 
number of cases rose to thirty. The rise of the EC‟s anti-dumping investigations reflected 
Japan‟s success in consumer electronics and information technology industries. The EC‟s 
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anti-dumping investigations affected a wide range of products, such as video recorders, 
videotapes, electronic typewriters, colour televisions, CD players, photocopiers, computer 
printers, mobile telephones and microwave ovens. The EC came to use its anti-dumping 
measures more frequently than any other countries. Between 1981 and 1987, more than 
281 investigations were concluded. Although only a quarter of those resulted in imposing 
anti-dumping duties, half led to „the acceptance of special undertakings by which 
importers agreed to raise their prices‟. Besides, many of these cases resulted in VERs.  
 In addition to the material impact of anti-dumping regulations, the EC began to 
use it as a threat for seeking confidential import restrictions. In 1989, when the EC 
claimed that Japanese semiconductor makers had been selling microchips at a loss since 
the mid-1980s, the EC threatened Japan effectively with anti-dumping duties. Japanese 
chipmakers yielded to its threat and concluded a price maintenance agreement with the 
EC.  
The unfair nature of the EC‟s anti-dumping regulations was pointed out by 
several independent bodies. The GATT also recognised the misuse of anti-dumping duties 
by some countries, and urged member countries to follow the GATT anti-dumping code. 
However, the GATT anti-dumping code was so vague that the EC anti-dumping law could 
still be used.  
 Unlike „Super 301‟ of the United States for cases of unfair competition, the EC 
did not possess effective countermeasures except its anti-dumping duties. A GATT trade 
panel in the 1990s ruled against the EC‟s use of anti-dumping measures, but the EC 
regulations were only reluctantly amended, while the EC continued to „argue for a 
retention of significant discretionary powers for contracting parties‟.113 
   
2-5. European countermeasures - Voluntary Export Restraints 
 Facing the deterioration of their trade imbalance, governments also tend to use 
VERs and Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs). Both measures restrict exports with 
quotas instead of tariffs. Governments made use of managed trade in an attempt to 
prevent trade disputes from escalating into full-fledged trade war.
114
 
 The tension between Europe and Japan over Japan‟s trade surplus led to some 
jointly agreed trade policies which added elements of „managed trade‟ to Euro-Japan 
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trade relations. Facing the inadequacy of GATT rules, the EC and Japan sought a bilateral 
settlement of their trade disputes. When the Japanese export surplus became an even more 
serious problem, Japan accepted a number of VERs with its European trade partners. The 
subjects of VERs were textiles and colour televisions in the 1960s, steel and shipbuilding 
in the 1970s, and cars and electronics in the 1980s.
115
 Japan accepted such VERs in order 
to avoid more severe European bilateral measures towards Japanese exports and to 
prevent trade conflicts from developing into a highly political conflict with the EC. 
 William R. Nester argued that VERs were beneficial to both foreign and domestic 
firms.
116
 While domestic firms were protected from a flood of import products, exporters 
were guaranteed a certain market share. Nester explained Japanese tactics with VERs as 
follows: Firstly, the Japanese start with sustained dumping attacks in strategic industries, 
such as automobiles, semiconductors or microelectronics. After a large market share is 
achieved and the foreign government threatens to retaliate, the Japanese sit down at the 
table for negotiation. Once VERs are agreed, under the secured market share, Japanese 
firms can raise the prices in order to compensate their previous losses in the dumping 
campaign. With its „trade brinkmanship‟, Japanese firms enjoyed both market share and 
profits. 
 
2-6. Japanese countermeasures - Foreign Direct Investment 
In the middle of the 1980s, in an attempt to circumvent anti-dumping duties, the 
Japanese increasingly started to invest in the EC which had so far not received any 
substantial Japanese investment. Until 1969, the Bank of Japan controlled outward capital 
flows and only allowed overseas investment in case they were considered essential to 
Japan‟s national economy. 117  Therefore, Japanese investments were merely orientated 
towards raw material procurement. In the early 1970s, production in Japan became more 
expensive: cost of land, labour and raw materials increased. Fuel prices, rising costs for 
shipping and in addition the upward float of the yen worked against production in Japan. 
To avoid these costs, and to circumvent tariff or quota barriers, and in order to secure 
export markets better, Japanese companies hesitantly started manufacturing investment in 
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Europe.  
During the 1980s, global increase of investment flow occurred among all major 
economic powers. Above all, Japanese FDI recorded a sevenfold increase during the 
decade. The massive outflow of Japanese FDI from the mid-1980s was encouraged by the 
„high yen‟. The strength of the yen enabled Japanese firms to invest more vigorously in 
the EC whereas the cost of investment had been too high in previous years.
118
 Without the 
great appreciation of the yen, Japanese investment into the EC would neither have been 
possible nor profitable. Although the major area of Japanese FDI was mainly in financial 
services, the manufacturing sector also attracted increasing FDI from Japanese investors.  
In the 1980s, Japanese and Europeans suggested joint research projects and 
building Japanese factories in Europe in an attempt to mitigate their trade frictions.
119
 The 
European governments reacted positively to Japanese FDI and facilitated the inflow of 
Japanese capital. Instead of leaving decisions to industrialists, some of the European 
national and local governments became significantly involved in encouraging Japanese 
FDI to their regions. The positive European reaction was due to the intention of 
revitalising local economies which were facing an industrial downturn. Although 
European high labour costs were not encouraging Japanese investment, Japanese factories 
gradually increased in Europe. In the mid-1980s, Japanese firms began to invest in 
Europe vigorously to safeguard and expand their gains from their earlier offensive trade 
approaches.  
More substantial Japanese FDI began in 1988. Japanese FDI into the EC steadily 
increased, recording over 14 billion dollars in Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 from 2 billion 
dollars in 1985. In FY 1990, Japanese FDI into the EC dropped slightly to 13.3 billion 
dollars, and more remarkably in the next FY marking 8.8 billion dollars. A series of 
decreased flows was due to the slowed economic growth in Europe and the „bubble‟ of 
assets increasing from 260 million dollars in FY 1987 to 1.1 billion dollars in FY 1991. 
The EC‟s FDI into Japan increased also by around 20 per cent per annum in the late 
1980s.
120
 
The rapid increase of Japanese FDI into the EC was also driven by business 
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opportunities and anxiety about the potentially exclusive effects of „Fortress Europe‟. The 
Japanese tried to entangle Europe with investments which were meant to breach any new 
tariff walls of „Fortress Europe‟ after 1992.121 In addition, the establishment of the so-
called screwdriver assembly plants in the European market circumvented anti-dumping 
duties.
122
  
The EC‟s frustration with some aspects of Japan‟s FDI was enhanced by the fact 
that European direct investment in Japan remained relatively small in contrast to Japanese 
FDI in Europe.
123
 The imbalance in investment paralleled the trade imbalance and raised 
yet again European criticism of the closed nature of the Japanese market.
124
  From 
1951 to 1988, Japan invested 30.164 billion dollars, 16.2 per cent of its total FDI, in the 
EC, while EC members spent only 3.013 billion dollars, which was 23.6 per cent of its 
total in Japan.
125
 Thus, Japanese investments reinforced gains made through exports. In 
March 1990, Japanese investments into the EC reached 42 billion dollars. Japanese 
investment concentrated in Britain with 37.6 per cent of total FDI in the EC. Holland 
received 24.0 per cent of Japanese investment, followed by Luxemburg with 12.8 per cent, 
Germany with 8.2 per cent, France with 6.9 per cent, Spain with 3.7 per cent, and 
Belgium with 3.2 per cent. 3.6 per cent of Japanese FDI was directed to other member 
countries. In 1991, Japanese investment concentrated on Britain and France with 187 and 
122 factories, respectively. Despite this rapid increase of Japanese investment into the EC, 
they constituted merely one quarter of the 164 billion dollars of American investment into 
the EC.  
 France, which had been most critical of the trade imbalance with Japan, 
attracted an increasing amount of Japanese FDI because various French regulations 
encouraged Japanese firms to invest in the country in order to avoid trade barriers. 
Another reason to diversify FDI across Europe was to mitigate criticism that Japan was 
using Britain as a Trojan Horse to enter the EC. Japanese investment revitalised many 
depressed regions in the Community. Hence, it was difficult for the EC to integrate 
member countries‟ different opinions into a common policy towards Japanese investment.  
Without FDI, Euro-Japan relations may not have improved as much as they have 
since the beginning of the 1990s. They helped to overcome a European inclination 
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towards protectionism and established a favourable climate with local communities.
126
 As 
a result the Japanese succeeded in entangling trade partners in a network of trade, 
investment, finance, and technology which also created a degree of political dependence. 
Under this Japanese strategy, trade partners were not able to retaliate, because retaliation 
might hurt themselves.
127
 
 
3. Case illustration of „Euro-Japanese bilateral trade resolution‟ - VERs on automobiles  
Euro-Japanese trade confrontation and subsequent retaliatory countermeasures 
can be clearly seen in the EC-Japan automobile trade dispute. This case represents many 
of the above analysed characteristics which aggravated Euro-Japan trade relations. 
Furthermore, this case shows several factors which hindered Euro-Japan cooperation in a 
multilateral context.  
Japanese car imports had been a sore point in EC-Japan relations since the end of 
the 1970s, which led to MITI monitoring since 1986 and finally resulted in a EC-Japan 
agreement in July 1991.
128
 The 1991 agreement called for the liberalisation of the 
European car market from the end of 1999.
129
Under the terms of a 1991 'understanding' 
between the EC and Japan, they agreed informal annual limits on the export of cars and 
light commercial vehicles to the EC to allow the Community to gradually open its market 
to full competition.
130
 The automobile dispute symbolised the troubled trade relations 
between the EC and Japan in the 1980s and exemplified their inclination for a bilateral 
dispute settlement in the pre-WTO era. 
 The automobile industry in Europe is the leading industrial sector contributing 
significantly to employment and the value added in EC manufacturing. By the 1970s, as 
the global economic prosperity began to falter, trade in cars began to grow. Japan, whose 
production was rising rapidly, exported a growing proportion of that production, from 30 
per cent of its output in 1971 to about 55 per cent by the early 1980s. Most of these 
exports reached the United States but a small number went to Western Europe.  
 By the late 1970s, the energy crisis affected the sale of „gas guzzlers‟ in the United 
States. Consumers switched to smaller, more economical cars. The market share of 
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Japanese-made cars rose from 12 to 21 per cent between 1978 and 1980. The powerful 
automobile lobby in Europe fought very hard to hang on to its privileged conditions while 
the manufacturers from Japan tried very hard to penetrate this market further through 
exports, local production and strategic alliances.  
 Traditionally, Europe has not had an open market for automobiles. This is partially 
because many European automotive firms were either government owned or government 
dominated. With regards to production, European producers do not have the global links 
of their US and Japanese competitors. Several European firms retreated from global 
markets while the Japanese firms advanced.
131
  
 
3-1. The completion of the Single European Market and the automobile import surge 
from Japan 
 At least until 1993 when the SEM was completed, the „European market‟ was 
composed of twelve individual markets. There were national imports restrictions imposed 
by any of the twelve member countries against goods from outside of the EC. This was 
possible because EC countries were allowed to keep the GATT-acceptable import 
restrictions they had established before they joined the Community. The most famous of 
these was the quota system which allowed Italy to impose a quota on Japanese cars from 
the 1950s onwards, in retaliation for the import limits that Tokyo - worried about 
competition from Europe - had first imposed on Italian cars. Spain and Portugal also had 
Japanese car import quotas which they acquired before they entered the EC. By contrast, 
France had no legal recourse in Brussels. Instead, it exploited the fact that there were 
differing technical standards for cars in the Community to keep the Japanese share of the 
French market low.
132
 
Highly protectionist countries, such as France and Italy, imposed quantitative 
controls on Japanese car imports. France allocated Japan a quota of 3 per cent of its 
market (85,000 units in 1991), whereas the Italian government admitted only 13,000 units 
in 1991, including those distributed via other member states. Britain set a ceiling of 11 per 
cent for Japan‟s market share. Countries without indigenous car manufacturers, such as 
Denmark, Greece and Ireland, assumed a more liberal trade stance, allowing the free 
inflow of Japanese-made automobiles. In contrast to these two groups, Germany did not 
have any formal barriers, but managed to keep the market share for Japanese cars at 
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around 15 per cent, much lower than shares in Denmark, Ireland and other non-restricted 
markets. Some believed a „gentlemen‟s agreement‟ allowed for a stable share of Japanese 
cars in the German market as well as in Belgium and the Netherlands, although Japanese 
manufacturers denied this and attributed the relatively smaller Japanese presence in the 
German market to the strength of German manufacturers.
133
 
There were requests from some member governments to stop non-EC goods 
coming into their national markets from other EC states. Such national import restrictions 
offended the single Community market idea, because they interrupted the free circulation 
of goods. It was the official dogma of the European Commission that such restrictions 
had to go by January 1, 1993. After that date, there were supposed to be no more customs 
posts between EC states, and therefore no systematic way of keeping tabs on intra-EC 
trade. However, some governments, such as Spain, France and Italy would ask Brussels to 
impose a temporary cordon, if any sensitive sector of their industry was hit by imports 
from outside the EC.
134
 
Since 1987, when the Commission started getting serious about trying to phase 
out Article 115 protection altogether, there had been a fall-off in government requests to 
Brussels for permission to close their borders to non-EC goods circulating in the rest of 
the Community. The Commission had been rejecting a rising percentage of these requests. 
For example, the EC executive had been steadily enlarging the Italian market share for 
Japanese cars. Italy's quota allowed the direct import of only 2,800 passenger cars and 
800 all-terrain vehicles a year from Japan. But the Commission used the Article 115 
procedure to steadily increase the number of Japanese cars coming into Italy from other 
EC countries – from 10,000 in 1989, 17,000 in 1990 and 22,000 in 1991. In addition, 
since 1987, Brussels had refused to let Italy put any block on indirect imports of Japanese 
jeeps.
135
 
The SEM forced those countries with protectionist policies to face freer 
competition from Japanese manufacturers, along with tougher competition from other 
European manufacturers. At the same time, the Single Market motivated Japanese 
automobile producers to invest in production facilities within the EC.
136
 The potential 
profits from the emerging single market lured the Japanese car makers into Europe, an 
attraction enhanced by their fear of the creation of a „Fortress Europe‟ that would 
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discriminate against foreign products and prevent Japan from benefiting from an expected 
market expansion. As a result of the SEM, national quotas for Japanese car imports 
became anachronistic, as cars could enter freely via member states not having import 
restrictions.  
However, member states had not yet agreed how to treat these 'transplant' cars 
under the new Community-wide quota on Japanese car sales to Europe, due to come into 
force after 1992. In 1991, EC member countries were also divided on how Japanese cars 
made in the US should be treated, when they came into the European market. In January 
1991, the UK claimed that Japanese cars built in the US had to be admitted freely into EC 
markets, because their place of origin put them outside the existing quotas on Japanese 
cars. The British government claimed that it would be illegal for the EC to restrict imports 
of the Ohio-made Honda which the company was due to start selling in Europe in spring 
1991.
137
 
Behind the British claim was a sharp division between EC member countries on 
how to deal with transplant cars, as well as a British desire to reinforce the strength of 
Britain's already firm position in UK-made Nissans. Free access for US-made Hondas 
would undermine the objections from the French and others to Britain's claim that there 
should be no European restrictions on UK-made Nissans, thus weakening efforts to limit 
Japanese access to the single market for European-built cars after 1992. The UK insisted 
that international rules defining origin as the place of 'last substantial transformation' 
would apply, making the cars incontrovertibly American. Therefore, under the rules, there 
would be no legal possibility for the Community to restrict their shipments. 
Japan joined the UK to criticise the EC‟s rigid attitude towards Japanese cars 
from transplant factories. In July 1991, Japan tried to forge a free-trade alliance with the 
US, Canada and Britain against continental Europe at the G7 summit in London. The 
Japanese government was deeply disturbed by moves in the EC to limit access to 
continental markets of products made by British subsidiaries of Japanese companies.
138
 
Japanese car imports and local Japanese car production in Europe remained the 
most sensitive outstanding problem to be resolved in the creation of the SEM from the 
end of 1992.
139
 Japanese manufacturers had since 1979 increased their capacity by 7 
million units world-wide and were planning to add capacity of another 2 million units a 
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year by the mid-1990s. Lindsey Halstead, chairman of Ford of Europe concluded that the 
Japanese would be the first beneficiary of a SEM.
140
 
 
3-2. EC-Japan agreement on VERs 
 In an effort to prevent the Euro-Japan relationship from deteriorating, Japan 
decided to conclude a bilateral agreement with the EC on Japanese car exports. In April 
1993, after months of wrangling, Japan agreed with the EC to reduce its car exports by 
9.4 per cent on the basis of forecasts that the EC market would decline by 6.5 per cent to 
around 13 million units in 1993. In 1993, new car sales in Western Europe as a whole 
were already down 17.2 per cent between January and June and, in its forecast, the 
European Automobile Manufacturers' Association predicted that demand would be 
decreasing even further. According to the association, without further reductions, Japan's 
market share would rise to substantially more than the 13 per cent in 1993, compared with 
less than 11 per cent in 1992. The European Commission asked the Japanese delegation to 
reduce the 1.09 million exports envisaged for 1993 in the 'understanding' of governing 
access to the EC market during the Community's transition to an open market in new cars 
by 1999.
141
 
Despite the bilateral agreement, the European car market had declined more than 
expected. In July 1993, the EC asked Japan for a change in its export ceiling, as the 
market was to show a 'substantial deviation' from forecasts. The Japanese government 
claimed that, while Japan recognised the fall in demand in the EC car market, revising a 
formally agreed quota after only three months would undermine the credibility of the 
bilateral agreement. Robert Verrue, chief EC delegate to the talks, admitted that due to the 
bilateral agreement in April, Japanese car exports to the Community had fallen sharply in 
the April-June period by about 30 per cent. However, the decline of new car sales in the 
EC had proved much steeper than expected. 
In August 1993, European Commission officials flew to Tokyo to persuade Japan 
to improve on the commitment made in April and to discuss the scale of further cuts.
142
A 
few weeks later, the Commission and Tokyo reached an agreement on cutting Japanese 
shipments of cars and light commercial vehicles to the EC by 17.6 per cent, to 980,000 in 
1993, compared with an earlier limit of 1.089 million set in April.
143
 This meant a cut of 
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Japanese car sales in the EC by about 100,000 in 1993, while the market would shrink by 
a total of at least 2.4 million.  
While welcoming the effort by both sides to adjust their market forecasts, 
European carmakers remained dissatisfied with the agreement regarding the level of the 
cut. Jacques Calvet, chairman of Peugeot Citroen most vehemently criticised the 
agreement as 'unacceptable and suicidal for the European car industry.'
144
 Other European 
car industry leaders also attacked the new car trade deal between the EC and Japan, 
saying it was unacceptable for Tokyo to boost its market share during the EC sector's 
worst decline since the Second World War. The board of directors of the European 
Automobile Manufacturers Association claimed that the deal meant the possible increase 
of Japan‟s EC market share (forecasted to be at least 12.5 per cent in 1993, up from 11.3 
per cent in 1992), and that it would run counter to a 1991 EC-Japan agreement limiting 
Japanese car exports to the EC.
145
 
Responding to European dissatisfaction, Japan decided to make a further 
concession. In March 1994, Japan's MITI agreed to restrict the rise in car exports to the 
EU to 0.4 per cent in 1994, reducing Japanese car industry hopes for an export-led 
recovery.
146
However in the first eight months of 1994, new car sales in the EU rose by an 
estimated 5.9 per cent to 7.911 million according to the figures from the European 
Automobile Manufacturers Association. Japan started to seek a bigger quota for car and 
light commercial vehicle exports to the EU because this higher than expected demand in 
Europe.
147
Following the sharp fluctuations of European car market growth, the EU and 
Japan held a number of meetings to adjust their agreement made in April 1993 to the 
actual situation.  
 
3-3. European concerns about US unilateral pressure on Japan 
While the EU and Japan were conducting successive rounds of negotiations on 
the Japanese car export quota, Japan was under strong US pressure to set numerical 
targets for purchases of US vehicle parts by Japanese carmakers.
148
 The US was aiming at 
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opening Japan's market to foreign cars and car parts.
149
 The US Administration had 
committed itself to reducing the budget deficit and increasing national savings and US 
competitiveness, while Japan promised to achieve a significant reduction in its trade 
surplus with the US, as well as a significant increase in import penetration.
150
 Europeans 
expressed clear dissatisfaction with US pressure on Japan for a result-oriented approach. 
Concerns expressed by the EU gave ground to Japan for rejecting US demands for 
numerical targets. Moreover, MITI was attempting to shift domestic public opinion 
against these targets. This Japanese strategy was effective in drumming up criticism of the 
US policy, not only in Japan but also overseas.
151
 
Frustrated with Japan‟s resistance, the US threatened to impose trade sanctions in 
retaliation for failure to meet US demands to open Japan‟s markets for cars and car 
imports. The Japanese government claimed that its market was already open and 
threatened to retaliate by taking the US to the WTO over the issue. While rebuffing US 
demands leading to managed-trade, Japan offered the US a number of measures aimed at 
encouraging car imports into Japanese market. In May 1995, Japan proposed to raise the 
amount of tax benefits available to wholesalers and retailers of imported manufactured 
goods, including cars, and to the sales subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers. US and 
Japanese carmakers which re-imported their vehicles were expected to benefit from the 
higher level of tax benefits. However, Europeans were not satisfied, as the proposed 
changes in Japan's import promotion tax schemes were unlikely to encourage European 
car sales to Japan. Europeans were calling on the Japanese government to amend its 
proposed measure to benefit all car importers 'without discrimination'.
152
 
In 1997, the weaker yen pushed Japan's worldwide vehicle exports up. In the first 
six months of 1997, Japanese car exports to the US showed their strongest growth spurt 
since 1980, prompting fears of renewed trade friction. According to the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers' Association, vehicle shipments to the European Union increased by 23.3 
per cent, while exports to the US rose by 22.3 per cent.
153
 In 1998, Japanese exports to 
Europe surged by 32 per cent in the 11 months to November, according to the figures 
from Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. Anthony Millington, representative of 
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ACEA, the European industry association in Tokyo, claimed that; 'This is the clearest 
indication the Japanese are exporting their way out of their troubles at the expense of 
somebody else.'
154
 
Despite their own criticism of Japan‟s trade policy, the Europeans also stood 
against US unilateral trade policy. While the US maintained its pressure on Japan for a 
bilateral dispute settlement with the threat of unilateral trade sanctions such as Super 301, 
Europeans remained sympathetic to Japan‟s resistance against strong US pressure. 
European carmakers drew a clear line between US insistence that the Japanese market 
was closed to foreign competitors, and the demand for numerical targets. One of the 
European carmakers defended the Japanese government by saying that US products did 
not meet the rapidly shifting demands of Japanese consumers, and the issue was not 
something the government could mandate.
155
 European brands were better established in 
the Japanese market after the European car manufacturers had spent much time and 
money on developing brand identity in the Japanese market, which the Americans failed 
to do.
156
 The Financial Times also criticised that the US had to accept the obligation to 
reduce its unilateralism. The paper claimed that the US was pretending that disputes with 
Japan were somehow special and should be handled outside the GATT rules, although the 
US did not have the sole right to decide when and how individual service sectors should 
be opened up.
157
 
 
3-4. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment into the European market 
While criticising US unilateralism, the EU also directed criticism against 
Japanese FDI. In 1998 when the Japanese car import surge into the European market had 
been attracting European criticism, a bigger threat to European carmakers were the car 
factory transplants which the Japanese were building in the region. Earlier in January 
1998, Toyota unveiled plans to invest 150 million pounds (241.5 million dollars) and 
expand engine production in the UK. The extra investment followed its decision to invest 
4 billion FFr. (656.8 million dollars) in a second European car plant in northern France to 
produce 150,000 new vehicles a year. Announcement of the new factory created a stir 
among European carmakers, concerned about rising overcapacity in their home market. 
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This Toyota expansion was the most conspicuous move by Japan's leading carmaker to 
step up its presence in the region. Other Japanese carmakers, such as Nissan and Honda, 
were also expanding their facilities in the UK, while Mitsubishi Motors had a joint 
venture with Volvo in the Netherlands aiming to increase output in Europe.
158
 
Already by the late 1980s, the rush of Japanese car factories into the EC area 
provoked criticism among the Europeans. European carmakers derided Japanese car 
factories as „screwdriver plants‟ because these factories mostly used imported Japanese 
parts. In 1988, the French government, supported by domestic manufacturers, objected 
vehemently to accepting such cars as European-made and sought to include them in the 
Japanese import quota. Although Japanese manufacturers managed to raise local content 
gradually, European criticism on Japanese transplant intensified in 1990s.  
The investments reflected a resolve among Japanese carmakers to win a greater 
slice of the European market. For Japanese carmakers, expansion in Europe became 
important at this point in their global business strategy, mainly due to the mature market 
at home. The share of Japanese sales in the US had reached a politically sensitive level of 
about 24 per cent. Raising exports to expand sales became increasingly risky. The 
situation raised the importance of Europe as an export market to soak up excess 
production in Japan and maintain domestic capacity utilisation.
159
 One of the reasons why 
Japan's car industry accepted the small increase in exports without complaint was the fact 
that their overall EU sales would be little affected as a result of the build-up in European-
based production.
160
Japanese FDI in Europe significantly increased as a result of the 1992 
programme. The sharp rise of the yen against the US dollar after 1985 also facilitated 
Japanese FDI in Europe. This accounted for the general trend of Japanese manufacturers 
transferring production abroad.  
The Euro-Japan automobile trade dispute represents the essence of Euro-
Japanese trade confrontation, mutual misunderstanding and subsequent retaliatory 
countermeasures which aggravated Euro-Japan trade relations. At the same time, this case 
revealed several factors which hindered Euro-Japan cooperation in a multilateral context. 
These factors which became obstacles to Euro-Japan cooperation are going to be analysed 
in the next section.  
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4. Conclusions of Part 1 - Obstacles to Euro-Japan cooperation 
 The brief overview of Euro-Japan trade relations and the case illustration of their 
automobile dispute suggests that Euro-Japan relations both in the bilateral and 
multilateral context had been rather confrontational until the establishment of the WTO in 
1995. As the multilateral level is of greater relevance in this thesis, I will in the following 
sections distill from the previous analysis the factors and circumstances which long 
prevented Euro-Japan cooperation and conflict settlement within the GATT.  
 
4-1. The EU-Japan trade imbalance and Japan‟s import structure 
 The main culprit for the EC/EU-Japan trade imbalance was considered by the 
EC/EU to be Japan‟s import structure (See 2.2.). It was pointed out that Europe and Japan 
were basically exporting the same range of manufactured products. However, Japan only 
imported roughly half as many manufactures as the EC/EU.
161
 By the 1970s, Japan 
imported only a relatively small amount of industrial goods. The imports of manufactured 
goods had never reached more than 30 per cent of total imports. The amount even fell to 
20 per cent in 1975 and 22 per cent in 1980 because of the high oil price. Japan‟s low 
import rate was due to the fact that Japan used import quotas and tariffs to restrict the 
imports of the products, which could be produced domestically in Japan. These measures 
were meant to protect newly established Japanese domestic industries from foreign 
competitors.
162
 The Japanese import structure was in striking contrast to the United States 
and most European countries which imported both absolutely and relatively a far greater 
amount of manufactured goods. 
 Endymion Wilkinson suggests structural circumstances. Both Europe and Japan 
are poorly endowed with natural resources.
163
 As a result, their trade was restricted almost 
entirely to industrial products. „Japan‟s trade with other major regions of the world: North 
and South America, Australia, the Middle East, China and South-East Asia – all of which 
include raw materials as an important element of their exports to Japan‟.164 Therefore, 
their trade relations with Japan were more complementary than Europe‟s. This fact forced 
Europe and Japan to stand in direct competition with each other. The Euro-Japan trade 
imbalance was therefore partly caused by the Japanese import structure which was 
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affected by „geographical setting and historical pattern of external trade and industrial and 
economic policies followed by its government‟.165 
 
4-2. Different perceptions of rules of the games 
 Behind the confrontation between Europe and Japan was also a difference in the 
perception of the „rules of the games‟. Japan‟s trade surplus towards Europe remained 
consistent, while the Europeans were struggling to increase exports into the Japanese 
market. European frustration caused by this trade imbalance resulted in a European 
perception of Japan‟s „unfairness‟. An important element of European (and also 
American) criticism towards Japan was, above all, the view that the trade imbalance with 
Japan was the consequence of having different rules of the game. This European 
perception was seen in a comment made by the then French Prime Minister, Edith 
Cresson: „Japan is an adversary who does not respect the rules of the game and whose 
overwhelming desire is to conquer the world…. Japanese investments are not like others. 
They destroy jobs. Those who can‟t see that must be blind…. We hear all too often that 
we must open up our markets, which really means first to the Japanese.‟166  
European criticism focused first on Japanese export strategies. Europeans 
suspected that Japanese manufacturers were „dumping‟ their products onto the European 
market. Japan insisted that it was common and legitimate business practice for companies 
investing in new products to sell them at prices below costs in the initial marketing phase. 
Europeans claimed that such practices were unacceptable and refused a compromise 
under which, if an exporter persisted with low prices into a second or third year, dumping 
might be considered to have occurred and anti-dumping duties could be charged 
retroactively. 
Along with Japan‟s export strategy, Europeans criticised Japan for its closed 
market. Japan‟s various standards and approval systems for safety and consumer 
protection, importing procedures, and government procurement policies were considered 
by foreigners as discriminatory against imports. It was exactly in these areas where 
foreign complaints about Japan‟s NTBs concentrated, although it was difficult to define 
what exactly were these NTBs and to judge whether Japanese domestic standards and 
approval system were barriers to imports.
167
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Japan disclosed its perception of the rules of the game in a June 1992 report of 
the Committee on Unfair Trade Practices and Measures which was working under the 
auspices of MITI. The Report ranked the EC second in its list of Japan‟s trade partners 
which allegedly used unfair trade practices, highlighting notably the European use of anti-
dumping as unfair. 
In addition Europe and Japan condemned each other for the illegal use of market 
protection measures. The fact was that Europe and Japan applied different types of market 
protection measures as forms of state interventionism.
168
 Japan depended on structural or 
regulatory obstacles, while the European system was more dependent on statutory 
protection such as anti-dumping. Both kinds of obstacles continued to fuel the Euro-Japan 
trade confrontation despite multilateral reforms achieved through successive GATT trade 
negotiating rounds. Although GATT succeeded in the reduction of tariffs, the removal of 
NTBs and the tightening of anti-dumping rules were left untouched. It was generally 
accepted in 1986 that the anti-dumping code needed to be tightened up and that 
controversial national laws against dumping should be changed to comply with a credible 
international set of rules.
169
 
 
4-3. Limitations of the GATT rules and lack of a coherent European foreign trade policy 
 One of the factors which aggravated Euro-Japan frictions was the fact that the 
GATT did not provide clear international trade rules. From 1948 to 1994, GATT provided 
the rules for much of world trade and contributed to the high growth rates in international 
commerce.
170
 GATT had succeeded in reducing tariff rates to a significantly low level, but 
the credibility and effectiveness of the GATT became challenged by the governments‟ 
attempts to circumvent GATT rules and principles. 
 In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the United States and Europe suffered from a 
series of economic recessions, governments devised other forms of protection in order to 
protect domestic economic sectors. Facing high unemployment and constant factory 
closures, European and American governments started to seek the solution in bilateral 
market sharing agreements with competitors. In agriculture, governments embarked on 
increasing their subsidies to protect the agricultural sector.  
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 The erosion of the GATT system became visible and frequent in the 1970s.
171
 
Bilateral trade in certain products between exporters such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong and their importers such as the European countries and the United States 
became restricted by formal or informal agreements, such as VERs, the Trigger Price 
Mechanism (TPM), the Basic Price System (BPS), and OMAs. For example, the 
regulation of VERs was clearly beyond the reach of GATT rules, because both the 
importing country and the exporting country did not complain to the GATT.
172
 
The overuse of such bilateral solutions demonstrated that the GATT system had 
been designed to deal only with barriers to trade at national borders, but it had not been 
able to neutralize the alleged advantages gained from national variations in culture, 
industrial organization, and macroeconomic policy.
173
 Such defects of the GATT system 
obviously delayed the solution of EC-Japan trade frictions. In fact, European allegations 
of the closed nature of the Japanese market, represented by the Keiretsu System, the 
complex distribution system or NTBs were not covered by the GATT rules.
174
  
 In addition to the limitations of the GATT system, one can point out that the lack 
of a coherent European foreign trade policy towards Japan caused a delay in the 
establishment of a sound Euro-Japan partnership. The incomplete process of European 
integration resulted in the lack of a coherent European foreign trade policy which also 
showed in the apparent absence of a common Community strategy towards Japan‟s trade 
policy.
175
 The Community was preoccupied with dismantling internal trade barriers, 
assimilating new members, and negotiating successive GATT rounds. As a result, the 
Community remained divided between two sides: protectionist, tough-line states (such as 
France, Italy and Spain) and free trade, soft-line states (such as Germany, Denmark and 
Britain). In fact, in 1972, the Community failed to negotiate an overall commercial treaty 
with Japan which would have provided safeguards in the event of a sudden increase of 
Japanese products.
176
 Japanese companies also tried to avoid EC anti-dumping duties on 
imported excavators, and import duties on Japanese electronic typewriters. To some 
extent, Japanese companies managed to minimise the import duties and tax penalties they 
had to bear.
177
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 In its foreign relations, Japan made good use of bilateral solutions. William R. 
Nester argues that Japan‟s strategy was to „divide and conquer‟. According to Nester, 
Japan took full advantage of the EC‟s divisions.178 Japan always avoided dealing with the 
EC as an international organization. Instead, Japan played off one member state against 
the other.
179
 Japanese exporters could always overcome French or Italian protection by 
sneaking in additional imports via the backdoors of more open countries such as Germany 
or Britain. This Japanese strategy had clearly exacerbated European disarray and 
divisions. The lack of a coherent European foreign trade policy was thus „a significant 
obstacle to the development of Euro-Japanese political relations‟.180  
 
Part 2. Europe and Japan in the GATT/WTO framework 
5. Europe and Japan in the GATT 
 As we have seen previously, Euro-Japan relations in the GATT started on the 
wrong foot due to European opposition to Japan‟s GATT membership and its maintenance 
of discriminatory measures against Japan. Besides, their bilateral trade conflicts hindered 
their establishment of cooperative trade relations. Despite these facts, as two of the 
world‟s biggest economies, both Europe and Japan had contributed to the successful 
conclusion of trade rounds in the GATT.
181
 In fact, their relations in the GATT rounds 
were generally seen as cooperative in the sense that the rounds were successfully 
concluded achieving a number of objectives through their mutual cooperation, along with 
their cooperation with other GATT contracting members. Their common objective 
throughout the GATT rounds was to expand world trade by removing tariffs and 
facilitating the world trade environment. However, from round to round, there were 
differences in the degree of their commitment, as well as different objectives. This section, 
therefore, traces the development of Euro-Japan commitment in the GATT trade rounds 
and investigates their relationship in the multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
5-1. The Kennedy Round (1964-1967) 
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 In the 1960s, the GATT was holding the Kennedy Round (1964-67) and dealt with 
further tariff reductions and an anti-dumping agreement. Reflecting the booming world 
trade, further tariff reductions were enacted efficiently. The tariff rates of the major 
industrial countries, especially in terms of tariffs on manufactured goods, were lowered 
substantially. This time period was also seen as the beginning of the EC and Japan‟s 
positive involvement in lowering tariffs on manufactured goods.
182
 
 The Kennedy Round was conducted under the strong leadership of the US and the 
EC. Japan, on the other hand, did not seem enthusiastic about an active participation in 
the trade round and industry, above all its manufacturing industry, was clinging to 
protectionism. Japan‟s economic policy was not in accordance with the GATT principles 
and the reduction of tariff rates was seen as threatening to industries which did not have 
enough international competitiveness, rather than as an opportunity to expand exports. 
These concerns prompted Japan to move towards strengthening tariff protection in 
agricultural and manufacturing industries. As a result of governmental protection and 
support, Japanese manufacturing industries had improved their international 
competitiveness in the 1960s. With the improved competitiveness of manufacturing 
industries, Japan obviously gained a lot of benefits from the successful conclusion of the 
Kennedy Round with its resultant lowered tariff rates. These positive outcomes of the 
multilateral trade rounds made Japan realize the utility of mutual tariff reductions. Japan 
was conscious that when it reduced tariff rates simultaneously with its trading partners, 
the result was an expansion of world trade as a whole, providing even more export 
opportunities. This recognition changed Japan‟s passive and protectionist trade stance 
after the Kennedy Round.
183
 
 Although the Kennedy Round further liberalised world trade by increasing the 
share of trade benefiting from tariff cuts, the EC and a number of other trading nations 
obtained justifiable exemptions from tariff-cutting agreements and these exceptions led to 
bilateralism replacing multilateralism. The short and long-term agreements for textiles 
and clothing were cases in point. The EC started to use quotas to curtail its imports of 
textiles and clothing from more efficient producers, notably in developing countries. 
 Another important feature of the Kennedy Round for both the EC and Japan was 
the introduction of agreed procedures for anti-dumping legislation. While provisions 
made in the Kennedy Round did not prove to be very significant, the fact that anti-
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dumping issues were on the world trade agenda was indicative of changes taking place in 
commercial policy. Issues other than tariffs became significant. For the first time world 
trade negotiators also identified agriculture and NTBs as relevant items for future world 
trade negotiations.
184
 
 
5-2. The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) 
 In the 1970s, the GATT negotiations of lowering tariff rates entered a new phase. 
The Tokyo Round (1973-79) started to attempt to tackle trade barriers which did not take 
the form of tariffs, and which were therefore called NTBs. Such trade impediments were 
now considered obstacles to trade facilitation and were to be removed to achieve further 
trade liberalization. Besides, the GATT system itself was under consideration for reforms 
during the Tokyo Round.  
 The Tokyo Round brought about the biggest multilateral trade negotiations after 
the Kennedy Round and its participants increased to 99 countries. Trade negotiations 
were largely dominated by the US, the EC and Japan, as they together accounted for 
about 50 per cent of world trade at that time. Because of the nature of the GATT, which 
was originally a „rich men‟s club,‟ the US and European countries had more than their fair 
share of political and economic power, as was also the case in other international 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Although the US and the EC 
attempted to extract concessions from each other, much of the protracted negotiations 
degenerated into „Japan-bashing‟ by the US and the EC.185 
Unlike in the Kennedy Round, Japan displayed leadership throughout this 
ambitious trade round. It was said that Japan and the US were the most active participants. 
Japan played a leading role in advancing negotiations by offering tariff reductions for a 
large number of items. Furthermore, Japan ratified all the agreements, being at the 
forefront of other participating countries. Japan‟s leadership made the GATT face NTBs 
for the first time. This active Japanese participation reflected the Japanese perception that 
the multilateral free-trade regime should be strengthened and preserved in order to reflect 
Japanese trade interests more effectively. Active participation was also crucial for Japan 
to establish its international position in the multilateral trade regime.  
 The EC, Japan, the US and many of the major industrial economies faced 
economic difficulties after the first oil crisis. Rising concerns about severe inflation, 
overcoming balance-of-payments difficulties, and the deepest depression since the 
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Second World War made participating countries take a more protectionist stance through 
the trade negotiations. This economic turmoil all over the world was obviously one of the 
greatest reasons why the Tokyo Round took a long time from announcement to 
conclusion. Besides, during the round, there were certain issues, on which member 
countries were not able to reach an agreement, such as agriculture.
186
 
 There was a large dose of bilateralism, especially in the tariff negotiations. The 
principal negotiations were inevitably between the US and the EC. Along with US-EC 
bilateral negotiations, both the US and EC conducted bilateral tariff talks with Japan. 
While the EC drew a significant volume of concessions from Japan, the Japanese argued 
that they could not go any further given the EC‟s quantitative restrictions (mostly 
Voluntary Export Restraints) on Japanese goods.
187
 During the Tokyo Round, Japan 
agreed to reduce its standard tariffs on industrial products by nearly 50 per cent, the EC 
by 27 per cent and the US by 31 per cent.  
 The Tokyo Round also attempted to create formulating rules of commercial policy 
on a global level. The negotiations were about commercial policy in general rather than 
merely aspects of tariffs. The Tokyo Round made some progress towards tackling 
problems caused by the use of NTBs. Codes were introduced to cover some areas affected 
by NTBs. These included a code preventing governments from discriminating against 
external producers via appropriately devised product standards; a code requiring 
governments to offer domestic foreign firms equal chances in being awarded contracts 
(public procurement); a code prohibiting direct export subsidies; and a code permitting 
the use of CVDs to deal with unfair competition arising from, for example, dumping. 
Negotiators failed, however, to make informal safeguard actions like VERs subject to 
Article XIX (which was designed to offer trading nations „emergency protection‟ in cases 
of fair but unduly strong import competition). Thus, VERs which had grown in 
importance continued to be informal safeguard actions, normally negotiated bilaterally 
and outside the GATT rules.
188
 
 The package also contained eight international codes on NTBs and three 
arrangements on trade in agricultural products. The MITI welcomed the signing of the 
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agreement and hoped that this would inhibit growing protectionist moves in the EC and 
the US. During the course of negotiations, the EC showed a considerable degree of 
scepticism about Japanese motives. This was reflected in the EC‟s withdrawal, just before 
the signing of the agreement, of their initial offer to remove import restrictions on 33 of a 
total of 64 Japanese imports. The EC cited the following as the main reasons for such 
action: 
 
1.) The Community‟s dissatisfaction with Japanese offers for liberalising trade, 
particularly its tariff-cuts, which were considered to be inadequate;  
2.) Dissatisfaction with measures to be taken by Japan in response to the removal of EC 
discrimination against Japanese imports; and  
3.) The failure of the new trade package to incorporate a code on safeguards (emergency 
import controls). 
 
 At the time, safeguards were often used by the EC and the US either against Japan 
or developing countries. Therefore, there was an attempt to revise Article 19 of the GATT 
rules which permitted the imposition of safeguards. The EC argued that they had the right 
to impose quantitative restrictions first and to consult the exporting countries later. Japan 
initially had serious reservations on the revision of Article 19, but later showed some 
willingness to accommodate. The Japanese government thought that such a provision 
might ultimately be an advantage to Japan in keeping out competitive imports from 
developing countries, such as Korea, Hong Kong, etc.  
 The Tokyo Round proceeded by overcoming severe economic difficulties. Both 
the EC and Japan worked together toward a successful conclusion of a number of 
agreements and preserving the multilateral trading system. An important area which was 
largely left untouched by the agreements reached at the conclusion of the round was trade 
in agricultural produce. Agriculture continued to be a highly protected sector with the 
protection giving rise to trade frictions among industrialised countries.
189
 In general, the 
Tokyo Round was fruitful for both the EC and Japan. However, from Japan‟s point of 
view, the initiation of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations during the Tokyo Round had 
still not reduced the pressure from the US and the EC on Japan.
190
 
   
5-3. The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) 
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Even by the time the Tokyo Round had been completed, it was clear that the General 
Agreement needed to be extended and revised in order to incorporate key aspects of trade 
such as NTBs, bilateral quantitative restrictions, emergency protection and agriculture. 
When a preparatory committee was established in November 1985, it was far from clear 
at that stage whether, for example, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights and 
foreign investment would be included in the global package of negotiations. The Uruguay 
Round was finally launched in September 1986 in Punta Del Este and it was agreed to 
define trade flows more broadly by including areas such as services, intellectual property 
rights, foreign investment and agriculture.
191
 
 All the main world traders pursued very specific objectives. They were prepared 
to make concessions in some areas, if they could make progress in others. The EU was 
keen on seeing restrictions removed on intellectual property rights, foreign investment 
and services. The EU also favoured further tariff reductions; in return it appeared to be 
willing to reduce protectionism in sectors such as clothing and textiles and, to a lesser 
extent, agriculture. The EU also seemed prepared to resort less to safeguard measures, 
CVDs and anti-dumping duties.  
On agriculture, the US and the EU bridged their differences in agriculture in a 
deal known as the „Blair House Accord‟. Great progress was also made on other subjects. 
By July 1993, the US, EU, Japan and Canada, often called „Quad‟, made significant 
progress on tariff reductions and market access. It required one more year for all of the 
relevant issues to be resolved. In April 1994, negotiations on market access for goods and 
services were concluded.  
 On the whole, the Uruguay Round was a long but productive trade round for both 
the EU and Japan. As a result of the round, tariffs on industrial products were to be 
reduced by more than one-third. Also, in agriculture, subsidies were to be substantially 
reduced. Furthermore, fair trade and market access rules were to cover a wide range of 
services, and protection of patents, copyrights and intellectual property were to be 
included into the GATT rules. Finally, in order to implement the achieved agreements, the 
WTO was established. Despite the success of the Uruguay Round, the agricultural issue 
prolonged the discussion among member countries. While the EU and Japan stubbornly 
resisted a drastic liberalization of agricultural trade, the US and other food exporting 
countries urged the EU and Japan to soften their protectionist stance.  
 
5-4. Strengthening international trade rules 
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 The Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds were characterised as a remarkable 
success. While EC/EU-Japan bilateral trade relations appeared to be rather 
confrontational, they both had been committed to the successful conclusion of GATT 
rounds. Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the GATT gave the EC/EU and Japan a new 
arena where they could work on common objectives which were significant for the entire 
world trade and, therefore also beneficial for both the EC/EU and Japan. As a result of the 
Uruguay Round, member countries agreed to establish a more powerful organisation to 
deal with a wide range of trade matters. The creation of the WTO was reflected by the 
strong desire of the EC/EU and Japan to have a stronger trade institution. Thus, this 
section of the chapter, examines what factors contributed to the current EU-Japan 
cooperation in the new multilateral context.  
 Both the EC/EU and Japan supported the creation of the WTO, as they wanted 
stronger multilateral trade rules, in order to solve trade disputes with their trade partners, 
as well as disputes between themselves. The Japanese perceived that the EC/EU was 
failing to live up to the agreed multilateral rules of the GATT, and drifting more and more 
towards the use of results-based trade policies. Japanese policy makers thought that when 
facing Japanese competition, the EC/EU effectively refused to be bound by the GATT 
rules. Japan argued that the EC/EU strayed from the GATT rules and found a unilateral 
interpretation of the rules to fit its own interests. Faced with growing import competition 
in sectors such as automobile, the EC/EU was seen as having rejected safeguard 
provisions provided in the GATT and having forced Japanese exporters to accept selective 
VERs. Japan also perceived that Europeans relied on unilateral interpretation of the anti-
dumping rule or rules of origin as a means of reducing imports.  
 In terms of trade imbalances, Japan argued that European companies did not really 
try to penetrate the Japanese market but merely used the perceived closed nature of the 
Japanese market as an excuse. Japan was also concerned about the growing inclination of 
the EC/EU and US to use „results-based‟ trade policies in areas of trade not yet covered 
by multilateral rules.
192
 
 Europeans, on the other hand, perceived that the trade imbalance with Japan was 
due to its differences in business practices or domestic economic structures. Europeans 
argued that the GATT rules were not inadequate as they had little or no effect on 
improving the access to the Japanese market. In this sense, Europeans viewed that the 
GATT rules were in favour of Japan. For this reason, Europeans wanted tougher 
multilateral rules especially where they were internationally competitive. For instance, in 
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the banking or pharmaceutical sector, European industries were determined to establish 
stronger multilateral rules in General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Albeit with different expectations, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
creation of the WTO were appreciated by both the EU and Japan. Tougher multilateral 
trade rules and an enhanced DSB were equally important to both the EU and Japan. They 
expected that the establishment of the WTO would provide the means of ensuring 
effective implementation of the rules.  
 
5-4-1. European perspective 
Although Europe considerably depended on the use of bilateral measures in 
order to cope with the Japanese trade surplus, there was also a strong desire on their part 
to strengthen multilateral trade rules. The greatest benefit was obviously the capability to 
restrain US unilateralist measure, such as Super 301. 
Europe was conscious that it had less influence on Japanese trade policy 
compared with the US. Europe was concerned about US unilateral practices towards 
Japan, because the outcome of US-Japan trade would significantly affect Euro-Japan 
trade. For instance, if the US limited imports from Japan, Japanese products would surge 
into the European market. Therefore, Europeans disliked US-Japan bilateral solutions of 
trade issues. The EC/EU had always been concerned that Japan might surrender to US 
bilateralism. Since the final US stance on trade issues had such an impact on both Europe 
and Japan, policy makers in Europe and Japan came to recognize the importance of 
establishing a more politically and economically independent position from the US. In 
other words, through the consolidation of the GATT system, they appeared to start 
attempting to minimize the influence of .the US-designed trade environment.   
 The EC/EU and the US vied for the most predominant role in setting and 
reshaping the rules of trade.
193
 There was therefore a strong leadership competition 
between them. Europe also had an interest in a stronger rule-oriented multilateral trade 
discipline in order to contain US unilateral or bilateral trade remedies. In order to restrain 
US bilateral solutions, GATT principles such as non-discrimination status or MFN status 
were desirable for the EC/EU. Hence, during the Uruguay Round, the EC/EU shifted its 
stance from supporting bilaterally negotiated solutions to ones embodying more 
multilateral adjudication and started to support stronger GATT discipline.
194
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5-4-2. Japanese perspective 
  Japan was often accused of being a free rider in the international trade arena. Such 
a view comes from the perception of some observers that Japan was a willing beneficiary 
of the free-trade system when it came to taking advantage of the open markets of other 
countries. However, it was a reluctant participant in terms of opening its own domestic 
market to foreign competition.
195
 
Facing such accusation, Japan realised that full compliance with the GATT rules 
helped to counter result-based trade policies used by Europe or the US. Through acting as 
a model GATT member, Japan could refute other countries‟ use of GATT-incompatible 
measures aimed at countering Japanese advantages related to its political economic 
system which were outside of GATT regulations.
196
 Within the GATT rules, Japan could 
also concentrate on improving its competitiveness. It was argued that Japanese 
willingness to comply with the GATT might be a result of the Japanese experience as the 
passive partner in an international trade system whereby the rules were set by the United 
States and Europe.
197
 
However, in the 1990s, Japan became increasingly vocal on US and EC/EU trade 
measures in conjunction with GATT trade rules. Noboru Hatakeyama, who took over in 
July 1991 as Japan's top international trade negotiator, announced to bring a new 
toughness to Japan's approach to trade issues. Hatakeyama claimed that until the 1990s, 
the Japanese stance had been to stress the importance of getting a solution regardless of 
the rules of the GATT and other international organisations, but Japan would no longer 
buy peace at any price in settling trade conflicts with the US, the EU and other trading 
partners. 
His comment implied that Japan could in future challenge the trade practices of 
other countries more often, instead of always being on the defensive. Hatakeyama clearly 
stated that: 'Japan has been the recipient of rules which have been made by others. From 
now on we would like to contribute to the formulation of new rules.'
198
 Hatakeyama, 
however, accepted some exceptions. He claimed that Japan had to be sensitive to the 
needs of other countries. According to him, VER agreements were a time-tested way of 
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giving such protection without having to resort to protectionist legislation, therefore 
exceptions could be admitted as long as the fundamental principles of free trade came 
first.
199
 
The change of Japan‟s trade policy promoted Japan‟s commitment to the WTO, 
as well as its relationship with the EU in an attempt to restrain US unilateral trade 
measures.  
 
6. Case illustration of „Euro-Japanese multilateral trade conflict resolution‟ – The Liquor 
Tax case 
The liquor tax dispute is a demonstration of the EC/EU and Japan resorting to a 
GATT-based (and later WTO-based) multilateral approach to trade conflict resolution, in 
contrast to the earlier automobile dispute which was addressed bilaterally. Moreover, it 
exemplifies the development from the inchoate conflict resolution mechanism in the 
GATT system to the more complex one of the WTO. As such the liquor tax dispute 
provides an ideal case illustration of the transition of EC/EU-Japan relationships in the 
GATT to the WTO.  
The liquor tax system in Japan was a long-standing trade issue between the 
EC/EU and Japan, despite the marginal economic size of the liquor industry. Japanese 
domestic shochu (spirits made of rice, wheat or sweet potatoes) makers are dispersed all 
over Japan, and this trade dispute therefore attracted tremendous attention in Japan.
200
 
Besides, taxation itself is a matter of domestic politics and sovereignty. However, the 
GATT regime already explicitly prohibited discriminatory taxation on imported products. 
Consequently, this trade dispute was not just a bilateral issue but also had a legitimate 
place in the multilateral trade regime.  
Since the early 1980s the issue of alcoholic beverage exports had constantly been 
on the EC‟s agenda at regular official meetings between the EC and Japan. Japan was one 
of the major importers of Scotch whisky, along with other kinds of alcoholic beverages. 
With the economic downturn in the mid-1980s, Scotch whisky sales decreased 
considerably while sales of shochu grew rapidly. Although the proportion of European 
alcoholic beverage exports to Japan was not spectacular, the issue obtained enough 
importance to be a test case to assess how willing Japan was to cooperate with the EC. 
 
6-1. The EC‟s challenge in the GATT to Japan‟s liquor taxation system  
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The Japanese liquor tax system was extremely complicated and the EC began to 
highlight it since the mid-1980s as a trade problem because it was perceived as 
discriminating foreign alcohol beverages. Most western countries tax alcoholic drinks 
according to their strength. The Japanese, however, had traditionally imposed duty on 
alcohol largely according to price and quality rather than strength.
201
 The tax amount and 
rate, for example, depended on liquor type, alcohol percentage and beverage grade based 
on „quality‟, this last item an uncommon one among industrialised countries. While there 
was a grading system for traditional beverages such as sake (rice wine) and shochu, there 
were no objective criteria to decide whether a certain product was of „quality‟ or not. 
Therefore, a poor person‟s drink, such as crude sake or the rougher shochu was taxed less 
heavily than the rich person‟s premium grade whisky, or higher-quality sake.  
Atsuko Abe explained that Japanese liquor tax law was based on four grounds: 
1.) it promised substantial income for the government; 2.) it would deter people from 
excessive drinking; 3.) the social cost caused by excessive drinking would be paid by 
drinkers, not by the general taxpayer; and 4.) those who could afford to drink liquor were 
assumed to be financially capable of paying the tax because consuming liquor is not a 
daily necessity for the most part. Legal studies on taxation emphasised this last point as 
the main reason for imposing a liquor tax, although the Ministry of Finance (MOF) found 
the first point crucial since the ministry‟s priority lies in retaining tax revenue.  
Japanese liquor taxation was based on an over-complex categorisation and 
grading of liquor, based on criteria such as alcohol percentage, raw materials and, in the 
case of distilled liquors, manufacturing methods. The complexity of the system was under 
serious criticism even in domestic circles. The system remained mostly unchanged from 
1962 to 1989 despite criticism that the liquor tax system caused structural problems since 
it did not reflect economic and social change over time.  
The EC considered such tax differentiation as discriminatory against European 
imports because it resulted in a higher tax on products with higher alcohol content such as 
whisky. There were three grades depending on alcohol percentage, providing a basis for 
different tax rates. Such a grading system levied a higher tax on products with higher 
alcohol content. On the other hand, shochu was considered a drink with a lower alcohol 
content so it had a much lower tax rate compared with other spirits.  
In April 1986, the MOF and Commission officials began several rounds of 
negotiations. In July 1986, after a series of unsuccessful discussions, the Commission 
formally requested consultations with Japan under GATT Article XXII:1 on Japanese 
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customs duties, taxes and labelling practices on imported wine and alcoholic beverages. 
Two GATT consultations in August and September failed to produce satisfactory results.   
Finally, Japan tried to settle the dispute on a bilateral basis, but failed so when 
the EC ultimately brought the issue to the GATT in late October. The EC claimed that 
Japan must reform its alcohol taxation system because it discriminated against imported 
products; it demanded Japan to lower the existing high tax rate on wine and whisky; and 
re-regulate the indication of origin rules more strictly, especially for wine. Tokyo 
maintained that shochu, traditionally a cheap spirit, was not comparable with imported 
whisky or brandy, which were luxury items. However, this argument was rejected by the 
1987 GATT panel.
202
 
Finally in November 1988, the GATT Council adopted the panel report that 
confirmed the Japanese defeat. The GATT notification forced the MOF to implement a 
drastic change in the liquor tax as part of the general taxation reform planned in 1988. In 
December 1988, the GATT General Assembly demanded that Japan implement the 
reformed taxation law during the FY 1988. Japan, however, had to face immense 
difficulty in persuading Japanese interest groups within the time allowed, while trying to 
win a compromise from the EC to postpone the reform. Domestic whisky makers fiercely 
opposed abolishing the grading system, fearing that it would seriously damage second-
grade whisky sales.
203
 
 
6-2. Japan‟s non-compliance with the GATT ruling  
In April 1989, a new taxation system was launched, including a new liquor 
taxation. The Japanese government made some changes to its liquor taxation system by, 
for example, removing the difference in taxes between local and imported liquor. While 
welcoming the 1989 reforms, the Community insisted that it did not believe that the 
GATT panel‟s decision was fully implemented. In comparing tax rates as a percentage of 
retail prices, whisky was still considerably higher than shochu. There was growing EC 
criticism of Japan over the discriminatory taxation system which still remained despite 
the 1987 GATT panel ruling. Criticism that Japan failed to comply with GATT 
recommendations came at a sensitive time for Japan, which was moving towards a more 
GATT-oriented trade policy. The Japanese government, under growing pressure over trade 
from the US and EC, said it would refer to the GATT when trying to resolve thorny 
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issues.
204
 
At the annual ministerial meeting between the EC and Japan in January 1993 and 
meetings of senior officials in April 1993, the Commission suggested resubmitting the 
case to the GATT, unless Japan fulfilled its 1987 GATT ruling obligations by 1994. The 
EC became increasingly impatient after waiting five years for Japan to remove the last tax 
areas placing imports at a disadvantage.
205
 
The excuse given by the Japanese had been that since shochu was made in rural 
areas it would be politically risky for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to 
introduce steps that might hurt producers. The Japanese government also claimed that it 
would be just as difficult to reduce the tax on other spirits at a time when its revenues had 
suffered in the economic downturn.
206
Japan also argued that shochu was part of the 
national culture because it was made by small rural distilleries across Japan, while Scotch 
makers insisted that more than half of all shochu was made by six large industrial groups 
involved in other activities such as pharmaceuticals.
207
 
Kojiro Shiojiri, director of First International Economic Affairs, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Japan, wrote to the Financial Times on 20 April 1993 that the 
new tax rates applied equally to domestic and foreign products, and therefore neither 
penalised foreign products nor broke GATT rules. He emphasised that the tax differentials 
were narrowed considerably as a result of the 1989 revision of Japan's Liquor Tax Law, 
which was undertaken in accordance with the recommendation of the 1987 GATT panel 
ruling.
208
 
Refuting this statement, Ronald Brown, chairman of the European Business 
Council Liquor Committee, and Tim Jackson, President of the EC Association of Spirit 
Producers, sent a joint letter to the Financial Times. They claimed that European 
producers felt the Japanese government had not taken advantage of an opportunity for 
implementation of full liquor tax harmonisation as provided in the 1987 GATT council 
ruling. They pointed out that the GATT ruling was accepted by Japan and partially 
implemented in 1989, and full compliance was again formally requested in 1992 by the 
Commission. They questioned why Japan continued to protect the ailing domestic spirits 
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industry at a time when its trade surplus continued to soar, and they emphasized that the 
MOFA and the Japanese government should face up to international GATT obligations.
209
 
The gulf remained between the EC and Japan on whether Japan‟s liquor tax 
system had been sufficiently altered to be in compliance with the 1987 GATT ruling. In 
the meantime, under the auspices of the Uruguay Round trade talks, the Quad members 
(Japan, the US, the EC/EU and Canada) agreed, in July 1993, to abolish tariff barriers on 
imported spirits. Among the Quad members, Japan would be most affected, as high 
import duties were levied on its imports. However, Europeans had seen Japan‟s liquor tax 
system as a much bigger impediment to whisky exports than import duties, and continued 
trying hard to persuade Japan to change it.
210
 
In June and September 1993, the Commission raised the issue at the GATT. 
Facing consistent European pressure, the Japanese government decided to raise the tax 
rate on shochu, further narrowing the tax difference with whisky. However, as this still 
did not satisfy the EU, in May 1994, the liquor tax was reviewed again, resulting in a 
further rise of the tax on shochu.  
The successive tax rise on shochu was still not enough to calm European 
criticism down. In November 1994, during two days of talks with Japanese officials in 
Tokyo, a delegation of liquor producers from the EU, the US and Sweden urged the 
Japanese government to use its 1995/96 budget to harmonise its liquor taxes. The 
Shochu‟s share of the distilled drinks market rose from 61 per cent in 1989 to 74 per cent 
in 1994. Imported drinks accounted for only 8 per cent of the Japanese market, compared 
with more than 30 per cent in most other developed countries.
211
 
 
6-3. EU-Japan dispute settlement in the WTO  
In the following year, Europe stepped up the pressure on the Japanese 
government. During a round of EU-Japan high-level consultations in Tokyo in February 
1995, Horst Krenzler, EU Director General for external economic relations, strongly 
rebuked Japan's failure to comply with a GATT ruling on Tokyo's liquor tax system, 
threatening to call for the newly established WTO dispute settlement process.
212
 In April, 
Sir Leon Brittan, EU Chief Trade Negotiator also claimed that the EU would take the case 
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to the WTO.
213
 Under tougher WTO dispute procedures, panel rulings had to be adopted 
and implemented unless there was a consensus against them or a successful appeal. The 
WTO, unlike GATT, could impose sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 
Masayoshi Takemura, the Japanese Finance Minister, expressed regret about the 
EU's decision to bring the case to the WTO,
214
 but the Japanese MOFA maintained, at 
least on the surface, their belief that the 1989 and 1994 reforms were sufficient.
215
 In June 
1995, the EU officially brought the case to the WTO. The MOF agreed to bilateral 
negotiations within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, although it was unwilling to 
make any immediate change in tax rates. 
These bilateral talks started on the 20 June 1995 but they did not resolve the 
issue, which led to the setting up an independent dispute panel. At the end of January 
1996, the first open hearing for the panel was held. It became the first disputes panel 
settlement sought by the EU under the WTO. Six months later, the panel ruled against 
Japan by concluding that the difference in tax rates between shochu and whisky was 
against WTO rules.
216
 
The Japanese Finance Ministry had to choose between raising taxes on shochu to 
bring them in line with higher taxes on other spirits such as whisky, lowering the tax on 
whisky and the others to the level of taxes on shochu, or adjusting the tax rate on all 
spirits to somewhere in between.
217
Japan faced a tough decision, because lowering the tax 
rate on whisky to the level of that on shochu ran counter to the Finance Ministry's policy 
to increase tax revenues and improve the country's finances,
218
 while increasing the tax 
rate on shochu would cause an outcry from domestic shochu makers. The domestic 
shochu industry lobbied the Japanese government intensely, claiming that shochu was a 
people's drink that could not be compared to more expensive alcoholic beverages such as 
whisky. The industry claimed that a bottle of shochu could be bought for about half the 
price of the cheapest bottle of whisky.
219
Despite the outcry from domestic shochu makers, 
the Japanese government decided to lower the tax on whisky by 58 per cent from October 
in 1997 and raised the tax on shochu, by between 1.6 and 2.4 times over five years. The 
decision of the Japanese government finally ended years of friction with Europeans over 
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Japan's liquor tax system.
220
  
The liquor tax dispute illustrates EC/EU-Japan resort to a GATT/WTO 
multilateral resolution. This makes a striking contrast to their bilateral resolution in the 
automobile dispute which was discussed in the Part 1 of this chapter. Besides, this case 
shows importance of the role of the WTO to settle the trade disputes between the EC/EU 
and Japan. Therefore, despite the marginal economic size of the liquor industry, the 
analysis of the Euro-Japan liquor tax dispute is very meaningful.  
  
Conclusions 
 This chapter investigated the relationship between the EU and Japan before the 
establishment of the WTO. The investigation in the chapter highlightened two prominent 
features; 1.) various domestic social forces have a significant impact on countries' trade 
policy. 2.) the lack of common international trade rules aggravated the trade relationship 
between Europe and Japan.    
 On the first point, the automobile case symbolised the troubled trade relations 
between the EC and Japan in the 1980s and exemplified their inclination for a bilateral 
dispute settlement in the pre-WTO era.  Automotive industry is the leading industrial 
sector for both the EC and Japan and contribute to employment. Thus, the powerful 
automobile lobby in Europe fought very hard to hang on to its priviledged conditions, 
while the manufactures from Japan tried very hard to penetrate this market further 
through exports. Thus, governments and carmakers often had a close tie. European 
automotive firms were either government owned or government dominated. Under the 
circumstances, relationship between government officials and automobile lobbies had a 
common ground for a cooperation.   
 On the second point, one of the factors which aggravated Euro-Japan frictions was 
the fact that the GATT did not provide clear international trade rules. While governments 
successfully lowered tariff rates through GATT rounds, they attempted to circumvent 
GATT rules and principles. As the cause of continuous trade conflicts, both sides 
concluded that different business practices or domestic economic structures had a 
significant effect on trade policies of each side. After the establishment of the WTO, as 
we have seen in liquor tax system, when the other side‟s trade practices are conceived as 
being incompatible with international trade rules, legal action is taken in accordance with 
WTO rules. 
 The above two points will be the main objectives of following chapters. As for the 
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first point, the impact of various social forces on trade policies of the EU and Japan, we 
will investigate closely in the next chapter on agricultural trade. As for the second point, 
the role of the WTO and its dispute settlement system, we will investigate in the fourth 
chapter on steel trade issue.   
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Introduction    
 In this chapter, we will investigate the EU-Japan relationship in one of the most 
contentious issues in the WTO, agricultural trade. First, the chapter commences with the 
individual agricultural policy of the EU and Japan and highlighten the difference between 
them. Then we closely look at, how they have developed a positive relationship between 
them, by focusing on the role of institutions and various social forces. 
 Since agreements in the WTO trade negotiations directly affect them, farm lobbies 
or other stakeholders are actively involved to achieve their goals through their 
government.    
 Among various shapes of relationship between the EU and Japan, we particularly 
investigate the transnational connection between social forces within the EU and Japan, 
and their joint strategy, 'multifunctionality' of agriculture.  
The chapter shows that the state is not a single unified actor in the international trade, but 
their policy is significantly influenced by the demand from various domestic actors within 
them.  
 
1. Agricultural trade 
While the GATT had been successful in reducing tariffs on manufactured goods, 
trade liberalisation talks essentially by-passed agriculture. It is more difficult to deal with 
agriculture on an international level, because the agricultural sector is a very entrenched 
domestic interest. Governments take a special custodial interest in the agricultural sector 
and intervene both in production and trade.
221
 Domestic farming sectors receive a variety 
of subsidies from governments to promote rural development and modernise farming 
techniques. At the same time, competitive imports are often severely restricted by high 
tariffs and quotas.
222
 Thus, from the beginning, agriculture was excluded from key GATT 
provisions. The first four rounds of GATT-based multilateral trade negotiations virtually 
ignored agricultural issues and the next three eventually had to drop them (See table 1).
223
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Many regional and other preferential trade agreements also largely excluded farm 
products in order to allow contracting parties some leeway. Even the Uruguay Round 
accepted a high and asymmetric level of tariffs and subsidies just in order to put them 
under at least some control.
224
  
 
Table-1: The GATT trade rounds 
Year Place / name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva  Tariffs 26 
1960-1961 Geneva  
(Dillon Round) 
Tariffs 26 
1964-1967 Geneva  
(Kennedy Round) 
Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62 
1973-1979 Geneva  
(Tokyo Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
“framework” agreements 
102 
1986-1994 Geneva  
(Uruguay Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, 
services, intellectual property, dispute 
settlement, textiles, agriculture, 
creation of the WTO, etc. 
123 
Source: the WTO, 1999 
 
Although average MFN tariffs in the Quad (Canada, the EU, Japan and the US) 
have fallen to about 5 per cent, tariffs for some agricultural commodities are over 100 per 
cent. Such tariff peaks are often concentrated on products that are of export interest in 
developing countries and include major agricultural staple food products, such as sugar, 
cereals and fish, tobacco, vegetables and fruit.
225
 The Uruguay Round resulted in 
significant tariff rises, as tariffication of NTBs in agriculture led to the imposition of high 
duties on agricultural products which had previously been constrained by import quota.
226
 
The countries favouring farm liberalisation are led by countries including 
Australia, Brazil, South Africa and New Zealand which are grouped together in the so-
called „Cairns Group‟ of 15 agricultural fair trading nations, together with many 
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developing nations. Most of these countries either abandoned means of supporting their 
agricultural sectors, or never had them, such as in some developing countries.  
At the other end of the scale sit Japan, Norway and Switzerland whose farmers 
are among the most protected in the world in terms of subsidies per head. But not far 
behind is the EU, which is a major agricultural trader. The Cairns Group and the US are 
interested in opening the EU market.  
Table-2 lists top agricultural exporters and importers. As we can see in this table, 
Japan‟s food imports account for around 10 per cent of the world market. Japan is the 
world‟s third largest food importer. With a 10 per cent share of the agricultural imports, 
Japan‟s agricultural policy attracts the attention of its trade partners. Table-3 shows 
Japan‟s trade commodities and their proportions. Agricultural products amounted to 12.1 
per cent of Japan‟s imports in 2001. As the percentage of agricultural imports in trade 
commodities is high, agricultural trade policy has great significance for Japan.  
 
Table-2: Top agricultural exporters and importers, 2001 
 Value  
$bn 
Share in world 
% 
 Value 
$bn 
Share in world    
% 
Exporters   Importers   
EU members 215.53 39.0 EU members 235.51 39.7 
EU to rest of 
world 
57.81 10.6 EU from rest 
of world 
79.78 13.5 
United States 70.02 12.8 United States 68.40 11.5 
Canada 33.57 6.1 Japan 56.94 9.6 
Brazil 18.43 3.4 China 20.12 3.4 
China 16.63 3.0 Canada 15.55 2.6 
Australia 16.56 3.0 Mexico 12.79 2.2 
Argentina 12.20 2.2 Korea, 
Rep.of 
12.50 2.1 
Thailand 12.06 2.2 Russian Fed. 11.40 1.9 
Mexico 9.07 1.7 Hong Kong, 
China 
11.06 - 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2002 
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Table-3: Japan‟s Global Trade by Commodity - 2000 
Imports % Exports % 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
31.6 Electrical Machinery 26.5 
Mineral Fuels  20.3 Machinery other than 
Electrical 
21.5 
Foodstuff 12.1 Transport Equipment 21.0 
Chemicals 7.0 Chemicals 7.4 
Others 28.9 Others 23.7 
Source: Japan Tariff Association 
 
The EU‟s stance on agricultural trade is conditioned by its status as one of the 
biggest agricultural exporters as well as importers. The EU‟s agricultural exports account 
for around 10 per cent of the world‟s exports, and its imports stand at around 14 per cent 
of the world‟s imports. The EU is the world‟s largest farm trader both in imports and 
exports (see Table-2). In 2000, EU imports of agricultural products totalled 58,200 
million dollars which was 5.7 per cent of the total imports of all products (see Table-2). 
At the same time, the EU‟s export of agricultural products reached 58,000 million dollars 
(6.2 per cent of the total exports of all products). Only the US exported more farm 
products in 2000.
227
 
 
Table-4: The EU‟s Global Trade by Commodity – 1999 
Imports % Exports % 
Machinery and Vehicles 39.1 Machinery and Vehicles 46.3 
Other manufactured articles 28.8 Other manufactured articles 27.1 
Energy 10.0 Chemicals 14.0 
Chemical 7.6 Food 5.8 
Others 14.5 Others 6.8 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
The trade stance of the United States is somewhere between that of the Cairns 
Group and that of the EU and Japan.
228
 After the Uruguay Round, the US deregulated 
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much of its agricultural sector and made some progress on decoupling compensatory 
payments to farmers from production. This decoupling meant that farmers were no longer 
given incentives to produce for non-existent markets. However, the US established about 
15 million dollars worth of „emergency packages‟ for farmers in 1999. Moreover, the US 
still grants to some of its farm sectors, including dairy and sugar, huge protection.
229
 
There are substantial threats to agricultural trade as there are considerable gaps 
between the big agricultural traders. Food exporters such as the US and Cairns Group
230
 
insist that the Japanese government‟s justification for continued support for rice 
production and the European Union‟s push to maintain a wide range of agricultural 
support mechanisms continues to distort world production and trade. 
231
The EU and 
Japan‟s agricultural policies are criticised for imposing considerable costs on consumers 
and taxpayers in countries where agriculture is highly supported.
232
 
 
2. Japan‟s agricultural trade policy  
2-1. The closed nature of Japan‟s agricultural market 
Japan‟s trade policy for agricultural products is notorious for its protectionism 
and is much criticised.
233
 While the average tariff on manufactured goods is 4 per cent, 
tariffs on agricultural goods are around 40 per cent. Although the Japanese agricultural 
sector accounts for just 2.1 per cent of the total GDP, the agricultural budget reaches 
about 10 per cent of the annual budget. Japanese farming products are well protected 
from foreign competition by the government‟s huge farm support.234 
Besides, Japan has used non-tariff measures to assist its agricultural sector. Non-
tariff measures include administered domestic prices, and strict health and quarantine 
regulations.
235
 Such measures often upset its trade partners and attract a storm of criticism 
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from food exporting countries. Some of Japan‟s trade partners say that Japan‟s stubborn 
resistance to open its agricultural market casts doubt on Japan‟s officially proactive 
commitment to the multilateral trade liberalisation talks on industrial products.  
High rates of agricultural protection are a relatively recent phenomenon in Japan. 
The average NRP
236
 (nominal rate of protection) of Japan in 1955 was 18 per cent, only 
about half the EC average of 35 per cent. It rose rapidly, reaching EC level in 1960 and 
Swiss level in 1965. The average NRPs increased from 1955 to 1970 not only in Japan 
but also in industrial countries in general. Real world prices of agricultural products 
declined during this period as a result of rising productivity and accumulated surpluses of 
grains in the United States and other major exporters.
237
 
Unlike the EC, where domestic agricultural protection displaced imports, Japan‟s 
agricultural imports continued to rise despite the rapid growth of agricultural protection. 
In 1990, the total cost for general farm income support was estimated at over 3 per cent of 
GDP to support 3 million households. Support for agriculture in Japan exceeded that in 
the EC and the US, at around 90 billion dollars or 3 per cent of GDP. Support in Japan 
was about twice the level of that in the US at 1.6 per cent of GDP (or around 76 billion 
dollars). In the EC, the total subsidy for agriculture amounted to approximately 120 
billion dollars or just over 2 and half per cent of GDP.
238
 
Farm income subsidies amounted to 50 per cent in the EC/EU, 53 per cent in the 
US but about 230 per cent in Japan. Disposable income spent on food support amounted 
to 20 per cent in the EU, 17 per cent in the US but about 30 per cent in Japan. Clearly the 
level of agricultural support in Japan was higher than in the EC/EU and much higher than 
in the US in the 1990s.
239
 
In November 2000, the WTO urged Japan to reform its agricultural policy, 
saying that it showed „potentially important competition distortions‟. Japan‟s average 
tariff on agricultural imports remains high and agricultural subsidies for farmers is well 
above the average of OECD member countries. The WTO pointed out the especially 
varied and complex Japanese tariff quota system, which covers over 200 agricultural 
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products. Weight-based custom duties, which are mainly applied to agricultural imports, 
range between 40.1 per cent and 983.7 per cent, if converted into ordinary value-based 
duties. This figure is far above Japan‟s average tariff rate of 6.5 per cent for 2000.240  
 
2-2. Japan‟s rice regime and declining rice consumption 
Japan‟s rice regime exemplifies Japan‟s rigid agricultural trade policy, which 
lacks flexibility to allow concessions in trade liberalisation talks on agriculture.
241
 Alister 
McFarquhar asserts that support for farming in Japan is largely a matter of rice policy. 
The rice price was ten times the average world price in 1986 and by the early 1990s the 
rice mountain peaked at around 1.5 million tonnes against a consumption of about 10 
million tonnes. Farm income support for rice was double the value of production in 
1990.
242
 
Rice has long been the staple food of Japan. Income from rice farming is about 
25 per cent of Japan‟s total agricultural income, and most Japanese farmers derive part of 
their income from rice, either by growing rice or contracting paddy land for rice 
growing.
243
 Because of the high costs of producing rice in Japan, rice prices there are 
among the highest in the world. Rice exporting countries see marketing potential in Japan 
and have sought to persuade it to change the policies that insulate it from world rice 
markets.
244
 Among the rice exporting countries, the US is the most vociferous protester 
against Japanese agricultural policy. The US reiterated its dissatisfaction with access to 
Japan‟s rice market. The US also hinted at taking further action after bilateral 
consultations with Japan. The options included taking the case to the WTO. The US 
insisted that full market access for American rice had to be secured. The intensive US 
demand for opening Japan‟s agricultural market was due to the fact that Japan became the 
largest export market for US farm products in 1994.
245
 Japan accounted for 9.3 billion 
                                                 
240 The Japan Times, 17 November 2000 
241 On Japan‟s rice policy, see: Kawagoe, „Deregulation and Protectionism in Japanese 
Agriculture‟, in Teranishi and Kosai, „Japanese experience of economic reforms‟, P381-
387 
242 McFarquhar, „World Trade Pressures – Reform of EU Common Agricultural Policy 
and Food and Agricultural Policy in Japan‟, P19 
243 Hisao Fukuda, John Dyck and Jim Stout, „Rice sector policies in Japan‟, (United 
States Department of Agriculture, Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic 
Research Service, 2003), P2 /  (www.ers.usda.gov) 
244 Economic Research Service / USDA, Agricultural Outlook, April 1999, „World 
Agriculture & Trade / Rice Tariffication in Japan: What does it mean for trade?‟ P1-4 
245 On the issue of US-Japan agricultural trade since the Uruguay Round, see C.C. 
Meyerson, “Domestic Politics and International Relations in Trade Policymaking: The 
United States and Japan and the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations”, 
Working paper, (Washington DC, Columbia University, International Studies Association, 
90 
 
dollars of the record 45.7 billion dollars in US farm exports in 1994, compared with 8.7 
billion dollars in 1993, followed by the EU and Canada. US farm exporters depend 
heavily on the Japanese market.
246
 
The US repeatedly claimed that Japan‟s commitment to open its domestic rice 
market, which was the result of the previous global trade liberalisation talks of the 
Uruguay Round, was not enough. The US also pointed out that imported rice rarely 
reached end consumers, instead it was either placed in storage or exported as food aid to 
other countries.
247
 The US claimed that the trade deficit with Japan remained a heavy 
burden for the US economy, therefore Japan should have increased rice imports from the 
US.
248
  
Japan‟s rigid agricultural policy stems from its difficulties with surplus 
production since the 1960s. Because of its climate and land base for rice paddies, Japan is 
well suited for growing rice. However, until the 1950s, Japan‟s large population 
consumed more rice than the country could consistently produce. As society changed in 
the course of recovery from the Second World War and national income rose, rice 
consumption per person began to fall in 1963, a trend that has continued until the present 
time. As rice consumption dropped, Japan‟s government sought to raise the incomes of 
the many households planting rice. The government ceased rice imports and took other 
steps, such as purchases, to raise the domestic production price of rice. Farmers 
responded with higher production, leading to rising government stocks. As imports of 
foreign rice continue to increase, the declining numbers of consumers have barely had a 
chance to overcome their traditional bias against foreign rice, long considered inferior to 
domestic rice.
 249
 
 
2-3. Food self-sufficiency ratio 
It is not only the Japanese government which has traditionally viewed its 
agricultural sector as something to defend to the last. Powerful farm lobbies provide part 
of the explanation, but there has also been a perception that countries should achieve a 
certain degree of self-sufficiency in food production and protectionism has been the 
means of achieving that. Food security has thus become one of the most important 
rationales for protecting the domestic agricultural market and the food self-sufficiency 
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ratio is a central figure in Japan‟s justification of agricultural protectionism.   
The Japanese food self-sufficiency rate has been declining in recent years (See 
Table-5) and is the lowest among industrialized countries.
250
 Table-6 lists the degree of 
self-sufficiency of food by commodity. Apart from rice, more than 90 per cent of various 
crops depend on import from foreign countries. The self-sufficiency rate of wheat is 9 per 
cent, soybean 4 per cent and corn 0 per cent. In terms of the food self-sufficiency rate on 
a calorie base, just 40 per cent is covered by domestic production. Overall, 60 per cent of 
Japanese food depends on imports, and there is concern about a shortage of food in the 
case of a global food production crisis.   
The annual report on food, agriculture and rural areas in Japan for the financial 
year 1999 emphasized the importance of the self-sufficiency ratio in Japan.
251
 The ratio 
showed a decrease during the period 1965 to 1998, declining from 73 per cent to 40 per 
cent on a calorie basis and from 62 to 27 per cent on a grain basis. From a long-term 
standpoint, one of the major factors behind this declining trend is a fundamental change 
in Japanese dietary patterns, as reflected in the increasing consumption of animal 
products and fats and oils, which are largely dependent on imported grains. In recent 
years, both trends have slowed down, while the domestic production of wheat and 
soybean has been declining. This is a key factor behind the declining self-sufficiency ratio 
in the short term. As the world food supply/demand situation could be tight in the mid- 
and long-term, Japanese people are now showing great concern for the future, particularly 
in view of the very low food self-sufficiency ratio. Since there are certain limitations for 
stockpiling and imports, the government increasingly feels that it is important to increase 
domestic agricultural production as much as possible.  
Regarding Japanese concern about the low level of food self-sufficiency ratio, 
Ryutaro Komiya cites as an instance soybeans. Soybeans are an essential foodstuff in 
Japan, used for tofu, bean baste soup and soya sauce. Japan was self-sufficient in 
soybeans until the 1920s when it started to import them from China. Although Japan 
became self-sufficient in soybeans again after the Second World War, Japan gradually 
liberalised its soybeans imports under US pressure. As a result, in 1973, Japan imported 
95 per cent of the domestic consumption of soybeans, and approximately 90 per cent of 
these imports were from the US.  However, because of a temporary domestic shortage of 
feeding-stuffs, in 1973, the United States put an embargo on soybeans exports. Even 
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contracted shipments to Japan were stopped in the ports. Soybeans are fed to cattle in the 
US but in Japan they are a vital food element for humans. This incident (the so-called 
„Soyabean shock‟) made Japanese aware of the importance of food self-sufficiency.252 
 
Table-5:  
 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries   
 
 
 
Table-6: Japan‟s food self-sufficiency rate by commodity 
Wheat 9% 
Rice 95% 
Corn 0% 
soybean 4% 
vegetables 83% 
Fruits 49% 
Beef 36% 
Pork 58% 
Chicken 65% 
 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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60% of Japanese food depends on imports. 
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2-4. International criticism and the relationship between farmers and the LDP 
Many specialists dismiss the Japanese government‟s concern with food self-
sufficiency as inappropriate.
253
 Anderson disagrees with the claim that a high level of 
food self-sufficiency is necessary to maintain food security.
254
 He argues that this claim is 
inconsistent with the usual definition of food security, which is that everyone always has 
access to the minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival. Lower rather than 
higher consumer prices for food would by that definition boost the number of food-secure 
people, suggesting that lower import barriers and export subsidies should be called for. 
But he concedes that becoming more dependent on imports raises questions about the 
preparedness of foreign exporters to assure a stable supply. For that reason, food 
importers may call for stronger discipline on the exceptions to GATT Article XI.1 which 
prohibits export restrictions other than export taxes. For example, Article XI.2 permits 
temporary quantitative export restrictions to relieve critical food shortage in an exporting 
country.
255
 
The IMF recognises food security as a legitimate concern. However, the IMF 
argues that food security could be addressed through increased trade rather than subsidies, 
preferential treatment of select groups of producers or restrictions on trade.
256
  
As Anderson points out, if Japan‟s claim of food security is inconsistent with real 
market mechanisms, does this then mean that Japan‟s low self-sufficiency rate is merely 
an ostensible reason for the closed nature of Japan‟s market? It is often pointed out that 
Japan‟s agricultural trade policy has its foundations in the country‟s political system. In 
spite of the dwindling number of farmers, Japan‟s farm lobby remains hugely influential, 
partly as a result of the overrepresentation of rural constituencies in the Diet. 
The ruling LDP has strong roots among a rural population that has become even 
more important in recent years as urban voters have grown dissatisfied with LDP politics. 
The farming sector has long been a traditional support not only for the ruling LDP but 
also for the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the former major opposition party. This is 
due to the electoral system and the insufficient adjustment of certain electoral districts to 
the demographic shift to urban areas. As a result, the voting system is weighted in favour 
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of the farming population. While the farming population may be falling, the number of 
people dependent on the large farm associations, such as Nokyo, which provide 
everything from life insurance to fertilisers, is still very large. They have a powerful ally 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) and a close relationship with 
politicians in the government.
257
 As a result, the political significance of protecting the 
agricultural sector is extremely high, not leaving much leeway for concessions in 
agricultural trade negotiations.
258
 
 
2-5. The food safety argument 
Japan‟s emphasis on food safety compounds the problem posed by Japanese 
agricultural import restrictions. The difficulty in dealing with food safety issues can be 
clearly seen in bilateral trade disputes. As in the case of the argument about food security, 
some observers point out that Japan‟s attitudes to food safety diverge so widely from 
some other WTO members that they may prove impossible to reconcile.
259
 If so, more 
trade disputes over food safety appear inevitable. 
A conspicuous example is a bilateral dispute with the United States on Japan‟s 
testing requirements for imported apples. The US complained that Japanese quarantine 
testing procedures for agricultural commodities were unnecessarily complex and 
burdensome and violated a WTO requirement that testing be based on scientific principles 
and risk assessment. The US trade authorities criticised that Japanese quarantine testing 
procedures were systematically discriminating against US farm exports.
260
 In response to 
the US complaint, the WTO panel ruled that Japan‟s testing requirements for imported 
apples and other produce breached fair trade rules. The panel report confirmed an interim 
finding that the Japanese measures requiring each variety of a product to be separately 
tested for the destructive codling moth were not backed by sufficient scientific evidence. 
The panel said Japan had the right to take appropriate measures to avoid importing the 
codling moth pest, which does not exist in Japan. But it had not tried to establish 
scientific backing for its strict procedures, as WTO rules require. The panel report marked 
a further step in defining WTO rules on what constitutes adequate scientific evidence for 
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high food safety standards, a sensitive and controversial area. At the same time, this 
bilateral dispute with the US clearly showed Japan‟s closed nature with respect to the 
agricultural market in relation to food safety issues. 
 
3. The EU agricultural trade policy 
3-1. The Common Agricultural Policy 
The agricultural policy of the EC/EU member states had been regulated since 
very early on at Community-level as stipulated in Articles 32 to 38 in Title II of the EC 
Treaty.
261
 The memory of post-war food shortages was still vivid and thus agriculture 
constituted a key element from the outset of the EC. Moreover, the founding of the 
Common Market was based on a balance of interests between countries with predominant 
agricultural interests versus those with mainly industrial interests. 
The Treaty of Rome defined the general objectives of the CAP. The principles of 
the CAP were set out at the Stresa Conference in July 1958. In 1960, the CAP 
mechanisms were adopted by the six founding Member States and two years later, in 
1962, the CAP came into force.  
The CAP is comprised of a set of rules and mechanisms, which regulate the 
production, trade and processing of agricultural products in the EU, with attention being 
focused increasingly on rural development.
262
 Among the European Union's policies, the 
CAP is regarded as one of the most important policy areas.
263
 Not only because of its 
share of the EU budget (almost 50 per cent, decreasing over the years), the vast number of 
people employed in the agricultural sector and the extent of the territory directly affected, 
but also because of its symbolic significance, and the extent of sovereignty transferred 
from national to European level. The significance of the CAP nowadays is also portrayed 
by the fact that it is directly related to the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), two key areas in achieving European integration. 
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The objectives of the CAP, as set out in Article 33 of the EC Treaty, are: 
 
4.) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the 
factors of production, in particular labour 
 
5.) to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture 
 
6.) to stabilise markets 
 
7.) to assure the availability of supplies 
 
8.) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices 
 
The CAP succeeded in reaching its initial goals.
264
 As a result of CAP, EU 
agricultural production is like in Japan heavily subsidised. It encouraged both production 
and productivity, stabilised the markets, secured supplies and protected farmers from 
fluctuations in world markets.
265
 
 
3-2. Export subsidies 
In contrast to Japan, the EU decided not only to subsidise production but also 
export of agricultural products in order to cope with the problem of overproduction and 
the goal of protecting farm incomes. Subsidising agriculture means that production and 
input use in subsidising countries are higher than would be the case in the absence of 
protection. The maintenance of high levels of protection in the EU under the CAP has 
resulted in excessive intensification of input use, resulting in the deterioration of the rural 
environment and natural resources. It is pointed out that reducing protection in the EU 
would lead to a reduction in EU farm production and a significant decrease in farm input 
use. Agricultural exporters in other countries would also benefit from the resultant 
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relative increase in world prices for a range of agricultural commodities. Furthermore, 
support of agriculture costs nearly twice as much as agricultural wages in the EU.
266
 
In order to make European agricultural exports competitive with the much lower 
world market prices, the EU decided to pay „restitution‟ or „export refunds‟ equal to the 
difference between EU and world prices. However, such a practice of exporting goods at 
a price that is below cost is condemned as „dumping‟. Under WTO rules for non-food 
items, this is normally not permitted, especially when the practice is driven by 
government subsidies. Until the Uruguay Round, however, the WTO placed few 
restrictions on the dumping of agricultural goods.  
The problem with dumping is that it depressed world prices for food and thereby 
infuriated food exporters based outside of the EU. The biggest losers from the CAP‟s 
dumping were the largest food-exporting nations, notably those grouped in the Cairns 
Group. Most countries practice some form of import protection on food, so while the 
CAP‟s tariffs were harmful to the world market, they were not viewed as particularly out 
of line with rest of the world‟s practice. The subsidised exports of food, however, were 
more unusual.  
Brussels asserted that its subsidies were within WTO rules. But the Cairns Group 
argued that while they were within the legal limits, export subsidies were inconsistent 
with the spirit of the rules. They argued that the EU had exploited a loophole in the rules 
by accumulating subsidy entitlements when world prices were high.
267
 
The differences in policies on export subsidies had also prompted exchanges 
between Brussels and Washington. In October 1999, Franz Fischler, the EU Agriculture 
Commissioner, refuted US criticism of the CAP, arguing that it was an attempt to deflect 
attention from the US‟ reluctance to negotiate on politically sensitive sectors. He said 
agricultural support spending was actually falling in the EU but rising in the US. His 
comments followed a warning by Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, that 
Washington‟s modest trade policy objectives could prevent the trade negotiations from 
proceeding.
268
 
The EU‟s criticism of US agricultural policy stems from the fact that the United 
States has been subsidising agricultural production as well as the export of agricultural 
products. The export subsidies under the US Export Enhancement Programme have been 
very costly to the US, have added only very modestly in proportional terms to the EC/EU 
budgetary cost of the Common Agricultural Policy, and have imposed large costs on 
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agricultural products exporting countries. 
 
3-3. The food safety argument 
While Japan has no agricultural export subsidies, both the EU and Japan share 
concerns about food safety. The EU-US confrontation over the safety of beef is a good 
illustration. In 1997, the WTO dispute panels ruled against the EU ban on hormone-
treated beef, because it had not been preceded by a proper scientific risk assessment. The 
case was the first big test of the WTO‟s new food safety rules – called SPS, or sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary rules. These were designed to reduce conflicts over the issue. They 
require safety regulations that exceed internationally agreed standards to be justified by 
scientific evidence. But although the WTO hormones‟ ruling is widely seen as a landmark, 
it raises as many questions as it answers. Both Brussels and Washington interpreted the 
decision as a victory but disagreed over whether it required the beef ban to be lifted 
immediately. The EU said it had the right to establish, on a scientific basis, a level of 
consumer protection which it considers appropriate, even if it is higher than the level 
resulting from international health standards.
269
 
 
4. The EU and Japan in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) 
4-1. The Uruguay Round: its inauguration and conclusion 
Protectionist agricultural trade policies of GATT contracting members, such as 
that of the EC/EU and Japan, resulted in extreme distortions of agricultural trade. The 
period since the 1950s has seen substantial growth in agricultural protectionism in the 
advanced industrial economies spreading to newly industrialising economies.
270
 Those 
tendencies accelerated in the 1980s.
271
 The growth of agricultural protectionism in 
industrialised countries has contributed to the long-term downward trend in the 
international price of farm products relative to that of industrial products. The extent of 
decline of the relative price of food, together with the EC/EU‟s provision from the latter 
1970s of export subsidies to dispose of its policy-induced surplus, stimulated the US to 
defend its export markets by subsidising US farm exports as well – a move that 
contributed to international food prices falling by 1987 to their lowest level that century 
in real terms.  
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As a consequence of these policy developments, the deadweight welfare losses in 
those protectionist countries from distorting their food markets more than doubled over 
the 1980s, while the benefits to their farmers as a group increased by about 50 per cent. 
According to one set of estimates from a multi-commodity model of world food markets, 
the annual benefits of these policies to farmers in Western Europe, the United States and 
Japan rose from 94 billion dollars to 141 billion dollars over the 1980s (in 1985 US 
dollars), while the cost to consumers in those countries rose from 120 billion dollars to 
216 billion dollars. The study estimates the direct global loss of economic welfare as a 
result of the food policies of the industrialised countries to have trebled in the 1980s, 
rising from 16 billion dollars to 50 billion dollars. That does not include the costs of 
lobbying for and administering these policies, nor that of the collection and by-product 
distortion costs of raising government revenue needed to finance the subsidies, let alone 
the indirect cost these policies imposed in terms of holding up the Uruguay Round‟s 
conclusion.
272
 
In the early 1980s, there was a growing concern that agricultural protection 
would continue, unless explicitly checked. Agricultural products exporting countries 
argued that real liberalisation means providing substantial improvement in market access, 
the elimination of trade-distorting subsides and fairer trade rules.
273
 These international 
circumstances surrounding agricultural trade made it unavoidable for the GATT to 
include farm policies in the Uruguay Round.  
The Punta del Este Declaration, which launched the Uruguay Round in July 1986, 
stated that the central objective for reforming the conduct of agricultural trade was  „to 
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and 
more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines‟.274 This clearly committed all 
GATT contracting members to allow their domestic agricultural policies to be the subject 
of international negotiations, as well as trade policies aimed directly at restricting imports 
and expanding exports at the expense of foreign competitors.
275
 
Keeping agriculture on the agenda for the Round was the initial concern of the 
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agricultural products exporting countries, such as the Cairns Group.
276
 It succeeded in 
attracting unprecedented attention to the agricultural issue during the Round, overcoming 
opposition from the EC/EU and Japan. The Cairns Group achieved its aim because of the 
solidarity of the group on agricultural issues. Declining agricultural export earnings was a 
political priority in all Cairns Group countries. Since the Uruguay Round, the Cairns 
Group, as a grouping of producers of agricultural products, has been a significant player 
in the GATT. 
For the US, agriculture was also the top priority for the Uruguay Round. The US 
deemed the effort necessary to open significant new opportunities for American 
agricultural exporters as well as to strengthen the global trading system so that all 
countries might compete on equal terms. On agriculture, the top US priority was to regain 
its market share of world trade in agricultural products, which had declined during the 
early 1980s, by negotiating through the GATT the abolishment of all forms of agricultural 
support and protection. The US was strongly supported by the Cairns Group.
277
 Among a 
variety of proposals tabled in late 1987 and early 1988 for the Uruguay Round, the US 
proposal was very radical.
278
 The US proposal was for a sweeping elimination of all 
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies by the year 2000, or over a ten year period (the so-
called zero option). It is unlikely that the US really believed that the EC and Japan would 
accept the zero option. The first negotiating proposal by the US in July 1987 was an 
ideological trial balloon launched by the US in the hope that political and economic 
trends would be favourable to achieving the desired result.
279
 EC officials felt the United 
States was insincere and only trying to scuttle an agreement by starting from a position 
everyone knew was unacceptable. Behind its strong stance on agricultural trade, the US 
also had an ulterior political objective, namely to reassert US political and economic 
hegemony by forcing the EC and Japan to tear down their trade barriers. Many officials in 
Reagan‟s administration (1981-1989) felt that the EC and Japan should help make a 
bigger contribution to the cost of US efforts to manage the international political 
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economy.
280
 
The EC‟s stance on agriculture during the Uruguay Round was reactive rather 
than innovative. The EC‟s position in the Round stemmed from the following four points: 
1). the presence of many small, inefficient producers in several countries unable to 
compete in open world markets, 2). the power of agricultural groups in its political system, 
3). the non-farm wealth to afford farm subsidies, and 4). problems of reaching consensus 
on change among the 12 countries on any issue. Due to those points, the EC was not able 
to exert leadership. Among the above four points, owing to conflicting interests of its 
members, it was particularly problematic to develop a common negotiating strategy. The 
Council of Ministers eventually agreed to the talks, provided that discussion covered 
everyone‟s direct and indirect forms of support for agriculture, not just the EC‟s.281  
Rather than forward its own proposals for reform, the Community chose to react 
to proposals for reform tabled by others, most notably by the United States and the Cairns 
Group.
 
The EC remained implacably opposed to the zero option on any time scale. 
Although the EC was prepared to contemplate modifying the CAP, it would not consider 
phasing it out. Throughout the Uruguay Round, the EC was under pressure from its 
agricultural trading partners which wanted improved market access to the EC market for 
their exports, as well as an end to subsidised competition in third country markets. 
Besides, there was internal pressure for reform for mainly budgetary reasons. 
Japan generally welcomed the initiation of the Uruguay Round, seeing in it a 
way to stem the rising protectionism in the US. Even the Japanese farm lobby, under 
strong bilateral pressure from the US to open the Japanese rice market to external 
competition, sought to use the Round as a shelter from this bilateral pressure. It was 
hoped that because of Japan‟s huge export surplus with the US, the protection of Japanese 
agriculture might emerge more favourably from multilateral rather than from bilateral 
negotiations, due to the support of other major food importers, such as the EC. This 
explains why, in April 1986, the Japanese government stated that it was not prepared to 
deal with the rice issue bilaterally, but only through the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. For the Round, the Japanese government was prepared to make 
minimum concessions on agriculture in the negotiations as were needed to ensure the 
success of the Round as a whole. Japan‟s attitude towards the Round was based on 
Japan‟s belief that, in the past, the primary aim of GATT negotiations on agriculture was 
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to benefit exporters at the expense of importers. Therefore, as the world‟s largest importer 
of agricultural products, Japan saw its role to defend the interest of food importers.
282
 
In November 1988, the US submitted a Framework Proposal which was 
specifically designed to set the agenda for future negotiations and as a guide for the Mid-
Term Review of progress made during the first two years of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. A framework agreement reached in the Mid-Term Review specified that the 
primary long-term objective of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations was “to provide for 
substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an 
agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in 
world agricultural markets”. This commitment was reaffirmed by heads of the seven 
major industrial nations at the summit meeting held in Houston in July 1990.
283
 A central 
element of the Framework Proposal was the „tariffication‟ of all agricultural trade NTBs. 
It meant that all NTBs should be converted to their tariff equivalents and bound. The US 
and the Cairns Group proposal contrasted with that of the EC and Japan which continued 
to refuse substantial alteration of their support policies and preferred market sharing 
arrangements. However, in the middle of the Uruguay Round, the US and the Cairns 
Group signalled a willingness to move away from the zero option and compromise 
towards a more realistic position of a short-term roll back of agricultural support, export 
subsidies and trade barriers. 
Towards the end of the negotiations, the EC and Japan‟s stance also changed. 
The EC‟s stance became more flexible in certain respects, largely as a result of rising 
internal pressure for a fundamental reform of the CAP. Despite the internal opposition to 
reduce agricultural protection, the Japanese government took some steps to relax barriers 
to agricultural imports. In June 1988, Japan decided to abandon all quota restrictions on 
beef and fresh oranges from April 1991. 
Throughout the Round, the position of Japan was close to that of the EC. Japan 
was prepared to make concessions equivalent to those conceded by the EC. Japan‟s 
position did not change after September 1990, although Japan was prepared for last 
minute compromises at the abortive „final‟ meeting of the Uruguay Round held in 
Brussels in December of that year. For that purpose, members of the ruling party were in 
Brussels as it was expected that the EC would make some further concessions on 
agriculture in exchange for gains made in other areas of the negotiations and to ensure the 
success of the Round as a whole. Japanese politicians needed to be there in case Japan 
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had to consider making last minute adjustments to its own position in response to moves 
by the EC.
284
 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture reached in the Uruguay Round stated that it 
recognised „that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support 
and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process.‟ 285  Members 
agreed that negotiations for continuing the process would be initiated one year before the 
end of the implementation period, taking into account: (a) the experience to that date from 
implementing the reduction commitments;  (b) the effects of the reduction commitments 
on world trade in agriculture; (c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to 
developing country members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system, and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the 
preamble to this agreement;  and (d) what further commitments are necessary to achieve 
the above mentioned long-term objectives‟.286 Shinji Hattori, Professor at Toyo University, 
argues that the agreement was made on the basis of a compromise reached between the 
US-Cairns Group and the EC/EU-Japan. In the agreement, he wrote, we see the 
expression of „substantial progressive reductions‟. The term „substantial‟ was included 
due to the demand from the US and other agricultural products exporting countries. The 
term „progressive‟ was mentioned in the agreement because of the demand from the 
EC/EU and Japan. He also argues that the agreement refers to the term „long-term 
objective‟, because of the demand from the EC/EU and Japan, which intended to play for 
time on agricultural reform. The term „an ongoing process‟ was put in the agreement by 
the US and Cairns Group which wanted to emphasise the continuation of agricultural 
reform.
287
 
However, this EC/EU-Japan relationship does not mean that the EC/EU and 
Japan maintained cooperation throughout the Round. Their stance for the tariffication of 
border measures, for instance, showed a clear difference. The issue of tariffication of 
border measures was highly important for Japan due to the concern of opening its rice 
market. Although Japan was strongly against tariffication, the EC/EU partially accepted 
the principle of tariffication. On the issue of export subsidies, Japan favoured its 
elimination, while the EC/EU was stubbornly against it.
288
 Japan proposed a freeze on 
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export subsidies which would subsequently be phased out, a reduction of domestic 
subsidies which lead to trade distortions and negotiated improvements in market access. 
Shinji Hattori argues that in the Uruguay Round‟s agricultural negotiations, there was no 
„strategic cooperation‟ between the EC/EU and Japan. According to him, Japan 
maintained the same distance from the US as from the EC/EU in terms of its negotiating 
position. The EC/EU and Japan did not make their cooperation clear, while the US and 
Cairns Group showed clear cooperation.
289
 The US sought to isolate the EC/EU by 
emphasising common interests with some members of the Cairns Group and Japan.
290
 
Interested in easing bilateral economic but also security relations with the US, throughout 
the talks Japan generally „kept its head low‟ while US and EC/EU officials engaged one 
another. David N. Balaam argues that Japan‟s negotiating style reflected an effort to 
appear cooperative and a team player, thereby playing a more positive role in the 
international system.
291
 
In November 1992, the US and the EC/EU settled most of their differences on 
agriculture in a deal known informally as the “Blair House Accord”. By July 1993 the 
“Quad” (US, EC/EU, Japan and Canada) announced significant progress in negotiations 
on tariffs and related subjects, such as market access. It took until 15 December 1993 for 
every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and 
services to be concluded. On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by ministers from most 
of the 123 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco. 
 
4-2. Conclusion of the Uruguay Round and its impact on Japanese and EU agricultural 
policy 
The concluded Uruguay Round‟s Agreement on Agriculture had three main aims: 
a reduction in farm export subsidies, an increase in market access and cuts in domestic 
producer subsidies.
292
 The tariffs on agricultural products were now bound and were to be 
reduced over the implementation period (1995-2000). Another important element of the 
agreement was the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for industrial country 
                                                 
289 Hattori, „Global-ka wo ikiru nihon nougyou‟, P104, P105 
290 John Peterson also argues that throughout the Round, “US negotiators proved 
resourceful and creative in isolating the EC on the agricultural issue”. - John Peterson, 
„ Europe and America in the 1990s‟, (Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1993),  
P16 
291 Hocking and McGuire (eds), „Trade Politics, International, Domestic and Regional 
Perspectives‟, P62, 63 
292 For details of the Agriculture Agreement made in the Uruguay Round, see the WTO, 
„Agriculture fairer market for farmers‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm) 
105 
 
farmers. AMS was agreed to be reduced by a four-fifth of its 1986-88 level by the turn of 
the century.
293
  
As a result of the Uruguay Round, agriculture finally became a mainstream issue 
of the WTO, which allowed other agreements in the Uruguay Round to be concluded.
294
 
In addition, it was agreed to reopen agricultural negotiations by the end of 1999 to 
continue the process of agricultural reform.
295
 Moreover, the requirement to transform 
NTBs into tariffs, to quantify the AMS and to notify all subsequent policy changes to the 
WTO‟s Committee on agriculture were major contributions to transparency. The new 
rules and obligations were expected to constrain further agricultural protection growth in 
both advanced and newly industrialised countries.
 
The wider effects of an overall GATT 
deal were expected to boost incomes in many countries, leading to rising demand for food 
products. This in turn was predicted to be likely to feed through into higher prices.
296
 It 
was hoped that these new rules would promise greater certainty and stability in 
international food markets in the next century. However, implementing the agricultural 
reforms agreed in the Uruguay Round involved only very modest liberalisation by 2000, 
with plenty of room for disputes over compliance during the implementation period and 
the need for further reductions in the future.
297
  
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round left a considerable impact on the EU and 
Japan‟s agricultural policy. 298  Throughout the cumbersome trade negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round, the EC/EU and Japan negotiated individually on the agricultural issue, 
while the US and Cairns Group formed a united front against the EC/EU and Japan. The 
EC/EU and Japan faced strong pressure from the US-Cairns Group coalition. This put the 
EC/EU and Japan on the defensive and forced them to agree to wide-ranging concessions 
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in the farm trade negotiations. This led to drastic changes in their farm trade policies.  
The main issue for Japan in the Uruguay Round was its closed rice market and 
the combined pressure from the US and the Cairns Group forced the Japanese 
government, against very strong resistance from domestic political interest groups, to end 
its total closure to foreign exports. It proved very difficult to convert the total ban on rice 
imports into a monetary levy.
299
 Japan refused initially to agree to even a partial opening 
of its rice market in the Uruguay Round, citing the devastating effect of cheap imported 
rice on domestic producers. Refusing to replace the total ban with a tariff scheme, Japan 
accepted at the end of 1993 the Minimum Access which obliged Japan to import a 
minimum amount of rice which would be gradually increased until 2000. Under this 
scheme, Japan had to import 4 per cent of the domestic rice demand in the first year of 
opening the market to imports.
300
 In 1995, the Japanese government imported 410,000 
tonnes of foreign rice, mostly from the US, China, Australia and Thailand, according to 
the MAFF. Of that amount, as much as nearly 70 per cent, or 280,000 tonnes, ended up as 
inventory kept in case of emergencies, and 90,000 tonnes went towards processed foods 
such as miso (a soup paste), while just 30,000 - 40,000 tonnes was distributed as rice for 
straightforward consumption, mostly in ethnic food restaurants, according to a ministry 
official.
301
 Imported rice was also used as food aid for developing countries, including 
North Korea.
302
 In 1997, imports rose to 511,000 tonnes. Combined with the 310,000 
tonnes left over as inventories, Japan had 821,000 tonnes of imported rice.  
The Minimum Access had led to a slow but steady increase in imported rice. As 
domestic farmers felt strong pressure from the production surpluses, they realised that a 
tariff scheme was more effective in protecting domestic agricultural industries from 
foreign competition. The introduction of the tariff scheme allowed Japan to raise the 
annual rate of rice imports by only 0.4 per cent during fiscal 1999 and fiscal 2000, 
compared with 0.8 per cent under the Minimum Access system. At the end of 1998, 
domestic farmers accepted the government‟s proposal for a tariff scheme. The ruling LDP, 
the agricultural ministry and the Zenchu, the farm lobby, agreed to switch from a system 
of import quotas to tariffication. In April 1999, Japan introduced weight-based tariffs of 
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about 1000 per cent, which is a flat tariff of 351.17 yen per kg and cut it to 341 yen per kg 
in April 2000, in a move that allowed it to avoid boosting the Minimum Access level. 
Japan was allowed to slow the pace of growth in mandated rice imports if it adopted 
tariffs before FY 2001.
303
 This tariffication raised the price of popular brands of US rice 
to 500 yen, or 25 per cent more than quality brands of domestic rice. This tariff rate 
triggered outrage among its trading partners.
304
 The US and Australian governments 
immediately expressed concern that 1000 per cent tariffs could cripple their rice exports 
to Japan.  
Objections to the Japanese tariff quota system were also raised by the EC/EU, 
Argentina and Uruguay. They claimed that the Japanese tariff rates were excessive and 
would block their agricultural exports to the Japanese market. Under a 1980 decision by 
the GATT, any WTO member country can raise objections to a change in another 
member‟s tariff policy within three months of the change being reported to the WTO 
secretariat. Despite the objections from some countries, Japan introduced the tariff regime 
without the WTO‟s formal recognition. The EC/EU, Australia and Argentina dropped 
their objections to Japan‟s tariff scheme soon after it was introduced, as Japan explained 
that Japanese tariff rates were calculated in compliance with the WTO rules.
305
 Uruguay, 
which exports about 5,000 tons of rice to Japan annually, was the only consistent 
opponent but in the end followed suit after strong persuasion from Japan. As Uruguay 
withdrew its objections, the WTO secretariat had issued a letter confirming that all 140 
WTO members approved Japan‟s tariff scheme for rice. While the new scheme liberalised 
Japan‟s politically sensitive rice market, it levied heavy tariffs on foreign rice imports, 
except rice imported under the „Minimum Access‟ deal.  
A government-controlled import system, for example, makes it difficult for 
retailers to offer steady supplies, even if they wanted to. Under the system, the Japanese 
government holds a tender for the high quality rice destined for sale to consumers four 
times a year. The tenders have generally been held every quarter but importers are not 
given precise information on the timing of the sales or the quantities being offered. As a 
result, large supermarket operators have no plans to offer customers imported rice, even 
though they found reasonable demand for the imported rice. The MAFF acknowledged 
that only a small amount of imported rice goes to supermarkets but said this is simply a 
result of poor market demand. However, the government clearly has no interest in making 
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it easier for consumers to become more familiar with imported rice. 
Apart from the interest of protecting its agricultural sectors, another problem the 
Japanese government faces is that while it has agreed to liberalise the rice market in the 
Uruguay Round, it faces an excess of domestic production. Japanese consumers have 
been eating more bread and pasta and less rice. In the year 1997, the surplus came to 3.62 
million tonnes.
306
 The Japanese agreement on Minimum Access at the end of the Uruguay 
Round was made by a coalition government which did not include the LDP.
307
 The LDP 
and the farm lobby have never forgiven the responsible politicians and officials for that. 
Japan‟s agreement was registered as a significant defeat and the ruling conservative 
parties do not want a repeat of that.
308
 Rice farmers have called for a repeal of the 
Uruguay Round agreement. There are many members of the ruling LDP who also want to 
see a repeal of the agreement.
309
  
The main issue for the EU was the export subsidies. In terms of export subsides, 
the EU faced cuts in subsidies to its domestic farm producers. Europe has managed to 
preserve direct payments to farmers as compensation for falling prices. Although income 
support for farmers must be reduced by 20 per cent in developed countries over the life of 
the deal – 13.3 per cent in developing countries – the EU gained exemptions for some 
direct payments. This means farmers could still be paid for growing less and for structural 
adjustment which is an important part of reform of the CAP. The EU farm industry was 
predicted to see its income decline in the short term, although this could be attributed 
more to CAP reform that to the GATT settlement. In the long run, farmers could make up 
for reductions in the artificially high support prices by increasing output or improving 
productivity. At the same time, introduction of tariffs for imports rather than NTBs would 
provide European farmers with even greater protection than they enjoyed before. But 
these tariffs were going to be reduced by 36 per cent over six years for developed 
countries, and 24 per cent for developing countries over 10 years.  
According to the Uruguay Round agreement, the value of subsidised exports had 
to be reduced over six years under the terms of the Blair House Accord. The reduction is 
prescribed as 36 per cent below the base period of 1986 to 1990. At the same time, the 
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quantity of these subsidised exports had to be cut by 21 per cent. These provisions almost 
brought the entire agreement to its knees when the French government called for 
modifications, fearing their farmers would lose export markets. The US and the EC/EU 
later agreed to stage the cuts from a higher 1991-1992 base line, allowing European 
farmers to export an extra 8m tonnes of cereal over the six year period.
310
 
In the Uruguay Round, an agreement on cutting and setting a ceiling on the 
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies was made under American leadership. As a result, 
the American ceiling was set at 19.1 billion dollars, while the ceiling of the EC/EU was 
69 billion euro. In 1996, US Congress passed the Freedom to Farm Act aimed at phasing 
out subsidies for most agricultural products. The US farm subsidies which were regarded 
as trade-distorting were reduced substantially to a level below its permitted ceiling. 
However, while trade-distorting subsidies were reduced, Washington started to provide a 
series of emergency payments to farmers. These emergency payments pushed up the total 
amount of US agricultural subsidies and spoiled the previous effort of 1996. Thanks to the 
introduced emergency payments, the US was suspected of breaking Uruguay Round 
commitments, although the US insisted that the utmost care was paid to follow the 
WTO‟s limits.311 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement (to limit the use of quarantine import restrictions to 
cases that can be justified scientifically)
312
 and the Dispute Settlement Agreement (which 
has greatly improved the process of resolving trade conflicts)
313
, ensured that agricultural 
trade would be much less chaotic in future compared to the time prior to the formation of 
the WTO in 1995.
314
 However, even after the introduction of those agreements, defects 
could be still found in them.  
With regard to the food safety issue, the WTO recognises the right of 
governments to take measures to protect human, animal and plant health, as long as these 
are based on science, are necessary for health protection, and do not unjustifiably 
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discriminate against suppliers. Governments continue to determine the food safety levels 
and animal and plant health protection in their countries. Neither the WTO nor any other 
international body does this. The SPS Agreement does, however, encourage governments 
to „harmonise‟ or base their national measures on international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations, such as those from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) / 
World Health Organisation (WHO) / Codex Alimentarius Commission (food safety); the 
Office International des Epizooties (animal health); and the FAO International Plant 
Protection Convention (plant health).
315
 
In terms of food safety, neither the ruling of the DSB nor the SPS rules say how 
scientific risk assessment should be conducted, their findings interpreted or, most 
crucially, how much risk is sufficient to justify trade restrictions. The problem here is that 
scientific opinion is often not clear cut and is notoriously subject to change. Parts of the 
SPS rules agreed at US insistence in the Uruguay Round are also ambiguous. It is said 
that the rules were much affected by US interests. The Clinton administration aimed to 
stop countries using their food safety rules to keep blocking farm trade, however, it was 
equally determined to assert its right to bar imports that did not meet its own 
environmental standards.  
Trying to have it both ways created a muddle. These inconsistencies and legal 
loop holes raise doubts about how far US faith in „sound science‟ as the international 
benchmark for food safety regulations is realistic or politically feasible. In order to deal 
with the uncertainty of food safety rules, it has been discussed whether the WTO dispute 
panel should define their applications much more precisely. This means that it is 
necessary to specify how scientific evidence should be interpreted and set the minimum 
risk levels required to justify import curbs.
316
 
There has been a growing international concern at the use of food safety and 
animal and plant health regulations as barriers to trade. Increasing use of such actions led 
to the inclusion of an international agreement on sanitary measures in the Uruguay Round 
of global trade talks. Many WTO members, especially those from developing countries, 
fear that new food safety rules could be used as an excuse for protectionism.
317
 
Due to the continuing strong protection of agricultural trade by some member 
countries including the EU and Japan, it was said that the 1993 agreement of the Uruguay 
Round produced little liberalisation. In fact, tariffs were still set high in some agricultural 
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products importing countries such as Japan. However, the accord at least opened the 
possibility of further cuts in farm support in a future trade round. Agricultural 
liberalisation talks remained a critical issue for the EU and Japan.  
 
 
5.  The Seattle Ministerial Conference (30 November – 3 December 1999) 
In the Seattle meeting, the EU and Japan were pressing for a broad-based round 
that would go much further than the already-programmed talks on agriculture and 
services, the so-called „built-in agenda‟. They wished for a comprehensive round 
including tariff cuts for manufactured goods, competition policy and reform of anti-
dumping rules. However, the US favoured a narrow round based mainly on negotiating 
improved market access for goods and services. The EU-Japan‟s intention of broadening 
the agenda was seen as a manoeuvre to dilute inevitable concessions in agriculture.
318
 
The text released for the Seattle WTO Ministerial by the EU sent a rather 
negative message on agriculture. The EU insisted on the aspect of Article 20 of the 
URAA which could be easily used for protectionist purposes, in particular, by focusing on 
the effects of implementing the reduction commitments made under the agreement, and 
by taking into account the “non-trade concerns” (for Article 20 of the URAA and non-
trade concerns; see 5-1). However, the EU did not mention the basic fact that Article 20 is 
titled „Continuation of the Reform Process‟ and starts by “Recognising that the long-term 
objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection […].”319  
The EU text offered no perspective about further EU tariff or export subsidy 
reductions or tariff-quota increases. Besides, the text stated that the coming negotiations 
should lead to the renewal of the “peace clause” (a provision that de facto excludes farm 
subsidies from the WTO dispute settlement regime) and should deal with the elimination 
of specific barriers, such as state-trading companies, export credit schemes, food aid and 
loan deficiency payments – all barriers used more by EU trading partners than by the EU. 
Moreover, the EU‟s text insisted on “non-trade concerns” as legitimate restrictions in 
farm trade (see below 5-1).
320
 
The initial EU approach was seen as tough negotiating tactics, consisting, at the 
beginning of the talks, of offering no concessions and demanding maximum concessions 
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from its partners. In November 2000, the EU approved a negotiating proposal including 
the reduction of tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support. Though the proposal 
shows the EU‟s willingness to negotiate, its offers are still very limited: an overall 
average reduction of tariffs, with a minimum reduction per tariff line (contrary to the 
traditional EU approach toward manufacturing tariffs); only “further reductions” (not 
elimination) of export subsidies; and the maintenance of the existing domestic support 
(subsidy) regime. The EU‟s proposal was perceived by EU trading partners as open 
enough that in March 2001 they decided to start the second phase of agriculture talks in 
the WTO. However, throughout the Seattle Ministerial Meeting, the EU took an overall 
defensive position. It reflects the very limited domestic reforms achieved by the EU since 
the Uruguay Round. 
321
 
Den Glickman, the then US Agriculture Secretary said that there was a tendency 
by the EU and other countries to want to preserve the status quo and that this was not 
acceptable to the US, because the status quo worked to the tremendous disadvantage of 
the US, which is export-dependent. However, critics accused the US of wanting it both 
ways, because it continued to protect its own market. Washington was planning 8.7billion 
dollars in an emergency farm aid in 1999 to compensate for drought and low prices. Mark 
Vaile, Australia‟s Trade Minister said that this US move sent entirely the wrong signal to 
the international community, particularly to other subsidising countries, in the lead up to 
Seattle. In the US, some senators were already lobbying for the reintroduction of subsidy 
regimes. The rationale for that was the EU‟s failure to liberalise its own agricultural 
regime. For this reason, Trade Ministers preparing for Seattle believed that the EU must 
make the first move on agricultural reform. Failure to do so would strengthen the 
protectionist lobby in the US. However, the EU showed little enthusiasm for farm reform 
and demanded a broader agenda for the Seattle meeting. Brussels said a comprehensive 
negotiating agenda was needed, because hard-line EU defenders of the CAP would only 
agree to liberalise farm trade if they won trade concessions in other areas. Washington 
and many other leading farm exporting countries suspected the EU was out to thwart 
agricultural liberalisation by tying the WTO up in negotiations on other issues.
322
 
 Japan, in its proposal which was made as a preparation for the 1999 ministerial 
conference, particularly insisted on establishing a set of rules and disciplines which 
emphasised three objectives.
323
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 First, Japan insisted on the importance of multifunctionality of agriculture. Japan 
demanded the WTO to allow a smooth implementation of domestic agricultural policies 
which take into account differences in natural conditions and of historical background.  
 Secondly, regarding the multifunctionality of agriculture, Japan particularly 
emphasised the importance of food security. It mentioned that the instability of food 
supply/demand in the international market should be taken into consideration.  Thirdly, 
Japan was also keen on redressing the imbalance in rights and obligations under the WTO 
rules between exporting and importing countries. This is due to Japan‟s perception that 
the URAA is not sufficient in terms of fair and equitable trade rules for food importing 
and exporting countries. 
Japan explained its basic stance to the WTO members, particularly the like-
minded members which share the idea of the importance of multifunctionality such as the 
EU, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland. They agreed that they should work in close 
conjunction in the Seattle negotiations.
324
  
In order to fill the gaps, diplomats of some WTO member countries, including 
the US, the EU and Japan, held a meeting as a last attempt to forge a high-level political 
consensus on the contents of a new round. The EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and 
Norway argued that the demand by food exporters was going far beyond the goals for the 
planned negotiations set out in the 1993 Uruguay Round agreement. Food exporters 
insisted that they would refuse to discuss any other aspects of the agenda until the terms 
of the planned negotiations on agriculture were settled. The EU acknowledged that 
agriculture, a key sticking point, was no longer a „taboo‟ for the European Union, and 
indicated that it did not rule out moving towards the application of WTO rules to 
agriculture in the long-term, but would not accept this as a goal for the next set of global 
negotiations.
325
 
Trade negotiations were locked over key portions of the draft declaration by 
Ministers which was supposed to set out the agenda for a new trade liberalisation round. 
The US, the EU and the Cairns Group were trying to thrash out a draft text on agriculture 
that would lay out a limited number of options. The EU opposed the US and Cairns 
Group‟s insistence on a reference to the elimination of export subsidies, while the EU was 
demanding references to food safety, quality and animal welfare, which the US and 
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Cairns Group found unacceptable.
326
 Behind the disagreement, there was the EU‟s effort 
to rally support behind its demand on agriculture. The EU was working on the draft text 
with other WTO members, including applicants to join the EU, Japan, Korea and other 
Asian countries, and South Africa. This plan was intended to galvanise talks on the 
preparation of the WTO agenda, which had been stalled for months by numerous 
disagreements over agriculture. This EU move was believed to be a pre-emptive tactic, 
aimed at Washington. The EU thought the US was trying to gather support for its own 
position and wanted to get its text on the table first.
327
 The European Union initiative was 
met by accusations that Brussels was trying to minimize the ambitions of new talks on 
agriculture. Suspicion was aroused, when the EU gathered some WTO members in order 
to discuss the EU‟s own version of a Ministerial text. Agricultural products exporting 
countries furiously criticised this EU move as a very divisive and harmful attempt to 
create a parallel process, although participants in the group denied this speculation.
328
  
The negotiations to reduce agricultural protectionism became a major reason for 
the failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference. Major agricultural traders had not much 
in common and agreed on little.
329
 The United States and the Cairns Group were pressing 
for further trade liberalisation on agricultural products. They demanded lower tariffs, cuts 
in domestic support and an end to export subsidies, which were mostly used by the EU. 
Developing countries, which depend on agricultural exports, were opposed to the 
members with a highly protectionist agricultural policy, such as the EU, Japan, South 
Korea, Norway and Switzerland.
330
 The US assailed the EU and Japan for erecting 
obstacles to reform agricultural trade. The EU and Japan‟s approach to the new round was 
criticized for being motivated by a desire to protect their highly distorting agricultural 
policies. The US also criticized the EU-Japan strategy for having the next round in the 
form of a „single undertaking‟, which meant no agreements could be concluded until all 
negotiations finish. The US Undersecretary of Commerce, David Aaron argued that the 
EU-Japan strategy was a „let‟s put everything in so nothing comes out‟ approach.331 The 
EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Norway reiterated that demands by Australia 
and South American agricultural farm exporters to set ambitious objectives for planned 
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negotiations on farm trade, went too far. Infuriated by this remark, Argentina, which is 
among the countries pressing for ambitious talks on liberalising agriculture, told the 
meeting that it would be better not to launch a round in Seattle that started with a flawed 
agenda.
332
 
The Seattle Ministerial Conference failed to launch a new trade round. In Seattle, 
the negotiating parties were never on the same wavelength, and the meeting ended 
without any agreement. President Clinton reflected on the meeting and said that the 
failure of the Ministerial Conference was essentially substantive in nature. He argued, 
„the big blocs here were the Europeans and the Japanese on the one hand, the United 
States and the developing nations on the other hand. We all had positions that couldn‟t be 
reconciled. The Europeans were not prepared at this time to change their Common 
Agricultural Policy, which accounts for 85 per cent of the export subsidies in the world. 
The Japanese had their own agricultural and other issues to deal with. The United States 
was not prepared to change its policy on dumping…‟333 After the collapse of the Seattle 
meeting, the EU and Japan received fierce criticism. The US trade representative, 
Charlene Barshefsky and the US Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and 
Agricultural Affairs, Alan Larson were extremely vocal in their criticism of the EU and 
Japan. According to them, the failure of the Ministerial Conference was due to the 
inflexibility by the EU and Japan on agriculture. They reiterated that the EU and Japan 
should have shown more flexibility on agricultural issues and create the conditions for the 
next round.
334
 While criticising the EU and Japan, it was reported that US President Bill 
Clinton told US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky that the US should also show 
more flexibility on agricultural issues.
335
 
  
5-1. Diverse roles of agriculture and „multifunctionality‟  
During the Seattle Ministerial Conference, the EU and Japan stubbornly insisted 
that the diverse roles of agriculture should be taken into account in agricultural trade talks. 
Despite the wide gap in the opinion on agriculture, most countries agreed on the point that 
agriculture was not merely about producing food and fibre but also included other 
functions.
336
 The focus of the debate in the WTO therefore became whether „trade-
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distorting‟ subsidies are necessary for agriculture to perform its multifunctional roles. 
Some members argued that all the objectives can and should be solved through non-trade-
distorting „green box‟ subsidies. 337  These non-trade-distorting subsidies include food 
security stocks, direct payments to producers, structural adjustment assistance, safety-net 
programmes, environmental programmes, and regional assistance programmes which are 
not linked directly to production and prices. Other member countries argued that the non-
trade concerns are closely linked to production, therefore subsidies based on production 
are needed. While the EU, Japan, South Korea and Norway lay emphasis on the need to 
tackle agricultural diversity as part of the non-trade concerns, some agricultural product 
exporting countries were concerned that non-trade concerns outside of the „green-box‟ 
might be merely a special and differential treatment for some countries.
338
 Some countries 
argued that not only agriculture but also other economic activities including industry or 
services equally embrace non-trade concerns. If the WTO addresses non-trade concerns, it 
should deal with all areas, not only agriculture.
339
 
Discourse on „non-trade concerns‟ became fierce when the WTO circulated a 
revised draft of the WTO Ministerial Declaration in October 1999. Strong disagreement 
appeared between the EU and Japan on the one side and members of the Cairns Group 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other over the EU-Japan 
demand to include the so-called concept of „multifunctionality of agriculture‟ into the 
revised draft ministerial text. The Cairns Group and the ASEAN countries insisted that 
„multifunctionality‟ was merely a disguise for protectionism. At a meeting of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development, the Cairns Group expressed “concern at the 
reintroduction of protectionism, under the guise of the concept of multifunctionality, 
which could be counterproductive to achieving the goals of sustainable development”.340 
The EU and Japan argued that more consideration should be paid to the multifunctional 
role of agriculture, such as rural development, the environment and food security. The EU 
and Japan wanted Article 20 of the existing Agreement on Agriculture dealing with „non-
trade concerns‟ to be expanded by „multifunctionality‟. 
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Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture recalls that „Commitments under the 
reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all Members, having 
regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the 
environment….‟ Although „multifunctionality‟ is not specifically mentioned, „non-trade 
concerns‟ is clearly stated in the agreement.341 However, the text does not make clear 
exactly what non-trade concerns are. This is why the debate on „non-trade concerns‟ and 
„multifunctionality‟ is contentious. The United States argued that the EU-Japan‟s concept 
of „multifunctionality‟ was not clear, therefore not worth considering until it obtained a 
better understanding. The United States, the Cairns Group and the ASEAN member 
countries insisted that agricultural negotiation should be conducted without any 
exceptions for agricultural products and in the same manner as industrial products.
342
 
„Multifunctionality‟ is the term which was once coined by Japan, and which 
became the basic approach of the EU and Japan to the 1999 Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. The EU, Japan and some other WTO members use the term 
„multifunctionality‟ as an „operationalisation of non-trade concerns‟.343 The term is an 
attempt to encapsulate the diverse roles of agriculture. Although agriculture has many 
functions, the use of the word „multifunctionality‟ has become a subject of contention. 
Parts of the disagreement stem from a lack of clarity on what multifunctionality means in 
practice.  
As well as producing secure supplies of food and fibre, agriculture has an impact 
on the quality of life, in particular on the vitality of rural areas (rural employment, society 
and cultural heritage), recreation, tourism, biological diversity, soil and water systems, 
landscape, food quality and safety and the welfare of animals. The term 
„multifunctionality‟ covers all of these diverse factors of agriculture. It is also 
complimentary and linked to sustainable agriculture and rural development. The relative 
importance of the various functions differs between localities, regions, countries or even 
groups of countries. 
The Japanese particularly emphasised that environmental conservation or 
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protection of land from natural disasters is closely linked to domestic farming operations, 
therefore they should be protected.
344The EU defines the term „multifunctionality‟ as 
follows: “Apart from its production function, agriculture encompasses other functions 
such as the preservation, the management and enhancement of the rural landscape, the 
protection of the environment, including against hazards, and a contribution to the 
viability of the rural areas”.345 Although the EU‟s definition of multifunctionality is quite 
similar to that of Japan, the EU and Japan stressed different objectives. Japan and Norway 
stressed food security and the viability of marginal rural areas as the most significant by-
products of agriculture.
346
 EU member states, particularly those in the South, stressed that 
the main by-product is not biodiversity and environmental protection, but rural 
development.
347
 
The basic fact that agriculture serves multiple functions is recognised by both the 
OECD and the FAO. In 1998, an OECD Ministerial Meeting introduced the concept of 
„multifunctionality‟ into that organisation, stating that „‟because of its multifunctional 
character, agriculture plays a particularly important role in the economic life of rural areas. 
There can be a role for policy where there is an absence of effective markets for such 
public goods, where all the costs and benefits are not internalised…‟‟.348 Despite such 
acknowledgements, the term „multifunctionality‟ has proved controversial. Its use by 
particular governments and organisations has generated suspicion that multifunctionality 
is merely an excuse for defending current agricultural policies and vested interests. 
Although some criticism of the invention or use of multifunctionality to defend current 
policy is valid, this does not refute the existence or importance of the multiple functions 
of agriculture.
349
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Although much of the recent debate has focused on whether to use the term 
„multifunctionality‟, the real point at issue is what it implies for actual policy making. 
Large differences in the degree and nature of multifunctionality exist between regions and 
between farm types within regions. For example, the availability of agricultural land and 
its proximity to local communities differs substantially between the EU and the US. This 
had produced different approaches to agricultural and environment related policies. 
„Multifunctionality‟ requires policies tailored to the specific circumstances of different 
countries and regions. Governments must therefore have the appropriate degree of policy 
flexibility in accordance with their level of development. The EU and Japan argue that the 
„one-size-fits-all‟ model of agriculture is inappropriate and cannot reflect the 
environmental, social and cultural diversity that exists around the world.
350
 The EU, 
Japan, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland which recognise the „multifunctional‟ role 
of agriculture also formed a group called „multifunctional friends‟.  
There are powerful arguments against the EU-Japan‟s „multifunctional‟ concept, 
at least as an argument for broadly based agricultural protection. The US and the Cairns 
Group strongly disagreed with the idea of „multifunctionality‟. The Cairns Group did not 
even accept the concept of „multifunctionality‟. Japan rejected talks with the Cairns 
Group, until they accepted the idea of multifunctionality.
351
  
The US and Cairns Group‟s rejection of „multifunctionality‟ gained support from 
some academics. Among the critics, Freeman and Roberts criticise „multifunctionality‟ for 
two reasons. Firstly, there are more effective and less costly ways of maintaining what 
people in society want. Secondly, subsidising agricultural production has been shown to 
also increase the negative effect of agriculture, including causing ongoing damage to rural 
environments. Freeman and Roberts argue that if the EU and Japan‟s push for the 
recognition of „multifunctionality‟ is successful, distortions to world markets and damage 
to efficient agricultural producers elsewhere, including developing countries, will 
continue. Potential benefits from trade negotiations on agriculture would be jeopardised. 
They say „multifunctional‟ effects apply to all economic activities. Hence, acknowledging 
their significance specifically in international agreements on agriculture could be 
constructed as a means of continuing the kinds of exemptions that have so far largely 
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excluded agriculture from the benefits of multilateral trade reform.
352
 
 
5-2. The limits of EU-Japan cooperation 
In spite of the fierce criticism from some WTO members, „multifunctionality‟ 
remained the EU-Japan joint strategy in Seattle. Despite the fact that the EU and Japan 
have considerable differences in the structure of their agricultural sectors, their highly 
protectionist farming policies enabled them to join forces to fight against the vehement 
demand from the US and other food exporting countries to liberalise agricultural trade. 
The relationship between the EU and Japan, especially since the Uruguay Round, can be 
characterised as forming an alliance on agricultural trade talks. However in the Seattle 
Ministerial Conferences, the EU and Japan showed symptoms of disharmony in their 
trade cooperation.  
Throughout the agricultural talks in Seattle, Japan took a particularly hard line, 
while the EU took a slightly more flexible line. The Japanese insisted that they would 
never agree to trade in farm products being treated in the same way as other industrial 
goods. Japan also indicated that it wanted more protection for its farm sectors.
353
 
Meanwhile, the EU was prepared to commit itself to negotiating on export subsidies, 
domestic support and market access in agriculture, if other WTO members acknowledged 
that the talks took account of non-economic concerns in the agricultural sector.
354
 
In Seattle, Japan was not happy about the emerging draft text which did not 
include a reference to the „multifunctional nature‟ of agriculture. Meanwhile, Pascal 
Lamy did not discuss whether the EU insisted on including the word „multifunctionality‟ 
in the text. The EU appeared to have settled for the term „non-trade concerns‟, while 
Japan and Korea wanted stronger language making clear that agricultural trade could not 
be treated in the same way as other merchandise trade.
355
  
As shown on the stance on multifunctionality, throughout the Seattle meeting, 
Japan‟s negotiating stance on agricultural trade was more rigid than that of the EU. 
Japan‟s stubborn refusal to discuss the agricultural issue raised suspicions that it did not 
intend to compromise. This is similar to the behaviour of Japanese negotiators in Japan-
US trade negotiations. Michael Blaker analysed Japan‟s strategy in Japan-US trade 
negotiations as follows; Japan employs “a wide array of techniques first to try to avoid 
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discussing the subject at all and then to try to minimize the scope of discussions and the 
content of subsequent compromises.” 356  Western diplomats suspected this Japanese 
reluctance to negotiate as a delaying tactic, in the hope that people would give up on 
agriculture. It was seen as the best way to achieve a successful round whereby Japan gave 
in on agriculture in exchange for progress in other areas. Given Japan‟s claim to be a 
champion of the multilateral round, it was unlikely to want to be responsible for ruining 
the Millennium Round. Besides, while Japan and the US agreed on other issues, Japan 
was isolated on the issue of agriculture, where even the EU was more accommodating. 
One trade official criticised Japan‟s trade stance saying that the question Japan has been 
facing is to what degree it is willing to take the opprobrium of being responsible for 
bringing the round down.
357
 
The limited nature of EU-Japan cooperation on agricultural trade is also 
illustrated by the two sides‟ different position towards the treatment of the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in the WTO. After the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference, the WTO was trying to put together a trade liberalisation package for the 48 
LDCs to ensure their products receive tariff-free and quota-free access to markets in 
developing countries. The move was spearheaded by Japan, some European countries and 
Mike Moore, the WTO Director General. The US, the EU and Japan already allow most 
LDC products into their markets duty free but control sensitive products which, according 
to the LDCs, account for most of their important exports.  
This issue is particularly important for the EU and Japan, as their protectionist 
agricultural policy is criticised by other WTO members. US Under Secretary of 
Commerce David Aaron said that the EU and Japan exacerbated the emergence of North-
South divisions. He argued that economic development of developing countries is 
hampered by trade-distorting domestic supports and export subsidies, and tariff peaks 
which average about 40 per cent, equivalent to the level of industrial tariffs at the end of 
the Second World War.
358
 The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi said Japan was 
ready to open its doors to most goods from the poorest countries provided other 
developed countries did the same. Japan was trying to champion the cause of Asian 
nations within the grouping. The Japanese offer, made by Obuchi during his visit to 
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), was well received by 
some European nations but the US was less enthusiastic.
359
 
In April 2000, the „Quad‟ members Japan, the United States, Canada and the 
European Union reached a basic accord to provide preferential trade treatment to the 
world‟s poorest nations. Despite the constructive contents of the meeting, „Quad‟ 
members were reluctant to specify the products from the poorest nations that would be 
entitled to preferential trade treatment because of politically sensitive sectors such as 
agriculture.
360
 Ahead of the third United Nations (UN) Conference on the LDCs in May 
2001, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sent letters to Japan‟s Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori and leaders of the other major industrialised countries. The letters asked 
them to take political leadership in opening their markets wider to imports from the 
world‟s poorest countries. However, Japan was not able to respond to the expectations of 
the UN and the world‟s poorest countries. The ruling LDP was expecting a presidential 
election in the same year. Under the circumstances, the LDP had no choice but to reject 
further opening of the agricultural sector, because domestic farmers are traditional LDP 
supporters. Moreover, the MAFF was waiting for a new trade round. Before the 
inauguration of a new trade round, they did not want to consider whether to liberalise the 
agricultural sector. The success of the UN conference was important for the launch of a 
new trade round, because many developing countries were either opposed or reluctant to 
new trade talks. They believed that further trade liberalisation would only benefit 
developed countries at the expense of their interests.
 
In a concession aimed at mitigating 
the reluctance of developing countries, Japan expanded its preferential import-tariff 
scheme for LDCs on industrial products, starting a month before the UN conference. 
However, Japan‟s preferential scheme did not include a huge chunk of agricultural 
products.
361
 
After this Japanese decision, more drastic concessions came from the EU. The 
EU announced that it would completely eliminate tariffs on all imports of both industrial 
and agricultural products from LDCs. The only exception was arms. Franz Fischler 
emphasised that the EU already imported more agricultural products from developing 
countries than the US, Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand put together; mostly at 
zero duty or with significant tariff preferences. At the same time, Fischler regretted that 
no other big operators had yet followed this EU initiative.
362
 The EU‟s landmark decision 
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to phase out import duties, including those on agricultural products, was in stark contrast 
to Japan‟s concessions, which excluded agricultural products. In that regard, while 
admitting Japan‟s efforts to grant LDCs greater access to its market, Kofi Annan pointed 
out that imports from LDCs still accounted for only one per cent of Japan‟s total imports. 
Annan also requested Prime Minister Mori to exert his personal influence to increase 
Japan‟s imports from LDCs, not only of industrial products but also of agricultural 
products. 
The EU wanted Japan to follow its decision and declare to free tariffs on all 
imports from the world‟s poorest countries at an annual summit of leaders from the Group 
of Eight in Genoa, Italy. Receiving the call from the EU, however, Japanese government 
officials dismissed the possibility for Japan to follow the EU‟s example. As the election 
for the Upper House drew nearer, it was impossible for Japan to take any liberalisation 
steps on agriculture. The LDP lacked a majority in the Upper House at the time. As the 
party depended on the farm vote, the party was vehemently opposed to liberalise the 
Japanese agricultural market. Japan‟s negative stance on agriculture embraced the 
possibility that the criticism would come not only from the US, Canada and Australia but 
also from the EU.
363
 In Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and 
the MOFA had informally asked the MAFF to lighten the levies on farm imports. 
However, the MAFF rejected any concessions in agricultural trade, at least before the 
WTO trade negotiations on agriculture started. The adamant resistance of the MAFF 
stems from the fear that if Japan makes any concessions on farm trade before the new 
round, it will only face more pressure to open the Japanese market once the new round 
begins. Therefore, the uncompromising stance of the Ministry was an attempt to keep as 
many bargaining chips as possible for the new round.
364
  
 
5-3. The EU and Japan after the Seattle Ministerial Conference 
After the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Conference, WTO member countries 
started with formal WTO talks in March 2000, which were aimed at further agricultural 
trade liberalization. Unlike in Seattle, the EU suddenly softened its stance on agricultural 
negotiations. The EU moved to serious negotiations on agricultural trade liberalisation. 
This EU move was the most positive since the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Seattle. Concrete technical proposals on reducing agricultural support, including export 
subsidies, were put forward by autumn, alongside a rough timetable for the conduct of 
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negotiations. Despite this positive EU move, there was not much prospect for quick 
progress in the agricultural talks. The EU, Japan and other nations with protectionist 
agricultural policies did not have the ability to make more concessions on farm trade, 
because their concessions were limited by the lack of trade-offs in other areas. However, 
Brussels hoped that a broader set of trade talks would be launched by the time agricultural 
negotiators reached the difficult bargaining stage.
365
 
While it showed a positive stance on agricultural liberalisation issues, another 
confrontation between the EU and other agricultural products exporting countries arose 
over the issue of the nomination of the chairman on the WTO negotiations. The formal 
start of WTO talks in March 2000, aimed at further agricultural trade liberalisation, was 
jeopardised when WTO members failed to agree who should chair the agricultural 
negotiations. The EU did not accept the nomination of Celso Amorim, Brazil‟s WTO 
ambassador and a former Foreign Minister, because Brazil was a member of the Cairns 
Group of agricultural exporters which was pressing for an end to other farm subsidies. 
The EU, which originally put forward its own candidate Michael Dowling, the former top 
official at the Irish Agriculture Ministry, proposed Nacer Benjelloun, the Moroccan WTO 
ambassador. Amorim, who had the support of most WTO members, was originally 
proposed as chairman of the sensitive agricultural negotiations. The EU denied any 
intention of delaying the meeting.
366
 However, as a consequence of the EU‟s objection 
against nominating Amorim as chair for the agricultural talks, the WTO round could not 
start in time. The EU‟s rejection raised the question whether the EU was serious about 
negotiating on agriculture and launching a new trade round.
367
 
Japan, on the other hand, showed reluctance to proceed with agricultural trade 
talks. In 2001, Japan was expected to host the so-called Farm Trade Forum which has 
been held every two years since the 1980s, attended by Agricultural Ministers from Japan, 
the US, Canada, Australia and the EU. The conference‟s venue has been alternating 
among its five members, and the last meeting had been held in Montreal in 1999. 
Although Japan was to act as the host in 2001, it failed to set specific dates for the 
conference. The delay apparently derived from Japan‟s reluctance to further liberalise its 
politically sensitive agricultural sector. With a crucial election for the Upper House in the 
summer, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori‟s government was under even stronger political 
pressure from his ruling LDP. Under these circumstances, Japan was becoming the target 
of criticism over its negative stance on further liberalisation of global farm trade. 
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Therefore, the composition of the five member conference caused Japan particular 
concerns. As the US, Australia and Canada are staunch advocates of farm liberalisation, 
the EU is the only ally of Japan among the five economies. However, the MAFF denied 
any reluctance to convene the meeting. The Ministry declared that Japan was carefully 
considering the appropriate timing and content. According to the Ministry, even if Japan 
softened its stance on farm trade and showed willingness toward further liberalisation, 
Japan would only be able to do so after the WTO members reached an agreement to 
conduct comprehensive negotiations, covering not only a built-in agenda but also other 
areas. The MAFF official also acknowledged that the EU was preoccupied by serious 
domestic issues such as „Mad Cow‟s Disease‟ and was not able to concentrate on global 
agricultural negotiations.
368
 In the end, the forum on global agricultural trade did not take 
place in 2001. Japan wanted to postpone the biannual talks until 2002, because it was 
difficult for Japan to arrive at any concessions until a new general trade round was 
launched.
369
 
This abandonment of the biannual Farm Trade Forum by the host nation Japan 
had been preceded by strong domestic manoeuvres of the farm lobby. At the ruling LDP‟s 
special committee on agricultural trade held in October and November 2000, party 
legislators representing the farm sector had demanded the abolition of the minimum rice 
access provision. Representatives of the influential Central Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (Zenchu) attended the committee meetings in support of those legislators. 
Zenchu complained that rice was being imported at a time when farmers were being 
forced to reduce paddy acreage. The MAFF cautioned that Japan‟s trading partners would 
not agree to the abolition or reduction of the import quota, but the LDP legislators argued 
strongly for the protection of farmers.
370
 In December 2000, several panels of the ruling 
LDP agreed to call on the government to demand the reduction of the Minimum Access 
levels on rice imports in the proposals for the next trade round. The decision was made at 
a meeting of trade-related Cabinet ministers ahead of the submission by WTO members 
of their proposals for agriculture and services.
371
 LDP members insisted that access 
amounts should be set appropriately in view of food security as well as the domestic 
production and consumption level of each country. At the same time, LDP members 
insisted that Japan‟s proposal should not include any specific figure regarding the level of 
access. This Japanese position differed from the demand of major exporters, such as the 
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United States, Australia or other Asian countries. They wanted to see Japan‟s Minimum 
Access level increased substantially.
372
  
Japan‟s proposal to the WTO in 2001, which included reducing its minimum 
import quota for rice and creating new safeguards against foreign access to its markets, 
was based upon the following five major points: 
 
 Consideration of the multifunctionality of agriculture 
 Ensuring food security as the basis of society in each country 
 Redressing the imbalance between rules and disciplines applied to 
agricultural products exporting countries and those applied to importing 
countries 
 Consideration for developing countries 
 Consideration for the concerns of consumers and civil society 
 
The Japanese government insisted that these five points reflect the general 
consensus of the people of Japan, after having received opinions from a wide range of 
members of the society, such as agricultural producers, the food industry, consumers and 
NGOs. Besides, it was stated clearly in the proposal that Japan was in no position to agree 
on the outcome of negotiations, if this only enabled a small number of competitive 
exporting countries to benefit from the international agricultural market.
373
 
The proposal became controversial among WTO member countries. While it 
received support from food importing countries such as South Korea and some European 
countries, farm exporting countries led by Australia severely criticised the Japanese 
proposal on global farm trade. The latter accused Japan of pushing non-trade concerns at 
the negotiating table. Japan‟s position on agricultural trade was regarded as nothing but an 
excuse for actually putting off talks focused on agriculture. Harsher criticism came from 
Latin American countries. Uruguay described the Japanese proposal as impracticable and 
self-serving and said it was just „a bad joke‟ to be ignored. The US even argued that 
Japan‟s proposal was a more regressive stance than the current agreement reached during 
the Uruguay Round.
374
 The MAFF, which had expected such criticism, showed no signs 
of backing down for domestic political reasons. The US insisted that Japan‟s proposal 
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held back WTO trade talks. Japan‟s other proposals, including a reduction in the 
Minimum Access level and invoking safeguard measures, were also criticised and 
described as a form of protectionism. Japan refuted US criticism saying that Japan‟s 
proposals could not be considered as protectionist whereas the US position could be 
criticised for paying only attention to exporting countries.
375
 
The EU proposal was given a far less critical assessment than Japan‟s although 
some WTO members expressed their dissatisfaction with it. However, they recognised the 
constructive elements of the EU‟s proposal, although the proposal was judged insufficient 
in certain areas, including subsidies. The proposal received a more favourable response at 
the WTO mainly because the EU favoured in general the opening up of its market to 
developing countries. The EU had to rebuild its CAP ahead of the admission of Eastern 
European nations. Unlike Japan, the EU wanted to see an early conclusion on 
negotiations over trade in agricultural products.
376
 
 
6. Relationship between the EU and Japan in the Doha Ministerial Conference (9-13 
November 2001) 
Ahead of the Doha Conference, in an unprecedented way of EU-Japan 
cooperation, the EU and Japan issued a special joint statement at a regular bilateral 
ministerial meeting in January 2000.
377
 In the early 2001, in order to cement the 
cooperation with the EU, Japan‟s Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister, Yashio 
Yatsu went to Europe and held a meeting with EU Agricultural and Fisheries 
Commissioner Franz Fischler. The meeting called for the relaunch of a new trade round 
after the failure of the Seattle meeting, but the ministers also reiterated their common 
position on trade talks. The ministers discussed a wide range of trade issues. They also 
reconfirmed their common strategy on agricultural negotiation, the „multifunctionality‟ of 
agriculture.
378
 Although details of the meeting were not made public, it was reported that 
both sides were satisfied with their discussions.
379
 
However, in addition to reconfirming the common position with the EU, Japan 
had another agenda for the meeting with the European side. Among the various 
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agricultural negotiating issues, Japan‟s prime concern was how to achieve an international 
acknowledgement of Japan‟s stance on Minimum Access. In order to explain Japan‟s 
stance on the slow growth in mandated rice imports into Japan, along with the meeting 
with Fischler, Yatsu had a meeting with WTO Director General Mike Moore, ministers of 
European Union member states, the FAO and other officials. Yatsu asked them to 
acknowledge Japan‟s position on a slower pace of expansion for mandated rice 
imports.
380
 His intention highlights the fact that the issue of rice imports was at the centre 
of Japan‟s concern among the non-trade concerns, and achieving recognition of its stance 
on mandated rice was as important as cementing a common strategy with the EU.  
 
6-1. Cooperation between the EU and Japan and their conflicting interests 
Starting with Yatsu‟s visit to Europe, ministers of both the EU and Japan 
intensified their effort to consolidate their cooperative stance on agriculture. In October 
2001, Foreign Ministers of the EU and Japan held meetings in order to reconfirm their 
trade stances on agricultural issues in the context of a new round.
381
 In a meeting held 
between Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka and European Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy it was agreed that a ministerial meeting should not set a specific direction on 
farm trade, and agricultural liberalisation should be promoted in a way that met the 
requirements of each country. They also reaffirmed their intention to continue their 
cooperation on agricultural talks and oppose drastic farm trade liberalisation. An 
important point of their meeting was that Tanaka and Lamy also agreed that Japan and the 
EU maintain their cooperation on a variety of other issues, such as investment and 
competition policies and trade rules related to the environment. Lamy called for support 
from Japan for talks on establishing trade  regulations in relation to environmental 
concerns. In response to this call, Tanaka said that Japan would extend as much support as 
possible. 
However, the stance of both the EU and Japan, which transpired at this meeting, 
was in striking contrast to that of other major farm products exporting countries. The 
Cairns Group argued that the ministerial declaration should include specific commitments, 
such as applying the same rules to agricultural products as those for industrial products 
and the abolition of export subsidies.
382
 
In an attempt to tackle the cumbersome agricultural negotiations and to start a 
new trade round, the WTO launched on 10 November 2001 five days of high-level talks 
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in Doha, Qatar. Thorny issues such as agricultural negotiations remained unsettled even 
after the 5 day meeting. WTO members had been divided over a draft text setting out 
guidance for WTO negotiations on agricultural trade even before the Doha meeting. The 
broadly worded text, compiled by Stuart Harbinson, chairman of the WTO‟s ruling 
general council, called for comprehensive negotiations aimed at „substantial 
improvements in market access, reductions of all forms of export subsidies and 
substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support‟. There were also references to 
special and differential treatment for developing countries. However, specific wording on 
agriculture had been omitted from the draft, reflecting the sensitivity and importance of 
the issue for almost all WTO members. Members of the Cairns Group said the draft text 
did not go far enough in committing WTO members to slash government aid for farmers, 
an objective also supported by the US.
383
 In particular, the draft text did not refer to the 
eventual elimination of all trade-distorting domestic subsidies, a key element of the 
group‟s platform. The EU and Japan, on the other hand, complained that there was 
insufficient emphasis on non-trade concerns, such as food safety and protection of the 
environment, which the text simply says „will be taken into account‟. About 40 ministers 
discussed non-trade aspects of agriculture, such as food security and environmental 
conservation. The EU and Japan yet again emphasized the importance of non-trade 
concerns on agricultural negotiations. The Cairns Group criticised the Japanese argument 
for lacking clarity in its definition of non-trade concerns. Led by Australia, the Cairns 
Group reiterated that farm trade should be conducted under the same rules as those of 
industrial goods.
384
 The EU, Japan, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland insisted that 
non-trade concerns should be a prominent component of the WTO negotiations. This, 
along with negotiations on the environment, was seen by the EU as essential to bring the 
more reluctant member states such as France on board for big cuts in farm subsidies.
385
 
On the issue of export subsidies, the EU was struggling against overwhelming 
opposition to water down language in the proposed agenda.
386
 It was of great importance 
for WTO members, in particular for developing countries, that the Doha agreement called 
for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies. However, the matter became more 
cumbersome when it came to state aids which governments use as political 
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instruments.
387
 The EU was under strong pressure from France to reject a reference to 
„phasing out‟ farm export subsidies. France was facing elections early the following year. 
France‟s refusal to accept wording in the draft agenda that called for the „elimination‟ of 
farm subsidies remained one of the biggest stumbling blocks in negotiations. The Cairns 
Group was pressing the EU to reduce its generous agricultural subsidies under the CAP, 
worth 90 billion dollars a year. The Cairns Group insisted that the aim of negotiations 
should be a substantial reduction in, with a view towards phasing out, agricultural export 
subsidies. The French Economy Minister, Laurent Fabius said that „no European‟ could 
accept such a clause, as it implied a pre-determined endpoint for the negotiation.
388
 
France dropped its opposition only when the EU succeeded, after all-night talks, in 
inserting a qualification and in obtaining a stronger WTO commitment to negotiate on 
trade and environment.
389
 The EU and the US remained divided over the pace and extent 
of lowering trade barriers to their agricultural markets and how to deal with export 
subsidies. Besides, the EU in particular insisted that its concessions could be conditional 
on broader trade-offs being made in a global trade round. It was also demanding 
comparable reductions in US help for its farming sector, including „disaster assistance‟ 
and extensive use of export credits and food aid, which the US rejected. The EU admitted 
that it was isolated on this particular issue. Even Japan, with its highly protected 
agricultural sector, was unwilling to back the EU line. Japan and Norway, which also 
objected to the wording previously, finally declared to accept it. The EU‟s intransigence 
reinforced other countries‟ resistance to its attempts to secure WTO negotiations on 
investment, competition policy and environment, which Brussels said it needed to agree 
on in the new round.
390
  
The EU was also isolated on the „precautionary principles‟, which is the right to 
establish the level of protection that it deems appropriate. It covers cases where scientific 
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation 
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous 
effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the 
level of protection chosen by the EU.
391
 The EU noted that agreement on a shared 
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principle for precaution would ensure that it was not an excuse for protectionism. Japan, 
the US and Brazil asked for clarification from the EU as to the definition of this principle. 
There was discussion on the status of this principle in public international law. Several 
delegations noted that WTO rules could accommodate the reasonable use of the concept 
of precaution. Australia, Malaysia, Brazil, and Norway noted that the application of 
precaution would vary depending on a case-by-case analysis and, that its use was context-
specific.
392
 Japan made clear that it did not support the idea of „precautionary 
principles‟.393 Being isolated on the issue, the EU finally abandoned its plans to try and 
put the „precautionary principles‟ at the heart of trade and environmental issues.394 
Overcoming deep divisions, on 14 November 2001, the 142 members of the 
WTO agreed to launch a new trade liberalisation round. WTO Director General, Mike 
Moore, called the five-day meeting „historic‟.395 In general, Japan saw its views for the 
most part reflected in the declaration. Japan was satisfied that the Doha declaration did 
not require farm products to be subject to the same trade rules as those governing 
industrial goods. Such commitments had been strongly desired by the Cairns Group, 
while Japan and others were opposed to setting a specific outcome before the conclusion 
of farm trade negotiations. Although the EU failed to bring „precautionary principles‟ into 
discussions, both the EU and Japan were satisfied with the inclusion in the Doha 
declaration of a clause saying that non-trade aspects of agriculture were going to be taken 
into consideration in liberalizing the agricultural sector.
396
 
 
6-2. The EU-Japan relationship after the Doha Ministerial Conference  
The intensity of the EU-Japan relationship became less visible after the Doha 
Ministerial Conference. Instead, the EU-Japan relationship after the Doha Ministerial 
Conference was shaped by the sudden announcement of an American law to subsidise 
agriculture and relatively strong proposals by the European Union to revise the CAP.  
After the new trade round was launched in November 2001 in Doha, a sudden 
change occurred in US agricultural policy. The US introduced a huge number of farm 
bills agreed by the House and the Senate. In 2002, an election year, lawmakers of 
Congress were significantly affected by the political clout from farm states and caved into 
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their demands. Ann Veneman, Agricultural Secretary under the Bush Administration, 
suggested a more non trade-distorting support unlinked from production, and more 
focused on the environment. However, her suggestion was ignored by Congress and did 
not obtain any support from the President. This sent an incoherent message to the rest of 
the world. US officials in Geneva pushed trade liberalisation, while lawmakers in 
Washington decided to provide trade-distorting farm subsidies. Official numbers 
indicated that the US farm bill would increase government spending on agriculture by 80 
per cent, which would account for an additional 82 billion dollars over ten years. Many 
observers argued that this was a conservative estimate. The bill covered a number of 
agricultural products. New payments which were adapted to America‟s biggest crops, 
such as soybeans, corn and wheat, were related to prices and production and therefore 
highly trade-distorting.
397
  On 16 May, before the two-day annual meeting of the 
OECD in Paris, the US announced that the farm bill kept US domestic agricultural 
support within the 19,000 million dollar annual limit set by WTO rules and contained a 
„circuit breaker‟ provision which allows the Agricultural Secretary to intervene in case the 
ceiling is breached. The US insisted that the WTO annual domestic support limit for the 
EU was more than 61,000 million dollars and for Japan about 31,000 million dollars. As 
justification of the farm bill, the US insisted that unless there was a negotiation for a new 
reform package, the US should be allowed to have this level of support.
398
 Technically, 
the US farm bill did not breach the WTO commitments, but the introduction of the bill 
reduced the credibility of the United States as an advocate of the reduction of such 
subsidies.
399
 
Concurrently with the introduction of the new US farm bill, the EU showed signs 
of moving towards the reform of its notorious Common Agricultural Policy. In striking 
contrast with US retrogression from agricultural liberalisation, Franz Fischler delivered, 
on 10
th
 July 2002, a proposal on the reform of the CAP which aimed at decoupling 
subsidies and production, while redirecting the use of the CAP at social goals, such as 
encouraging land use. Under his proposal, farmers would no longer be paid for over-
production. Instead, they would receive flat payments.
400
 His proposal was especially 
supported by NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, WWF, RSPB and Alp Action. 
According to those organisations, European citizens did not want to waste taxpayers‟ 
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money anymore on natural devastation and unhealthy food (destruction of bio-diversity, 
soil erosion, widespread pollution) and inequality (70 per cent of funding for 20 per cent 
of farmers), for which the CAP is responsible.
401
  
In 1999, the EU had negotiated internally a major set of farm reforms, Agenda 
2000, and said it would be the basis of its negotiating position in the next round. Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy insisted the EU was willing to negotiate but not able to say 
whether it would move further than Agenda 2000.
402
 Agenda 2000 implemented the 
Common Agricultural Policy‟s first budget freeze in 40 years but did not agree on the 
means to achieve it.
403
 The CAP had notoriously recorded 90 per cent of highly trade-
distorting subsidies. The number decreased to 20 per cent in 2000. The CAP‟s export 
subsidies had resulted in a huge production surplus and had caused significant expenses 
for the EU‟s taxpayers and consumers. Nearly half of the EU‟s annual budget, around 40 
billion Euros (39 billion dollars), was spent on the CAP, benefiting farmers who account 
for less than 5 per cent of the total workforce. The OECD indicated that when indirect 
subsidies such as price supports and tax-breaks for farmers are added to direct payments, 
the aid for farmers accounted for 104 billion Euros in 2001, compared with 50 billion 
Euros in the US. EU farmers get around 35 per cent of their incomes from subsidies, 
compared with 21 per cent in the US and 1 per cent in New Zealand. 
Despite huge CAP expenses and their main aim to protect small farmers, the 
CAP in effect promoted the integration of small farmers into large agribusinesses. In 
accordance with the McSharry reforms set up in the early 1990s, the EU attempted to 
shift its farm support from production-linked subsidies to direct income payments to 
farmers. The EU had to tackle urgently the reform of the CAP in consideration of EU 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.
404
 The ten new member countries were 
expected to be fierce defenders of the CAP.
405
 The Dutch government unveiled its 
concern that if the CAP was not reformed before its enlargement of ten new members, 
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farm spending would rise by a further 20 billion Euros a year. In addition to the 
Netherlands, Germany, Britain and Sweden were pushing for the CAP reform, as they are 
net payers into the CAP.
406
 However, at the same time, they were prepared to abandon 
their insistence on immediate reform. They were aware that if they insisted too much on 
reform, it might cause a delay of EU enlargement.
407
 
As for producer support of farmers, American farmers receive almost as much as 
EU farmers. American agricultural support is, however, conducted through direct 
payments which are supposed to be separated from prices and production and therefore 
regarded as less trade-distorting than the CAP in the EU. However, a few years before the 
Seattle Ministerial Conference, the US provided „emergency‟ help to farmers hit by low 
farm-product prices. The „emergency‟ help accounted to 8.7 billion dollars in 1999 (as 
mentioned in 4-2 and 5). Besides, the US maintains high protection for some agricultural 
commodities, such as sugar, peanuts and dairy products.
408
  
The 2002 US farm bill grants 190 billion dollars to American farmers over ten 
years. In this regard, if the CAP was reformed in accordance with Fischler‟s proposals, it 
was possible for the EU to take a more offensive stance in the agricultural negotiations. 
However, certainly aware of this possibility, the US unveiled an ambitious proposal about 
liberalisation of agricultural trade, two weeks after Fischler delivered his CAP reform 
plan. Aiming at more liberalisation of agricultural trade, the proposal indicated that the 
US wanted to abolish export subsidies and drastically reduce other trade-distorting farm 
support over five years. The proposal also demanded negotiators in Doha to set a date for 
abolishing all tariffs and distorting subsidies.
409
 However, even this ambitious proposal 
was not enough to mitigate the outrage over the US 2002 farm bill.
410
 
The Berlin summit in 1999 had established a threshold for the CAP budget until 
2006 and permitted its existence until 2013.
411
 Germany withdrew from its insistence on 
immediate CAP reform in return for a French promise that from 2007 on, costs would be 
capped at the 2006 level plus one per cent a year.
412
 On January 22
nd
, Fischler formally 
unveiled his proposal and reiterated the importance of the CAP reform. He wanted the 
reform plan to start in 2004, before the new member countries join the EU. 
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Japan managed to continue to protect its rice market by applying high tariffs to 
rice imports beyond a Minimum Access quota.
413
 In 2002, Japan proposed that the WTO 
set average tariff rate reductions for all farm products and minimum reduction rates for 
each specific item, thereby enabling member nations to decide more flexibly on cuts as 
long as they achieve both targets. Behind Japan‟s proposal was its desire to protect its rice 
market. This proposal ran counter to the US proposal to substantially cut tariffs across the 
board. The US proposed that the WTO aim at cutting all tariffs by no more than 25 per 
cent over a five-year period. Without exception the cuts would mean larger reductions on 
high tariff items, including rice. The US also called for a 20 per cent across the board rise 
in minimum tariff-free import quotas, which the Japanese apply to rice. Under this 
Japanese proposal, similar to the one applied at the Uruguay Round, WTO member 
countries would be allowed to use their discretion on tariff reductions. Japan, for example, 
would be able to lower the tariff on rice only by the required minimum rate set for each 
item, and instead reduce tariffs on other farm products by larger amounts to achieve the 
overall farm-product average reduction target.
414
 
Japan was still calling for tariff cuts and other liberalisation steps to be 
minimised, with individual member countries to have autonomy in addressing market 
access matters on individual farm products. The Japanese government wanted to buy 
some time until the domestic agricultural industry increased its global competitiveness, by 
curbing imports of farm products as much as possible. The WTO negotiations on farm 
trade covered tariff cuts and other improvements in market access, reductions in export 
subsidies and cut in subsidies paid to domestic farmers. On matters of market access, 
Australia and other nations with strong competitive positions were asking for a massive, 
uniform liberalisation, while European Union members and Japan were seeking to keep 
high tariffs in place. In addition, Japan intended to ask for a cut in the amount of foreign 
rice Japan had to import under the WTO‟s Minimum Access programme, and the 
establishment of a new form of safeguard measures to block surging imports of fresh 
vegetables and other products. Japan also sought tough criteria for export subsidies, while 
asking for flexible rules on the provision of subsidies to domestic farmers.
415
 
In February 2001, Japan had expressed the expectation that its tariff scheme for 
rice would finally be recognised by the WTO as a legal trading regime. In April 1999, 
when Japan had introduced the tariff scheme for its rice imports, it was not approved by 
the WTO, because of strong opposition from some agricultural products exporting 
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countries, such as the European Union, Australia, Argentina and Uruguay. However, 
Japan had kept the new scheme running under domestic laws. Under the scheme, high 
import duties were imposed on foreign rice to protect politically powerful domestic 
farmers. Agricultural products exporting countries claimed that the Japanese tariff rates 
were excessive and blocked their agricultural exports to the Japanese market. Under a 
1980 decision by the GATT, any WTO member country can raise objections to a change 
in another member‟s tariff policy within three months of the change being reported to the 
WTO secretariat. Despite the objections from some countries, Japan introduced the tariff 
regime without the WTO‟s formal recognition. In FY 1999, tariffs of about 351 yen per 
kg were levied. The EU, Australia and Argentina dropped their objections to Japan‟s tariff 
scheme soon after it was introduced. Uruguay, which exports about 5,000 tons of rice to 
Japan annually, was the only opponent and followed suit only after strong persuasion 
from Japan. As Uruguay withdrew its objection, the WTO secretariat had issued a letter 
confirming all 140 WTO members had approved Japan‟s tariff scheme for rice. While the 
new scheme liberalised Japan‟s politically sensitive rice market, it levied heavy tariffs on 
foreign rice imports, except rice imported under the „Minimum Access‟ deal.416  
When the WTO opened a special session on farm trade talks in March 2001, a 
Japanese delegate spoke on the opening day of the special session. Japan again 
underscored the importance of the food security issue in agriculture. The delegate used 
the term „multifunctionality‟ of agriculture to support the argument that agriculture should 
be part of an overall trade liberalisation agenda. Brazil and other farm product exporting 
countries represented in the meeting urged Japan to take a more positive role on farm 
liberalisation talks. They warned Japan that it could not expect progress in other areas 
under negotiation if the WTO failed to make progress on agriculture. Japan reiterated that 
agriculture required special consideration.
417
 
Besides, Japan‟s Agriculture Minister, Tsutomu Takabe, said the common 
formula on farm trade liberalisation to be worked out by the WTO members should not 
treat all products uniformly, in effect urging WTO member governments to let Japan 
exclude rice from the scope of trade liberalisation as part of the new round of multilateral 
talks. During a meeting with WTO General Council Chairperson Stuart Harbinson, 
Takebe said that each country has its own unique circumstances, therefore, each member 
government should be given the flexibility to exclude some items. The liberalisation 
formula was expected to specify the binding numerical targets of tariff cuts on farm 
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products and reductions of government subsidies. It calls on member governments to 
achieve their targets, expressed in percentage terms, over a certain period of time. These 
targets were put into a multilateral agreement.
418
 
In the two-day meeting in Nara (July 2002)
419
, ministers of five major farm 
trading regions held a discussion focusing on the issue of increased US farm subsidies. 
Australia, Canada, the EU and Japan were all against the US law, which critics say runs 
counter to the WTO‟s free trade goal. Australia was especially critical of the US law, 
saying it would affect its export competitiveness. Japan, the EU and Australia agreed on 
opposition to the new US farm law designed to increase subsidies to US farmers. Canada 
also expressed concerns. Japan‟s Agricultural Minister, Tsutomu Takebe expressed his 
concern that the US was strengthening a tendency toward protectionism. Responding to 
critics, Ann Veneman argued against the law being branded as protectionism, but said it 
did not infringe on the country‟s subsidy cut commitment under the Uruguay Round and 
would not lead to increasing trade barriers.
420
   
The meeting was meant for ministers to discuss how to proceed with WTO farm 
negotiations scheduled to set overall targets and rules for member‟s farm policy reforms 
by March 2003 as part of a three-year trade round launched in November 2001 in Doha 
with the deadline set for January 1, 2005. However, Japanese farm minister, Tsutomu 
Takebe made the most of being the host country of this meeting. Takebe arranged a tour 
for ministers to see rice paddies and stress the importance of rice from social aspects of 
agriculture. This was seen as Japan‟s desperate attempt to include various aspects of 
agriculture into the WTO farm trade negotiations. Although US Agricultural Secretary, 
Ann Veneman showed her understanding on the multiple purposes of agriculture, she 
adamantly demanded Japan to sever the link between such subsidies and production.
421
 
US calls for sharp cuts in tariffs on agricultural products and subsidies were 
intensified in bilateral talks which took place during these multilateral farm talks in Nara. 
The EU and Japan opposed the US proposal which ran counter to Japan‟s desire to 
maintain a high tariff against imported rice and the EU‟s desire to maintain support for 
farmers. During farm talks in 2000, Japan had insisted on reducing the Minimum Access 
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level and maintaining the high tariffs, a position in complete opposition to that of the US. 
While the US criticised Japan‟s high tariffs on imported rice, the EU was criticized by the 
US for its export subsidies. According to the US, back in 1999, the EU had provided 
about 70 times more subsidies than the US to help agricultural exports. The EU however 
insisted during the WTO ministerial talks in November 2001 that it would maintain a high 
level of export subsidies.
422
  
A new US proposal was met with fierce opposition from other participants. The 
US proposed that the WTO farm negotiations should target the cutting of all tariffs to no 
more than 25 per cent, capping trade-distorting domestic subsidies at 5 per cent of farm 
output and scrapping export subsidies over a five-year period. The proposal was itself a 
response to unanimous criticism by the other four participants over the new US farm law 
stipulating an increase in the already heavy subsidies for its domestic agricultural industry. 
Although the US was in agreement with Australia and Canada over the need for sharp 
cuts in tariffs and the elimination of farm export subsidies, even the farm ministers from 
Canada and Australia, along with the EU and Japan, labelled the US farm law 
„protectionist‟.423  
For the EU and Japan, this US proposal of uniform cuts in tariffs was too drastic, 
lacking consideration of non-trade functions and leading to unrealistic elimination. The 
EU and Japan also agreed that the US proposal lacked consistency with the farm policy 
reform efforts WTO members had made. Japan was against the proposals, since they 
required more reform from importers than exporters and lacked a commitment to slash 
export credits. The EU also regarded the proposals as unbalanced saying that they 
required other farm traders to move more compared with the US, and it was not an 
appropriate way to find a compromise in the negotiations. The US acknowledged that the 
proposals were drastic by setting a high starting point. The US hoped to receive support 
from Australia, New Zealand and other farm-exporting countries for its farm proposals. 
Australian Agricultural Minister, Warren Truss generally supported the US proposal as 
constructive but insisted on the abolition of export credits, on which the US subsequently 
agreed to negotiate specific reform.
424
 
Despite their intensified talks at their two-day meeting, farm ministers merely 
agreed to continue talks to lead the rest of the world towards farm policy reform, while 
moving ahead with their own efforts. There was no specific progress of agricultural 
negotiations, since ministers from the five major trading economies failed to narrow the 
                                                 
422 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 July 2002 
423 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26 July 2002 
424 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26, 27 July 2002 
139 
 
gaps on tariffs and subsidies. 
Agriculture remained the arena where the EU and Japan came under pressure 
from food exporting countries. According to OECD data quoted by the WTO, the EU‟s 
support to producers fell from EUR 107.6 billion in 1999 to EUR 97.9 billion in 2000. 
However, the WTO pointed out that this fall in 2000 would be due less to structural 
reforms than to the rapid rise in prices on the world market and exchange rate 
developments.
425
 Japan still insisted on reducing the Minimum Access level and 
maintaining the high tariffs.  
 
6-3. A new issue: genetically modified food 
 As explained above, food safety has been a particular concern for the EU as well 
as Japan, and no issue has more illustrated this concern than the introduction of 
genetically modified food.
426
 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), which are created by genetic 
engineering, became an industry in 1996, when cotton and maize engineered to be 
resistant to insecticides and soybeans resistant to weedkiller were grown for profit in 
significant quantities for the first time.
427
 In November 1998, the EU and Japan held a 
first meeting on GM (Genetically Modified) foods, when the third EU-Japan high level 
consultation on consumer policy was held. The meeting involved ministers of health and 
welfare of both sides.
428
 In 1999, the issue of the GM foods came up for discussion at the 
WTO for the first time, when several members proposed the establishment of a working 
group in the Organisation to study GMOs in preparation for the Seattle Ministerial 
Meeting.
429
 However, since the Seattle Ministerial Meeting in 1999, the issue has not 
been discussed thoroughly, and no such working group saw the day. So far, only a handful 
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of trade disputes over GMOs
430
 have been brought to the WTO dispute settlement 
system.
431
   
 Despite such a marginal number of trade disputes, the issue of GMOs is likely to 
be a major issue in the WTO agricultural trade negotiations and in trade disputes also 
involving the EU and Japan.
432
 The issue of GMOs has been framed by the sharp 
differences between the EU and the US. However, Japan has also increasingly become 
interested in regulating the imports of GMOs from the view point of food safety. However, 
there have been differences between the EU and Japan on the matter of what kind of rules 
should be applied to the trade of GM foods.  
 Japan merely stressed the need for the WTO to address the issue of multilateral 
rules on GMOs and wanted the current WTO rules to be applied to the trade of GM foods. 
Japan attested to the efficiency of biotechnology but sought careful application of it in 
order to secure product safety and achieve public confidence, while it suggested 
promoting disclosure of information related to the safety of GM food and creating an 
international database on allergens and genes.
433
 Japan, Canada and Australia were 
pushing for a working group on biotechnology aimed at examining how WTO rules 
should apply to GM technology. Their proposal was also supported by the United 
States.
434
 
 The EU, on the other hand, considered the current WTO rules were not enough to 
deal with the issues of GMOs. The EU insisted that the consumers in the Union have a 
right to ask for protection that did not fall within the existing WTO rules. European 
Commission president, Romano Prodi called for a European food safety agency and told 
EU leaders that they must create strong, scientifically-based institutions for evaluating 
products such as GM foods.
435
 Franz Fischer suggested that the EU would like to 
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renegotiate the SPS to permit trade restrictions for reasons of consumer preference.
436
 
 Moreover, the EU wanted WTO rules to allow the „precautionary principles‟, 
which allow member countries to restrict imports, until the safety of GM crops is 
satisfactorily proven.
437
 Denmark, together with some other European countries, insisted 
on „precautionary principles‟ in order to ban the commercialisation of GM products. 
Europeans insisted on the need of labelling GM foods due to consumer protection.
438
 The 
US, the world‟s largest exporter of GM foods, pointed out that food ingredients were 
altered not only by genetic modification but also by growers‟ selection of desirable crops. 
The US opposed special safety checks only for GM crops.
439
 
 As seen above, the discussion on GMOs could become complicated, since the 
issues of GMOs are related to several WTO agreements, including SPS, Agriculture, 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). They have been 
discussed in the Trade and Environment Committee. Trade problems arise when countries 
have different regulations regarding the testing and approval procedures necessary to 
place GMOs and their products on the market, or when they disagree about labelling and 
identification requirements.
440
  
Despite differences between the EU and Japan on the introduction of 
precautionary principles, the EU and Japan share the same stance in the issue of labelling 
the GM foods. Labelling issue first rose to the surface in relation to the trade of GM corn 
and soybeans. While accounting for the main producer of GM corn and soybeans, the US 
was the leading exporter for these commodities. In 1998, out of the 71.6 million acres of 
soya and the 73.8 million acres of corn grown in the US, 35.2 per cent of the former and 
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27.0 per cent of the latter were genetically modified.
441
 
Consumers in the EU, Japan, and some other countries began to demand that 
their food be produced without GM corn and soybeans. This presented a potential 
problem for US farmers and processors, because the EU and Japan were two of the largest 
markets for US corn and soybeans. The EU imported large amounts of soybeans and corn 
gluten, a byproduct of US ethanol production, while Japan was a large importer of corn 
and soybeans.
442
 
In particular, labelling of the GM nature of food ingredients was compulsory in 
the EU.
443
 Following European moves on GMOs, the Japanese government also 
introduced labelling requirements for products containing GMOs, in response to 
consumer concerns.
444
 The tolerance levels for labelling differed among countries. There 
was a need for processors and traders to meet emerging mandatory GMO-labelling 
requirements in the EU, Japan along with Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand.  
 Japan's labelling regulations were perceived much more reasonable than those in 
the EU. The Japanese government required mandatory labelling when GM material was 
present in the top three raw ingredients and accounts for 5% or more of the total weight. It 
also admitted the presence of non-GM labels at the same tolerance level, if produced with 
identity preservation. For instance, tofu could be made from non-GM soybeans and be 
labelled as such or else it must be labelled as containing GM material. Exemptions to 
Japan's labelling requirements included feedstuffs, alcoholic beverages, and processed 
foods such as soya sauce, corn flakes, and other vegetable oils. In the EU, the threshold 
applied to each ingredient.  
 On a larger scale, labelling affects international trade. Consequently, the European 
and Japanese policy affected the choices of other agricultural exporting countries. 
Australian GM policies were partially designed to fit the labelling requirement for exports 
to the EU or Japan. Eastern European countries and Russia have probably decided to 
follow the EU's 1% threshold labelling requirement for trade reasons.  
 Along with the labelling issue, as a part of precautionary approach, the EU 
unilaterally imposed a moratorium on any new GMOs in Europe. The EU‟s long delays in 
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approving products, such as genetically modified corn, raised US frustration to boiling 
point and repeatedly threatened a trade war. The US insisted that there was clearly 
something wrong when the EU took up to three years to approve products, which the US, 
Canada and Japan approved in eight to twelve months.
445
 
Besides, there was an argument that the EU bans on GMOs had little to do with 
public safety and much to do with EU agricultural policy. The EU did not want farmers to 
use techniques which expand output and increase the cost of the Common Agricultural 
Policy.
446
 
Although this moratorium almost certainly broke the WTO rules, the United 
States initially did not challenge it in the WTO‟s DSB. US hesitation stemmed from their 
anxiety that such a lawsuit was politically risky.
447
 It might have not only aggravated 
European sentiment but also stimulated anti-GMO feeling in the US. Besides, like 
consumer health or food safety, there were some political differences among nations 
which the WTO dispute settlement mechanism could not solve.
448
 However, finally on 
May 13, 2003 the US government filed a complaint with the World Trade Organisation 
against the European Union‟s de facto moratorium on genetically engineered 
organisms.
449
 
 As seen above, on the issue of GMOs, there was no sight of any EU-Japan 
cooperation yet. Trade friction seemed to be appearing rather between the EU and the US, 
while Japan‟s position remained somewhere between them. On the one hand, advances in 
food technology were leading to a rapid increase in US production of genetically 
modified crops. At the same time, the growing influence of farm state representatives in 
Congress intensified US pressure on other countries to open their markets. On the other 
hand, the „mad cow‟ crisis and other food scares in Europe made consumers and 
politicians gravely concerned about food safety. Feelings ran highest in Germany, Austria 
and the Nordic countries, where there had long been mistrust of products that were not 
naturally produced.
450
 
 Despite no sign of clear cooperation between the EU and Japan, they were often 
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criticised together from GM foods exporting countries. US Senator in Iowa, Chuck 
Gassley also fiercely criticized both the EU and Japan. He stated: „As far as 
biotechnology is concerned, the only thing Europe, and now Japan, have to offer is fear. 
It's how the Europeans have protected their domestic agricultural markets from American 
competition for 30 years.‟451 He criticized Japan for getting set to require mandatory 
safety tests on genetically modified foods before they could be imported into Japan. He 
argued that Japan was taking this action even though genetically modified products 
produced in the United States must be approved by a food regulatory agency that the 
world looked to as the model for what a food safety agency should do. Regarding the 
consumer choice, some observers pointed out that in the EU and Japan, where GM 
labelling was mandatory, it was virtually impossible to find food products on the shelf 
labelled as containing GM ingredients. Therefore, the approach taken by the EU and 
Japan was not really giving consumers a choice.
452
  
Considering the above US accusations against the EU and Japan and the  overall 
controversy regarding GM food, GMO cases are the types of disputes which can be 
expected to become more frequent in the future. WTO members must deal with 
differences in regulatory regimes and attitudes towards risk.
453
 GM food issue might 
provide the WTO agricultural trade negotiations a new arena where agricultural trade 
liberalisation talks could be divided not only between the agricultural products exporting 
countries and importing countries, but also between GM food exporting countries and 
importing countries of such products. The issue of GMOs is still relatively new. Therefore, 
nothing can be said firmly on the EU-Japan cooperation on the issue. However, the fact 
that some countries, particularly the US, started to criticise both the EU and Japan on the 
issue of GMOs, there will be a possibility in the future that the EU and Japan would seek 
cooperation between them in order to protect their positions.  
 
Conclusions 
 This Chapter investigated the development of the EC/EU-Japan relationship 
during the agricultural negotiations from the Uruguay Round to the Doha Ministerial 
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on Biotechnology and Trade‟, 2 May 2000, (http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2000/p0r5-
02b.htm) 
452 Colin A. Carter and Guillaume P Gruere, „International Approach to Labeling 
Genetically Modified Foods‟, Agricultural marketing resource centre, Agricultural Issues 
Centre University of California and Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California, Davis, March 2003 
453 Hoekman and Kostecki, „The Political Economy of the World Trading System, second 
edition‟, P84 
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Conference focusing on various social actors in each side.  
 Although both the EU and Japan have a vital stake in the promotion of a more 
open trade regime, the domestic importance of their agricultural sector, despite its 
marginal role in the overall economy of both sides, has prevented both economies from 
playing a more pro-active role in the Uruguay Round and Doha Rounds. First, the 
Europeans and Japanese did not show cooperative stances during the Uruguay Round, 
since their industrial structure in agriculture differed from each other. Namely, Japan, as 
one of the world's largest importer of agricultural products, intended to protect certain 
sectors of its agricultural market, while the EU, as the largest importer as well as the 
largest exporter of agricultural products,  intended to maintain the CAP.  
 This chapter showed that the agricultural trade policies of both the EU and Japan 
are significantly affected by various social forces. 'State' is not unified actor. For instance, 
Japan's agricultural trade policy is influenced by various intentions from Japanese MITI 
officials, MAFF officials, politicians of ruling LDP, farms associations such as Nokyo or 
Zenchu.  
  The EU and Japan, though their industrial structure in agriculture are so much 
different, they opted for cooperation due to some shared concerns.  What is noted here is 
that the EU or Japan are not a single decision maker, but their individual trade policies 
and their cooperation are a result of absorbing the demand from various social forces. 
Such ties across social forces could be joined internationally with other social forces, and 
could form an alliance. A good example here is Cairns Group. They are an alliance of 
both developed and developing nations which is formed only for agricultural issues.  
 The EU and Japan, on the other hand, intended to create an alliance across shared 
interests. For this purpose, the EU and Japan created the term, 'multifunctionality' of 
agriculture and tried to form an alliance internationally. They also extended the discussion 
on agricultural trade liberalisation to the issue of food safety, food security or even to 
environmental issues. In this sense, transnational connection among social forces could 
overcome the difference in industrial structure (as seen in the EU-Japan cooperation) and 
also the boundaries between the developed and developing countries (as the example of 
Cairns Group).  
 The US, the biggest trader for the EU and Japan, has been also concerned about 
the reaction of social forces. When the EU did not abide the WTO rules in approving GM 
foods into European market, the US did not challenge it in the WTO's DSB. US hesitation 
to take the issue to the WTO was due to the concern that such lawsuit might stimulate 
anti-GMO feelings and therefore politically risky. Since the issues connected to food 
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safety or food security are sensitive to society, states also need to consider and calculate 
the social reaction in trade partners. Not only the reaction of trade partners but also 
reactions of consumers in the export destination became significantly relevant. The case 
of GM food is a type of dispute that could be more contentious involving many social 
actors.   
 Thus, the EU and Japan relationship on agricultural issue can be seen as an 
attempt of powerful agricultural industry, as social forces, joining internationally. The 
relation between social forces and the decision making of government will be discussed 
in chapter 5, the final conclusion.  
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Introduction 
 In this chapter, we will investigate steel trade on which the EU and Japan are 
actively cooperating. Like agriculture, various social forces, non-state actors are involved 
in this issue.  Adding to the relationship among social forces, this chapter effectively 
shows how the WTO, as an institution, enables its members to interact with  each other.  
 Steel trade issue involves various trade disputes in the WTO. The EU and Japan 
have a number of trade disputes with their biggest trade partner, the United States. Steel 
industries in the EU and Japan, which were adversely affected by the protectionist US 
trade remedies, do not have membership in the WTO, since they are not „state‟. Therefore, 
they ask their government to represent their position. Thus, the WTO provides an arena 
indirectly for various domestic social forces to achieve their goals. Therefore, this chapter 
will investigate how the international institution facilitates the cooperation for member 
countries as well as various social forces within members.  
 Steel is one of the most commonly-used materials in the world. Its properties of 
elasticity, flexibility and ability of being recycled, coupled with its good value for money, 
make it the number one amongst those materials which are universally used.
454
 The 
importance of steel is also due to its multiple usage with a wide range of vital functions in 
economic life, from construction to machine tools.
455
 
 Over the past two decades, the EU and Japan have been two of the largest traders 
of steel products (See Table-7 and -8). The EU has been the largest steel exporter 
accounting for 11.0 % of world share in 2004. Japan has been the second biggest exporter 
of steel products accounting for 8.8% of world share in the same year. As an importer, the 
United States had the largest market accounting for 9.9% of world share in 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
454 EUROPA, trade issues, sectoral issues, steel sector,  
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/index_en.htm) 
455 UNCTAD, „New and dynamic sectors: Steel‟, 
(http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3561&lang=1) 
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Table-7: Leading steel and iron products exporters in 2004
456
 
 Value  
(billion dollars) 
Share in world trade in exports  
(%) 
Exporters 2004 1980 1990 2000 2004 
The EU (25) 
 (extra-EUexports) 
29.20 - - 11.4 11.0 
Japan 23.29 20.4 11.8 10.4 8.8 
The US 8.71 4.2 3.3 4.4 3.3 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics - 2004 
 
Table-8: Leading steel and iron products importers in 2004 
 Value  
(billion 
dollars) 
Share in world trade in imports  
(%) 
Importers 2004 1980 1990 2000 2004 
The US 28.12 10.1 9.5 12.5 9.9 
The EU (25) 
(extra-EU imports) 
24.34 - - 7.6 8.6 
Japan 5.57 1.1 4.1 2.4 2.0 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics – 2004 
 
Table-9: World merchandise exports by product
457
 
 1990 1999 2001 
 Share Share / amount Share / amount 
steel and iron 3.1 % 2.3 % (126 billion dollars) 2.2% (130 billion dollars) 
agriculture 12.2 % 9.9 % (544 billion dollars) 9.1%  (547 billion dollars) 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, 2001 
 
 
 Among trade commodities, however, the steel trade is marginal in terms of world 
trade (See Table-9). Despite its relatively marginal position, steel trade provides an 
                                                 
456 See WTO International Trade Statistics – 2004, Table IV. 34, „Leading exporters and 
importers of iron and steel, 2004 / 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/section4_e/iv34.xls) 
457 WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, 2001. World merchandise exports by 
product, 2000, 2001 
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interesting insight into EU-Japan relationships in the WTO, since the steel trade caused a 
number of trade disputes in this institution. Out of all 335 trade disputes in the WTO 
(from 1995 until the end of 2005)
458
, there are more than 30 trade disputes related to steel 
products (26 cases are related to agricultural trade).
459
 
 The EU-Japan relationship on the steel issue is, in the first place, framed by 
increasing protectionism of the United States especially since 1997 to which the EU and 
Japan felt the need to reply with lawsuits in the WTO Dispute Settlement System.
460
 
Because of the nature of the steel trade issue and its relevance to the GATT/WTO, it is 
essential to conduct separate investigations on each steel dispute in which the EU and 
Japan have taken part.  
 
1. Steel trade and its background 
1-1. Trade disputes on steel and interdependence of the US, the EU and Japan 
 Steel trade has witnessed a number of various remedies to address trade disputes. 
Out of 20 trade disputes regarding CVDs, 6 cases are related to steel products. Out of 60 
trade disputes regarding anti-dumping remedies, 16 cases are related to steel products. 
Out of 34 trade disputes regarding to safeguards, 12 cases are related to steel products.
461
 
A large number of such import restrictions invoked against steel products effectively 
proves that steel is a very sensitive product, especially for its importers.  
 Among various steel trade disputes, the EU and Japan had been involved in 10 
and 5 cases respectively (including 4 cases related to the 1916 Act and Byrd Amendment 
Act) which were all with the United States.  
   
 
 
 
                                                 
458 Dispute settlement; the dispute, „Chronological list of disputes cases, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm) 
459 For details of the disputes, see WTO home page, „WTO Dispute settlement: the 
disputes‟, index of disputes /  
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm) 
460 For the brief explanation of the function of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, see 
for example: Asif H. Qureshi, „The World Trade Organisation – Implementing 
international trade norms‟, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), P97-107; 
and see also: John H. Jackson, „Designing and implementing effective Dispute 
Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects‟ in Anne O. 
Krueger (ed), „The WTO as an International Organisation‟, (London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), P161-180  
461 WTO home page, „WTO Dispute settlement: the disputes‟, index of disputes 
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Table-10: Iron and steel imports of the EU and the US by supplier – 1999 & 2001462 
 The EU 
 1999 2001 
Suppliers Value (million dollars) Share (%) Value (million dollars) Share (%) 
The US 655 1.1 635 1.2 
Japan 402 0.7 486 0.9 
 
 The US 
 1999 2001 
Suppliers Value (million dollars) Share (%) Value (million dollars) Share (%) 
The EU 3994 24.4 4003 26.7 
Japan 1772 10.8 1387 9.2 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, 2001 
 
 
 Table-10 shows the relationship between the EU, Japan and the US in the steel 
trade. Both the US and Japan supply a large value of steel products to the EU. (For the 
EU, the US and Japan are two of the biggest exporters of steel products.) As for the 
volume of imports, the United States is a far bigger import market for both the EU and 
Japan. This table clearly shows that both the EU and Japan heavily depend on the US 
market. The interdependence between the EU, Japan and the US suggests that any drastic 
change in trade shares or trade amounts between two parties would also significantly 
affect the third party. There had always been a possibility that a sudden change in the 
economic environment might shift the balance between three of the biggest steel traders 
and develop into fierce trade disputes. 
 Facing steel trade frictions, the US introduced (or threatened to invoke) three 
different trade measures; 1.) unilateral approaches such as Section 301, 2.) anti-dumping 
measures and 3.) safeguard measures. Therefore, the chapter is divided into three main 
sections which explain the EU-Japan relationship in relation to various US trade remedies. 
The first section briefly outlines unilateral US moves and US bilateral pressure on the EU 
and Japan. This is followed by an analysis of EU-Japan relationships against various US 
anti-dumping laws. The third section presents an analysis of EU-Japan relationships 
                                                 
462 WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, IV. Trade by sector, 4.1 Iron and steel, 
Table IV. 37, „Iron and steel imports of the EU and the US by supplier, 1999‟ 
and International Trade Statistics – 2001, Trade by subject, Table IV. 33, 2001, P26 
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against US safeguard measures. 
 The issue of anti-dumping and safeguards are closely related to the various steel 
trade disputes. For example, in case of Japan, out of 8 cases in which Japan initiated a 
complain against the United States, 6 cases were related to US anti-dumping or safeguard 
measures, and most of these measures were related to Japanese steel products.
463
 In case 
of the EU, out of 29 cases in which the EU as complaint had trade dispute with the United 
States, 9 cases are related to US anti-dumping or safeguard measures, and among the 9 
cases, more than 4 cases are related to steel products.
464
 Since the issues of anti-dumping 
and safeguards are closely related to various steel trade disputes of this chapter, they are 
also going to be analysed briefly.   
 
1-2. Historical background 
 In the late 1950s, the United States, which has been the largest trading partner for 
steel for both the EC/EU and Japan, started to suffer from the structural changes in the 
world‟s steel market.465 Since becoming a net importer of steel in 1959, the American 
domestic market became increasingly sensitive to world market developments.
466
 As a 
result, US steel trade policies moved towards protectionism, starting with VRAs 
(Voluntary Restraint Agreements) in the mid 1980s.
467
  
 The EC, in the meantime, also started to use protectionist measures. By the 1980s, 
it became the largest VRA exporter of steel mill products and fabricated steel products 
because of US-EC agreements. The EC accounted for a share of 42 per cent of VRA 
exports and 31 per cent of all exports to the US in 1989. The VRAs expired at the end of 
                                                 
463 These 6 anti-dumping cases are: (DS322) Measures relating to zeroing and sunset 
reviews, (DS249) Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products, 
(DS244) Sunset review of anti-dumping duties on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat 
products from Japan, (DS184) Continued dumping and subsidy offset act of 2000, 
(DS217) Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan, 
(DS162) Anti-dumping Act of 1916.  
464 These nine anti-dumping and safeguard cases are: (DS319) Section 776 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, (DS294) Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping 
Margins (Zeroing), (DS 262) Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Steel Products from France and Germany, (DS248) Definitive Safeguard 
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, (DS225) Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Seamless Pipe from Italy, (Ds217) Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
(DS214) Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular 
Welded Quality Line Pipe, (DS136) Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, (DS63) Anti-Dumping 
Measures 
465 For the history of US protection of steel industry, see: Mary A. Yeager, „Trade 
Protection as an International Commodity: The Case of Steel‟, The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol.40, No.1, The Tasks of Economic History (March 1980), P 33-42 
466 Kent Jones, „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade‟, (Allen&Unwin Publishers, 
1986), P91-102 
467 Jones, „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade‟, P154, 155 
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March 1992 despite the fact that no international agreement banning subsidies to steel 
producers had been reached.
468
 
 Until 1988, the EC even maintained internal national steel production and trading 
quotas between its member countries, supposedly to allow for orderly capacity reductions 
to restructure the market. Phillip Oppenheim argues that despite the dismantling of these 
internal quotas, a series of limitations on imports of non-EC steel, originally imposed in 
the 1970s, remained in force during the 1980s. These included quotas and provisions, 
euphemistically referred to as „consulting arrangements‟ and „price monitoring systems‟, 
to ensure that importers do not bring steel in below a certain price. Among the exporting 
countries, Japan was most seriously affected along with South Korea, Finland and 
Norway.
469
 
 The EC also intervened in the EC steel market through subsidisation. Heavy 
government involvement in the steel industries of several EC member countries not only 
delayed adjustment, it also tainted trade relations.
470
 The US was also concerned about 
the trade distortions resulting from subsidies paid to and state aid provided for 
uneconomic European steel plants.
471
 
 In the 1980s, trade tensions developed between the European and American steel 
industries. The steel industries in both the EC and US had had to adjust to very changed 
circumstances.
472
 Demand had shifted towards less steel-intensive products; steel-saving 
substitution processes were introduced in, for example, the motorcar industry; and new 
suppliers arrived on the world market. Surplus capacity problems arose in both Europe 
and America.
473
 
 While steel-making capacity in the United States and the EC has declined since 
1980, Japan was in the process of restructuring its steel industry and started to become 
one of the biggest steel exporters.
474
 Consequently, it became inevitable for Japan to have 
                                                 
468 Heidensohn, ‚Europe and World Trade‟, P134, 135  
469 Oppenheim, „Trade Wars – Japan versus the West‟, P62 
470 Jones, „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade‟, P157-167 
471 Heidensohn, ‚Europe and World Trade‟, P134, 135 
472 For details on the European steel industry, see; Gernot Klepper, „The steel and metal 
industry‟ in David G. Mayes, „The European Challenge‟, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), P372-385 
473 Heidensohn, ‚Europe and World Trade‟ P134, 135 
474 On Japan‟s industrial promotion in steel sector, see: Hideki Yamawaki, „The Steel 
Industry‟, in Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno and Kotaro Suzumura (eds), „Industrial 
Policy of Japan‟, (Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 1988), P281-305; On the steel industry 
in Japan in relation to Japanese governmental promotion and protection, see: Jon 
Woronoff, „Japanese Targeting‟, P100-103, P205-208; On Japanese steel industry and 
governmental support (especially in relation to MITI administrative guidance) see: 
Shigeto Tsuru, „Japan‟s Capitalism: creative defeat and beyond‟, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
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frictions with its trade partners on steel.
475
 
 As the background of the steel trade disputes, Kent Jones best describes the 
changing structure of the steel market and its development.
476
 According to him, the 
changing competitive structure of the world steel market triggered a protracted spiral of 
steel protectionism.
477
 Trade disputes among the big steel traders, such as the EC/EU, 
Japan and the US started first with steel trade protectionism in the EC/EU and the US, 
deeply influenced by the pressure from domestic steel industries. Kent Jones argues that 
developments in the relationship between the steel industry and government had placed 
trade policy in the US and the EC/EU on a collision course with the US-stated doctrine of 
open trade adopted in the post-war period. In the United States, an entrenched steel 
oligopoly had adopted the strategy of pursing political channels, and was therefore in a 
strong position to resist. In the EC/EU, the growing trend towards governmental use of 
the steel industry as a means to build a strong economy indicated the likelihood of 
massive government intervention in the steel market, including trade restrictions, if 
adjustment pressures threatened the industry.  
 The US steel industry enjoyed a significant amount of special protection from 
imports. From 1969 to 1974, the EC and Japan negotiated VERs that limited their exports 
to the United States. In 1978, the administration initiated the TPM as part of its 
programme for the steel industry. The TPM was to have established a minimum price 
below which imports could not enter without being subjected to an expedited anti-
dumping investigation. In 1982, the majority of the integrated US steel producers made 
an effort to obtain tariff protection under the anti-dumping and CVD laws. The EC agreed 
to quotas on steel exports of specific products under the US-EC arrangement. The US and 
the EC agreed to limit EC exports of certain carbon steel products to the United States to 
specified percentages of US consumption, and the US companies withdrew the anti-
dumping and CVD petitions they had filed against the companies in the EC. In the 
meantime, Japan‟s steel products were subjected to the US 301 case. The US Trade 
Representative negotiated a voluntary restraint promise on steel exports with Japan, and 
Japan was said to provide its estimate of the next quarter‟s steel shipments to the US. 
There was a number of formal and informal quantitative restraints on steel imports 
                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 1993), P98-100; On the Japanese steel industry since the 1950s in 
relation to MITI, see Ira C. Magaziner and Thomas M. Hout, „Japanese Industrial Policy‟, 
(Berkely, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980), P17-24, P55-
67  
475 Heidensohn, ‚Europe and World Trade‟, P157-167 
476 Jones, „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade‟, P157-167 
477 Heidensohn, ‚Europe and World Trade‟, P91-102 
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imposed by the US, thus both the EC and Japan had already significantly limited their 
exports to the US.
478
    
 Mary A. Yeager once argued that in the US steel industry, there has been a history 
of protectionism of artificial interference in natural market processes, and the American 
steel industry‟s inclination toward protectionism has been habitual.479 In the 1980s and 
1990s, even as the US finally sponsored the creation of the WTO to arbitrate trade 
disputes, Congress also passed legislation which enabled more unilateral retaliation. 
During the 1980s, concern about Japan was at its height, and there were fears that 
imported goods would overwhelm the American industry, especially steel, electronics and 
autos. Despite the decline of those fears, the trade legislation it had engendered lived 
on.
480
 
 In the 1980s, world steel consumption had been relatively stable, having reached 
its highest level ever in 1989. However, in 1990, 1991 and 1992, world steel consumption 
fell.
481
 Since then, steel became one of the most competitive items in world trade, as it 
faced chronic international overcapacity.
482
  
 Adding to the chronic overcapacity of steel products, the Asian financial crisis 
occurred in 1997, prompting the US to protect itself from a flood of steel imports 
emanating from its trade partners which in turn affected the US‟s biggest steel trade 
partners, the EU and Japan.  
  
2. Steel trade and unilateral measures 
2-1. The EU and Japan facing the US 
2-1-1. Steel import surge into the US market 
 With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, steel imports into the US 
began to rise dramatically. The US trade deficit in the first 11 months of 1998 reached an 
                                                 
478 David G. Tarr, „Costs and benefits to the United States of the 1985 steel import quota 
program‟ in Ryuzo Sato and Paul Wachtel (eds), „Trade friction and economic policy‟, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), P159-176 
For the US-EC steel trade issues see: Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, „The 
United States and the European Union in the 1990s-second edition‟, (London, Macmillan 
Press, 1996), 185-188 
479 Yeager, „Trade Protection as an International Commodity: The Case of Steel‟, The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol.40, No.1, The Tasks of Economic History, P 33-42 
480 BBC News, 14. July, 1999, „Business: The Economy The US arsenal of trade weapons ‟, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/393199.stm) 
481 Jones, „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade, ‟P91-102 
482 See: UNCTAD, (iii) Steel and related specialty products, Background note by the 
UNCTAD secretariat, P6 
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all-time high of 153 billion dollars.
483
 The global financial crisis affecting Asia, Russia 
and parts of Latin America led to shrinking American exports and to a deluge of imports 
into the still-booming US market.
484
 Among the nations affected by the Asian financial 
crisis, Japan was hurt more severely than any of the other industrialized countries, mainly 
due to Japan's strong trade and investment ties in the region. Since the second quarter of 
1997, there had been a downturn in Japan‟s domestic economy. Export demand, mainly to 
the US, was the only significant source of economic growth.
485
 
 During 1998, steel producers in Japan, along with Russia and Brazil, captured a 
large share of the US market. US steel producers accused their rivals of “dumping” and 
called for the introduction of quotas.
486
 The US government reached agreements with 
Russia and Brazil on voluntary reductions in steel shipments.
487
 Japan, however, 
dismissed the idea. Japan claimed that it was America‟s problem, if its steel industry 
could not compete internationally. Japan argued that it was the high dollar, not predatory 
prices, which made Japanese steel competitive. Many industry analysts also pointed out 
that the success of foreign producers was triggered by the strong dollar, which made their 
products very cheap. Akira Chihaya, chairman of the Japan Iron and Steel Federation 
claimed that US mills bought 25 per cent of steel shipped from Japan in 1998 because of 
a shortage in production capacity.
488
 
 The EU did not increase its steel exports into the US. On the contrary, according 
to the UK Steel Association, the EU steel imports had in effect doubled between 1997 and 
2001.
489
 Later US pressure on the EU was meant to force the EU to import more steel in 
order to reduce the pressure of foreign steel imports.  
 
2-1-2. US pressure on Japan for bilateral conflict resolution 
                                                 
483 The Japan Times, 29 January, 1999 
484 The situation was noted by US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky in 
testimony before a Senate committee in 1999.  
485 Trade Policy Review of the WTO, on Japan January 1998 noted that Japan‟s economy 
had been heavily depending on exports. / 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp69_e.htm) 
486 BBC News, 13. July, 1999, „Business: The Economy US, Russia sign steel deal‟, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/393581.stm) 
487 Russia agreed to limit its exports of steel and other metals to the United States over a 
five-year period after Washington threatened to introduce quotas and punitive tariffs. 
The deal was aimed at lifting the threat of Russia being completely excluded from the 
US market, which could have cost Russia 1.5 billion dollars in export earning over five 
years. In return, US anti-dumping proceeding against Russian hot-rolled steel was 
halted. 
488 The Financial Times, 9 April 1999 
489 The UK Steel Association, Parliamentary briefing for November 2001, 
(http://www.uksteel.org.uk/nw82.htm)  
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 Facing this import surge the US unilaterally announced in January 1999 that Japan 
had voluntary agreed to reduce steel exports. Japan immediately denied the US 
statement.
490
 US-Japan trade relations further deteriorated when President Bill Clinton, in 
his State of the Union speech in 1999, indicated his readiness to mount an aggressive 
defence of the US steel industry and singled out Japan as a prime offender among 
countries "dumping" steel on the US market.
491
 Nobutaka Machimura, Japan's 
Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, emphasised Japan's determination to 
resist US pressure to agree to VERs for steel, as such arrangements violated WTO 
rules.
492
 The WTO Agreement on Safeguards, Article XIX (Prohibition and Elimination 
of Certain Measures) clearly stated that “..., a Member shall not seek, take or maintain 
any VERs, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or 
the import side.”493In the past, Japan had concluded a number of VERs with the US. In 
the GATT era, in most VER cases, exporting countries did not officially announce the 
conclusion of such VERs. Generally, negotiations for VERs were conducted in private.
494
 
These measures were called „gray area‟ and had been criticised for their nonconformity 
with the GATT spirit.
495
 
 Facing deteriorating relations, the US asked the Japanese government to consider 
setting up a new economic forum to discuss trade and other matters with the aim of 
defusing problems, before they caused further friction. Japan welcomed a high-level 
mechanism to discuss wide-ranging economic issues.
496
 In August 1999, the US proposed 
formal talks to resolve the protracted dispute over Japanese steel exports to the US. Japan 
believed that an offer from the US to begin formal, bilateral discussions was based on the 
                                                 
490 The Japanese trade ministry‟s steel division stated that “There is absolutely no truth 
in the (claim) that we have made a commitment to reduce steel exports to the US.” / The 
Financial Times, 9 January 1999 
491 BBC News, 14 July 1999, „Business: The Economy The US arsenal of trade weapons ‟, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/393199.stm) 
492 The Financial Times, 30 January 1999 
493 The Safeguard Agreement was negotiated in large part because GATT Contracting 
Parties increasingly had been applying a variety of so-called “grey area” measures 
(Bilateral Voluntary Export Restraints, Orderly Marketing Agreements, and similar 
measures) to limit imports of certain products. The Agreement now clearly prohibits such 
measures, and has specific provisions for eliminating those that were in place at the time 
the WTO Agreement entered into force. / See, Uruguay Round Agreement, Agreement on 
Safeguards, (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm) 
494 For VERs, see B. Peter Rosendorff, „Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-dumping 
Procedure, and Domestic Politics‟ in The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 
(American Economic Association, Jun. 1996), P544-561 
495 Mitsuibussan-boueki-keizai-kenkyuzyo , „WTO – Nihon keizai ha doukawarunoka‟, 
P274-277 
496 The Financial Times, 16 February 1999 
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misconception that Japan had engaged in unfair trade practices.
497
 Japan made clear that it 
could not accept any discussions with such prejudice.
498
 Bearing in mind that such 
bilateral arrangements in the past did not result in favour of Japan, the Japanese 
government stressed that trade problems in particular should be discussed multilaterally 
through the World Trade Organisation, rather than bilaterally.
499
 
 
2-1-3. US call for burden sharing on the EU  
 Further policy measures taken by the US were bound to lead to some relationship 
between the EU and Japan because they forced both to face challenges from Washington. 
Without reaching a bilateral agreement with Japan, US frustration was directed against 
the European Union, one of the largest traders of steel products. There was a view in the 
US that Europe was not doing its share with respect to absorbing imports, particularly 
from troubled Asian countries. The Clinton administration therefore called on the 
European Union for "burden sharing".
500
 The US Secretary of Commerce, William Daley 
mentioned that the US alone could not absorb all of Asia's exports. He claimed that “We 
will not be the dumping ground for troubled economies, unless Europe does more, there 
could be a huge public outcry that is loud enough to rekindle the fires of protectionism." 
The US was not satisfied with the EU‟s commitment to sustain a balanced steel trade.  
 The European Union mentioned emphatically that Europe had no intention of 
satisfying the US demand. The EU pointed out that European steel imports had grown 
almost 80 per cent
501
 in 1998.
502
 Sir Leon Brittan, Europe's Trade Commissioner, pointed 
out that although EU imports from Asia were smaller than those by the US, they rose 
faster in 1999. The EU mentioned that it kept its market open to imports from troubled 
Asian countries, provided they fulfilled pledges to the IMF to reform and liberalise their 
economies.
503
The EU insisted that the Asian financial crisis hit the EU harder than the US. 
According to the EU, steel imports into the EU rose by 7 million tonnes, or 43 per cent, in 
1998, while exports fell by 4 million tonnes. The EU's balance of trade in steel with third 
countries fell by 11 million tonnes compared with 1997, while the US balance of trade in 
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steel fell by only 9.9 million tonnes.
504
 The EU steel industry was in deep trouble. 
Demand was down, prices were plummeting. The lack in demand hurt prices.
505
 Facing 
these problems EU steel makers went through a wave of mergers.
506
 
 
2-1-4. EU and Japanese resistance against US pressure 
 While putting pressure on Japan toward a bilateral agreement to mitigate its steel 
exports, the US continued to press the European Union to shoulder more responsibility 
for reviving global economic growth by removing restrictions on imports from Japan and 
Russia.
507
 Charlene Barshefsky, US trade representative sought close cooperation on 
initiatives to liberalise multilateral and transatlantic trade and to discuss trade disputes 
with the EU.
508
 Her intention reflected concern by the Clinton administration and the will 
to resist protectionist pressures and maintain support in Congress.
509
 
 The EU dismissed this criticism and completely ignored the US outcry. In the face 
of the EU move and a continued flood of steel products, US steel makers started to lobby 
desperately for support in Congress.
510
 These vigorous appeals forced the US government 
to take Draconian measures towards steel exporters from the following year. US analysts 
pointed out that placing curbs on Japan, along with Russia, was vital for controlling the 
surge of imports which were blamed for causing thousands of job losses in the US steel 
industry.
511
 
 Facing tough resistance from the EU and Japan, the US started to exert strong 
bilateral pressure on some steel exporters which were not WTO members. Since it was 
not a member of the WTO, Russia finally gave into US pressure and agreed to quotas 
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under the threat of duties which would have cut them out of the market altogether.
512
 
Encouraged by the successful agreement with Russia, in October 2000, the US further 
warned several countries outside the World Trade Organisation that they must restrain 
steel exports to the US.
513
 Such a tough US stance with non-WTO members made Japan 
confirm its policy that trade problems with the US should be discussed through the WTO 
in order to avoid bilateral pressure from the US. 
 
2-2. US unilateral action 
2-2-1. Japan‟s reaction to Super 301 
 The EU and Japan‟s stubborn resistance against US pressure continued, and the 
US started to resort to tougher trade actions in order to defend the US steel industry. 
President Clinton threatened to revive Super 301 authority with which he could punish 
countries which his administration decided were unfair traders. The Super 301 had 
expired in 1997, but was re-instituted on 31 March 1999. Section 301 (involving „regular 
301‟, „super 301‟ and „special 301‟ processes), a provision of the 1974 Trade Act, was the 
most potent weapon in the US arsenal which authorized not only the investigation of 
particular goods, but of the trading practices of an entire country.
514
 The provisions of the 
act had been suspended when the WTO was established in 1995.
515
 
 The US revival of Super 301 developed into a serious concern for Japan. It 
insisted that unilateral sanctions initiated under Super 301 were not acceptable under 
WTO rules. The US stressed that any action the US took would be consistent with WTO 
rules and procedures, as strengthening the international trade regime was consistent with 
US interest.
516
 As the US decided to revive the controversial Super 301 procedure, Japan 
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started market-opening discussions with the US to prevent a trade conflict.  
 The Iron and Steel Federation of Japan made clear that the industry would take 
steps toward a complaint with the WTO, if the US imposed sanctions and unilateral 
restrictions on its steel imports. The chairman of the Federation came to the conclusion 
that the US steel industry was not hurt by increased imports of Japanese steel, citing "the 
longer than expected strike" at General Motors in the summer of 1998 as a reason for the 
decline in domestic steel demand and price drops in the US. The federation was 
cooperating with the US Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission in their anti-dumping investigations in response to complaints from the US 
steel industry. The Iron and Steel Federation of Japan urged Tokyo to file a complaint 
with the WTO, if Washington resorted to measures such as Super 301 which violated 
WTO rules. Chihaya, the chairman of the Iron and Steel Federation of Japan pointed out 
that unilateral import restrictions not only violated WTO rules but also undermined the 
competitiveness of the US steel mills in the long term.
517
 Regarding the domestic 
situation, he concluded that the steel and iron industry was in a state of overcapacity, and 
that cut-backs and consolidation were inevitable.
518
  
 As for the Super 301, many analysts, not only those outside the US but also some 
free-trade advocates within the US viewed these forced negotiations as American bullying. 
They considered Super 301 as running counter to the multilateral trade regime of the 
WTO. Michiko Ikeda claimed that if Super 301 was used against a WTO member, it 
would possibly be illegal under the WTO rules, unless it was used in a field which was 
not covered by the WTO rules, for instance, practices which might disturb competition, 
such as Japanese „Keiretsu.‟519 
 
2-2-2. The EU and unilateral US trade countermeasures  
 The re-activation of Super 301 by President Clinton, in the context of growing 
trade tensions, infuriated not only Japan but also the European Union.
520
 European Union 
Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan told the Japanese that Europeans were concerned 
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about protectionism in the US.
521
 In their view, Super 301 allowed the US government to 
act as both judge and jury in trade cases.
522
In February 1999, the EU made a decision to 
initiate a procedure against the US on the grounds that US „fair trade‟ laws, such as 
Section 301, were inconsistent with WTO rules.
523
 The EU and Japan had repeatedly 
complained about Section 301, and claimed that it was in violation of the WTO. 
 Despite its resentment against Super 301, the EU had itself in the past also 
introduced a general „unfair trade‟ provision. Unlike Japan which does not possess any 
unilateral trade remedies, the EU had introduced, in 1984, the New Commercial Policy 
Instrument, modelled on US Section 301. The EU had used unilateralist rhetoric in trade 
relations, for example, in its criticism of domestic regulation in Japan, which limited 
market access for EU exporters, yet it had not been able to plausibly threaten unilateral 
measures in the same way as the US.  
 Therefore, at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, a number of member 
governments, led by France, called for the introduction of an EU „fair trade‟ instrument 
with more teeth. The result was the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR), adopted in 
December 1994 (TBR replaced the 1984 New Commercial Policy Instrument). This 
provided the opportunity to act against „unfair‟ measures in other countries which 
inhibited, or prevented, access to third-country markets as well as against „unfair trade‟ 
practices which resulted in, or threatened, material injury to an EU industry. The balance 
of opinion within the Council of Ministers was against the pursuit of aggressive 
unilateralism, and hence the TBR was used mainly as a means of identifying potential 
WTO dispute settlement cases.
524
 Thus, on unilateral trade remedies, there were 
differences between the EU and Japan. While the EU exercised such unilateral trade 
instruments, Japan, in the past, had been targeted by such unilateral measures taken by the 
US and the EU.  
  
2-2-3. Prohibition of unilateral trade measures under the WTO 
 The unilateral measures of both the US and the EU were no longer going with the 
trend of the times. In terms of unilateral trade remedies, such as the TBR or Super 301, 
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the international institutional context had changed since 1995. The formation of the World 
Trade Organization greatly inhibited its member countries to use unilateral trade 
sanctions.
525
 The creation of the WTO restricted Washington's ability to use Section 301 
in order to pry open foreign markets.
526
 In the GATT era the use of any retaliatory 
weapon was only challengeable in the GATT, if and when that use was in conflict with 
the obligations and GATT rules.
527
 Under the WTO's far stronger dispute settlement 
mechanism, the US was profoundly constrained in its ability to impose WTO-inconsistent 
unilateral trade retaliation.
528
 
 The EU moved forward on its threat to challenge the mere existence of Section 
301 before the WTO. However, the EU‟s complaint regarding Section 301 was not related 
to its steel trade with the United States, but originated as part of the US-EU banana 
dispute.
529
  
 On 27 January 2000, the World Trade Organisation adopted a panel ruling that the 
US could keep its controversial Section 301 trade law as long as it did not take unilateral 
action against trading partners in violation of WTO rules. The European Union, which 
had brought the case, decided not to appeal against the panel verdict, which it described 
as "balanced".
530
 The panel said that Sections 301-310 of US trade law, which permitted 
unilateral action against unfair trading practices, were apparently in breach of WTO 
dispute settlement rules. However, it noted that the US pledged in a formal statement to 
Congress to abide by the WTO's multilateral procedures, and so far appeared to have done 
so. The European Union claimed that the report strengthened the WTO system. It required 
the US not only to respect its existing commitment to avoid unilateral action but to 
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renounce threats of any such action.
531
 
 The US threat of invoking Section 301 was the first case where the EU and Japan 
shared the same concern over growing US unilateralism in the steel industry, since world 
steel traders faced a changing competitive structure of the world steel market after the 
Asian financial crisis. The case also marked a change in the reactions of the EU and Japan 
against US bilateral pressure. Facing tough bilateral pressure from the US, the EU and 
Japan resisted this pressure and were determined to discuss the issue in the WTO.  
 Despite the January 2000 WTO panel ruling that the US could keep its 
controversial Section 301 trade law, the US was constrained by its trade partners and the 
WTO to actually use Section 301. This change forced the US to take more WTO rule 
abiding trade remedies against foreign imports such as anti-dumping remedies. These 
anti-dumping remedies are going to be analysed in the next section. 
 
3. Steel trade and anti-dumping measures 
3-1. Trade disputes over US anti-dumping measures 
3-1-1. Anti-dumping remedies and the GATT/WTO 
 Anti-dumping duty is one of the few forms of trade restriction permitted under 
WTO rules. Although it is governed by some WTO-imposed constraints, its practice has 
been widely criticised as arbitrary and elastic. Therefore, among the instruments of 
commercial defence, anti-dumping actions are now the most frequently used instrument 
for „commercial defence‟.532 Article VI of the GATT provides considerable scope for 
WTO members to apply anti-dumping duties selectively on particular products exported 
to them, when it is found that these have been dumped. There is no obligation to provide 
compensation.
533
  
 „Dumping‟ is the practice of enterprises exporting products at very low prices 
(below real costs) in order to capture market shares abroad and to eliminate competition. 
Such practice has been considered to be unfair in international trade. Dumping has the 
effect that the low price of the imported products may harm the domestic industry which 
is producing similar products. Although the consumers and industrial users of the product 
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in the importing country may benefit from such low prices, the producer industries 
usually supported by their labour unions are more vocal for action against dumping.
534
   
 In the GATT, the anti-dumping rules were modified during the Kennedy Round 
(1964-67), when an international anti-dumping code on the implementation of Article VI 
of the GATT (the article on anti-dumping and CVDs) was successfully negotiated. During 
the 1980s, Australia, Canada, the EU and the US accounted for about 96 per cent of the 
anti-dumping / CVD cases filed. The Uruguay Round Agreement on anti-dumping was 
born to provide more precise rules on the definition of the export prices, the normal value 
of a product and the conditions of comparing them. It also established more transparent 
and open procedures to be applied by the national authorities in charge of anti-dumping 
affairs.
535
  
 P. K. M. Tharakan argued that in the past, anti-dumping action was used to force 
foreign exporters to enter into VERs or to undertake raising prices. In the case of the EU 
and the US, anti-dumping / CVD actions were basically a flexible tool for preventing 
imports, whether dumped or not, from causing injury to domestic industry.
536
 Youichi 
Nakamura explains that once anti-dumping duties were levied on an imported item, in 
most of the cases, the item subjected was completely stopped, because the percentage of 
anti-dumping duties often became huge.
537
 
 As more and more countries were introducing anti-dumping measures, in 
December 1998, Renato Ruggiero, director general of the WTO, noted that the overall 
number of anti-dumping actions was no higher than the 1992-97 average and was well 
down on historic peaks.
538
 However, in a clear reference to the US and the EU, he said 
anti-dumping use had increased compared with 1995 and 1996, in particular by certain 
major trading powers and on certain products such as steel.
539
 Anti-dumping activity was 
most intense in the steel sector, which accounted for almost 40 per cent of all cases 
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opened in 1998.
540
  
 The US took a particularly aggressive stand on anti-dumping in 1998, for instance 
by granting expedited procedures for recent suits brought by the domestic steel industry 
confronted with a flood of imports from Japan and Russia, among others. Anxiety by 
Washington and Brussels to resist any weakening of their anti-dumping defences had 
been one reason for a stalemate in discussions over the past two years on possible WTO 
action relating to competition policy.
541
 
 
3-1-2. US invocation of anti-dumping duties 
 Despite the warning of the WTO director general, the United States started to 
respond to the import surge of Japanese steel products with fierce anti-dumping actions. 
Eleven steel import items had been subjected to Washington's dumping investigations 
since 1997, and the US International Trade Commission ruled against three of the 11 
items. In July 1999, Japan aired its concerns to the United States that a series of anti-
dumping claims by the US steel industry against steel imports substantially paralysed 
Japanese exports of most major steel products. Hisamitsu Arai, Vice Minister for 
International Affairs, told David Aaron, US Undersecretary of Commerce for 
International Trade that the overuse of anti-dumping suits by the US steel industry was 
abnormal, even though in 1999, Japanese steel exports to the US declined to levels logged 
in 1997 before the Asian financial crisis.
542
 
 While recognizing that Japanese steel exports to the US declined drastically in 
1999, David Aaron, US Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade insisted that 
more than 11,000 jobs were lost in the US and two manufacturers went bankrupt in 1998 
because of a flood of cheap imports from Japan, Russia and other foreign countries. The 
US decided to keep a close watch on the level of Japanese steel exports to the US.
543
 
Japan also questioned whether the move by the US Department of Commerce to shorten 
its investigation period for dumping claims deprived the accused parties of enough time 
to defend themselves but the US denied this.
544
 
 
3-1-3. The EU and anti-dumping measures 
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 Anti-dumping measures were also used by the EC to curb imports from Japan. In 
the 1980s, the EC had aggressively imposed anti-dumping duties on various Japanese 
products. The EC-Japan trade imbalance and the EC‟s structural unemployment and 
economic depression in the early 1980s added momentum to anti-dumping petitions by 
Community producers against Japan. The entry into force of the WTO had a great impact 
on EC/EU trade policy. Contrary to the GATT regime that had tolerated VERs, the WTO 
Safeguard Agreement provided for the prohibition of new VERs and the progressive 
elimination of existing VERs (with the exception of Japanese VERs on cars to the 
EC/EU). Prohibition of VERs in the Euro-Japanese trade would no doubt give weight to 
anti-dumping and safeguard measures in the EC/EU‟s arsenal of trade law instruments. 
Indeed, the EC/EU New Anti-dumping Regulation adopted to implement the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement innovated substantive and procedural rules and, at the same time, 
gave wide discretion to the anti-dumping authorities.
545
 
 However, the EU also became the target of the anti-dumping investigation. Up 
until June 2000, according to WTO notifications, the European Union led the rankings 
with 49 new anti-dumping investigations, followed by India with 26, Argentina with 23, 
Australia (18) and Brazil and the US (17 each). The goods from the EU became the main 
targets of anti-dumping measures. Two-thirds of the 1,229 cases in 1995-99 were directed 
at poorer nations, headed by China (159) and South Korea (98). The US was the target in 
79 cases, followed by Taiwan (60) and Japan (58). UNCTAD claimed there was clear 
evidence of increased resort to anti-dumping and countervailing measures in sectors such 
as steel and textiles since 1995, when the WTO banned VERs. At the end of June 2000, in 
terms of WTO figures, the US had 300 anti-dumping orders and price undertakings in 
force. The EU came second with 171.
546
  
 As explained above, since unilateral sanctions or bilateral agreements such as 
VERs were prohibited under the WTO rules, the anti-dumping act had become a popular 
remedy to restrict imports, especially for the EU and the US among others. The US took a 
particularly aggressive stand on anti-dumping, facing a flood of imports from Japan. The 
US and the EU‟s inclination toward the use of anti-dumping remedies caused serious 
concern for Japan. Particularly the US anti-dumping laws targeting Japan‟s steel exports 
caused trade conflicts between two economies, and ironically the US anti-dumping laws 
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also promoted cooperation between the EU, another heavy user of anti-dumping remedies 
following the US, and Japan. However, the different positions of the EU and Japan vis-à-
vis the US put considerable limitations on any EU-Japan cooperation although both had 
an interest to efficiently counteract US protectionism.  The following sections of this 
chapter are going to analyse the EU-Japan relationship on US anti-dumping actions. 
 
3-2. The 1916 Anti-dumping Act 
3-2-1. US anti-dumping law and EU-Japan 
 The case of 1916 US Anti-dumping Act is important for EU-Japan relationships, 
since both the EU and Japan were strongly against the US law. They filed a suit in the 
WTO DSB, but did so separately. This was due to Japan‟s expectation that the Clinton-
Obuchi summit might provide a breakthrough on this particular issue.  
 In 1999, a US anti-dumping suit under the 1916 Anti-dumping Act surfaced in the 
US-Japan steel trade dispute.
547
 The WTO anti-dumping agreement allows governments 
to impose duties to protect a domestic industry that has suffered from dumping, or the 
sale of imported goods at unfairly low prices, after due investigation. However, the 1916 
law allowed individual firms to file dumping suits with local courts, claiming criminal 
offence as well as civil liability for compensation that could be as high as three times the 
damage incurred from dumping. In March 1999, Japan requested the World Trade 
Organization to rule on the US anti-dumping law, charging that the law was not in 
compliance with WTO rules.
548
 Japan‟s WTO appeal was seen as retaliation for growing 
US pressure on bilateral steel trade.
549
 
 Although Japan contended that the 1916 Act did not conform to WTO rules on 
anti-dumping,
550
 Japan was careful with what it requested at the WTO DSB since there 
were expectations for a positive outcome from the Obuchi-Clinton summit meeting at the 
White House on 3 May 1999. US-Japan trade disputes over steel and some other sectors, 
including insurance, flat-glass and telecommunication were expected to be high on the 
bilateral agenda. Japan chose to refrain from taking any action that could provoke the US 
Congress, as well as the Clinton administration before the Obuchi-Clinton summit. But 
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Japan was also playing for time to prepare for a legal battle with the US. Japan was 
carefully examining the details of the US International Trade Commission judgement and 
consulting with the Japanese steel companies affected by the rulings.
551
 
 However, Japan was not the only one which resented the US anti-dumping law. 
The Anti-dumping Act of 1916 was also criticized by the EU. In 1998, the Commission of 
the European Communities and Japan, after having won no concession during the 
Obuchi-Clinton summit, separately requested consultations with the US regarding the 
inconsistency between the sanctions permitted under the 1916 law and those permitted 
under WTO agreements.
552
 After the failure to resolve the matter, the EU filed a 
complaint with the WTO over the US Anti-dumping Act of 1916 when an American steel 
company invoked it to file a suit with a local court in 1996 against a US-based European 
importer of steel products. The EU‟s complaint received strong backing from Japan. The 
WTO's DSB decided early in 1999 to set up a neutral panel to rule on the EU complaint 
against the American law.
553
 Japan filed a separate complaint on 11 February 1999. The 
US immediately expressed disappointment that Japan had followed the EU to the WTO 
but vowed to vigorously defend the law.
554
 
 
3-2-2. WTO ruling on the US 1916 Anti-dumping Act 
 As a result of the separate cases brought forward by the EU and Japan, two 
separate WTO dispute settlement panels stated in final verdicts early in 2000 that the US 
1916 Anti-dumping Act violated WTO rules. After the final ruling of the DSB, there was 
a possibility for the US to appeal the decision to the Appellate Body, the WTO‟s highest 
court. However, it is quite rare that the Appellate Body delivers a verdict different from 
the one handed down by a dispute settlement panel.  
 Despite the negative prospect, the US appealed the case to the Appellate Body. In 
July 2000, the WTO Appellate Body met in Geneva for its first and final hearing on the 
case.
555
 At the end of August 2000, the WTO Appellate Body acknowledged claims from 
the EU and Japan and ruled that the US must change its 84-year-old anti-dumping law.
556
  
 Although the US claimed that the 1916 Act was more akin to an antitrust statute 
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than an anti-dumping statute,
557
 the WTO dismissed the claim.
558
 Accepting the WTO 
ruling, the US asked the WTO for a „reasonable period of time‟, i.e. 15 months, for 
implementation, after consultations with the EU and Japan.
559
 The US argued that it 
would need until December 2001 to get Congress to make the necessary changes. Both 
the European Union and Japan pressed for a more accelerated timetable, and in 2000 
requested binding arbitration. While Congress in 2000 approved a big change to US tax 
law to comply with another WTO ruling, legislators were generally reluctant to change 
US laws to comply with WTO decisions. Although both the EU and Japan were annoyed 
by the US request for delay, a legislative amendment was particularly difficult in the case 
of the US anti-dumping law because of the influence of the steel industry.  
 In February 2001, an independent WTO arbitrator ruled in favour of the EU and 
Japan and stated that the US must remove a controversial provision of its anti-dumping 
laws before 26 July 2001. The decision put considerable pressure on the Bush 
administration, which was forced to seek early congressional action to change the law.
560
  
 In the case of the US 1916 anti-dumping act, the EU and Japan shared the same 
concern, since the law negatively affected their steel exports to the US. However, despite 
this common concern, Japan had shown some hesitation before the Obuchi-Clinton 
summit, hoping to achieve a bilateral resolution. Japan‟s expectation effectively 
demonstrated the nature of Japan‟s US-focused bilateralism.   
 Although the summit did not resolve the dispute between the US and Japan, 
Japan‟s hesitation prevented EU-Japan cooperation against the US anti-dumping law. 
Although there was no visible relationship between the EU and Japan, the WTO 
acknowledged their separate claims and ruled against the US law. In spite of the lack of 
clear relationship, the case against US 1916 anti-dumping law was seen as a significant 
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victory for the EU and Japan.
561
 
 
3-3. The anti-dumping case on hot-rolled steel 
3-3-1. The US anti-dumping act against Japan‟s hot-rolled steel 
 One of the steel products which caused a particular outcry during the steel conflict 
after the Asian financial crisis was hot-rolled steel.
562
 The dispute about the US anti-
dumping act against Japanese hot-rolled steel deserves special attention in the context of 
our research because Japan did not gain any support from the European Union despite the 
implications of the US anti-dumping action for the EU as well.  
 The dispute on hot-rolled steel started at the end of the 90s, when a huge amount 
of Japanese hot-rolled steel was directed to the United States due to its robust economy. 
US imports of hot-rolled steel from Japan increased more than five times in 1998, and the 
US bought 10 times more Japanese steel than the European Union did. William Daley, 
US Commerce Secretary noted that the surge in imports of hot-rolled steel from Japan for 
1998 represented a 385 per cent rise over 1997.
563
 The US became visibly frustrated with 
these Japanese exports.
564
 
 In September 1999, the US steel industry first filed a complaint with the US 
International Trade Commission over alleged dumping by Japanese exporters of hot-
rolled steel. Since then, roughly 80 per cent of all Japanese steel exported to the US was 
subject to anti-dumping measures or investigation. These drastic US measures caused 
tremendous damage to Japanese steel exports. Together with Japan 24 other economies 
were also subject to US dumping charges. International Trade and Industry Minister, 
Takashi Fukaya, announced in a hastily called press conference on 20
th
 October 1999 that 
Japan had decided to take formal steps also on behalf of those other 24 economies.
565
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3-3-2. Japan‟s complaint to the WTO 
 Nearly one month after Fukaya‟s announcement of filing a complaint, Japan 
finally brought the case to the WTO on 23 November 1999. There was speculation over 
the reason why Japan waited nearly one month to take action.
566
 In most of the previous 
cases where Japan filed complaints with the WTO against one of its trading partners, the 
country had actually done so only several days or even hours after announcing a decision 
to take action. 
 Ahead of the WTO ministerial talks, it was seen that Japan was rallying support 
from other WTO members on the hot-rolled steel dispute with the US.
567
 To prevent an 
abuse of anti-dumping measures by its trading partners, especially the US, Japan strongly 
insisted on putting a thorough review of the WTO's anti-dumping trade provisions on the 
formal agenda for the new round and tighten the anti-dumping rules. The WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Seattle was held for four days starting on 30 November 1999 to 
officially launch a new round of global trade liberalization negotiations. However, since 
the US vehemently objected to that idea, Japan was looking for an ally on the anti-
dumping issue. Therefore, synchronised with the legal battle in the WTO DSB, Japan was 
preparing for the Seattle Ministerial Meeting.  
 Although Japan denied such speculations of rallying support, the anti-dumping 
case on hot-rolled steel was seen to have some impact on Japan‟s tough stance on the 
review of WTO anti-dumping rules. The next section of this chapter is going to analyse 
the issue of the review of anti-dumping rules. (See: 2-3. Enforcement of WTO anti-
dumping rules).  
 
3-3-3. WTO ruling against the US anti-dumping remedy 
 In accordance with Japan's filing in November 1999 of a complaint with the WTO 
over the issue, the two governments entered talks on 13 January 2000.
568
 After the talks, 
Japanese Trade Minister, Fukaya expressed his satisfaction with the talk by making the 
comment that both sides gained a deeper understanding. However, he withheld Japan‟s 
                                                                                                                                                  
The Japan Times, 20 October 1999 
566 The question was raised by an editorial article in the Japan Times on 11th November 
1999.  
567 Japan denied such speculations of rallying support. / The Japan Times, 11 November 
1999 
568 The sessions were being held in accordance with procedural rules for a complaint it 
filed with the WTO. Under WTO rules, the Japanese and US governments were to enter 
bilateral talks within 30 days to attempt to settle the dispute. Japan had engaged in 
bilateral consultations with Washington since 13 January 2000. 
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decision on further courses of action based on the dialogue.
569
 One month later, Fukaya 
reversed his position on the outcome of the talks for unknown reasons and suddenly 
revealed that during the bilateral consultations, both sides had simply restated their 
position without reaching any kind of settlement.  
 Subsequently to these failed bilateral talks, in February 2000, Japan decided to ask 
the WTO to set up a settlement panel to resolve the dispute with the US.
570
 On 20 March 
2000, Japan won a WTO panel to investigate US anti-dumping duties on imports of 
Japanese hot-rolled steel which Japan claimed violated international fair trade 
rules.
571
The WTO ruling was a hard blow to the US, because the ruling could lead to a 
review of its anti-dumping laws.
572
  
 As compared with other anti-dumping issues on steel, it should be noted that in 
the case of hot-rolled steel, although it was another tough anti-dumping action taken by 
the United States, there was no relationship between the EU and Japan. It was reported 
that Japan intended to gain the support from other WTO members, especially from the EU. 
However, Japan was left alone against the US use of anti-dumping action and brought the 
case to the WTO without support from the EU. Although Japan won the case against the 
United States, it was not reported why the EU remained almost indifferent on the case. 
The lack of relationship between the EU and Japan on hot-rolled steel makes striking 
contrast with the US 1916 Anti-dumping Act case where the EU and Japan seemed to 
share the same concern. The absence of relationship between the EU and Japan on hot-
rolled steel may be explained by the fact that US anti-dumping action targeted imports 
from Japan, and the EU was therefore not a concerned party in this particular case. 
However, the non-relationship in the hot-rolled steel case casts doubt on the overall EU-
Japan relationship on anti-dumping cases with the United States.  
 
3-4. Enforcement of WTO anti-dumping rules 
3-4-1. The absence of the EU-Japan cooperation on the issue 
 Frustrated with a series of anti-dumping charges by the US steel industry, Japan 
intended to tighten WTO anti-dumping rules to prevent their abuse. Japan acknowledged 
anti-dumping measures were consistent with WTO rules, but it wanted to revise the 
measures. Japan was pushing to include the revision in the agenda for the new round of 
trade liberalization talks to be launched at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting from 30
th
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November to 3
rd
 December 1999.
573
 To prevent what it perceived as protectionist 
practices by WTO members, especially the US, Japan and other Asian countries insisted 
on including a review of international anti-dumping rules on the new round's agenda. US 
President Bill Clinton's administration was, however, under strong pressure from the 
domestic steel industry and labour unions, and vehemently rebutted Japan‟s demand.574  
 The EU was also concerned about the frequent use of US anti-dumping laws and 
interested in tightening the WTO anti-dumping rules. However, the EU did not take any 
proactive action toward the review of anti-dumping rules.
575
 This was due to the fact that 
the EU was one of the most frequent users of anti-dumping actions, while Japan was 
mostly the target of such anti-dumping actions.
576
 Consequently, there was still no clear 
relationship between the EU and Japan on revising anti-dumping rules. Trade ministers 
from the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan held two days of talks in 
Tokyo in May 1999 which centred on preparations for trade liberalization negotiations in 
Seattle.
577
 Specifically, they discussed the so-called built-in-agenda of service and 
farming sectors, issues that were being carried over from the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. However, priority of the talk was given to a discussion on 
whether enforcement of anti-dumping measures should be included in the trade 
negotiations in Seattle. 
 There were deep differences of opinion, particularly between the US and Japan. 
Japan still strongly insisted on the need for the WTO to review its existing anti-dumping 
agreement for the sake of transparency and appropriate practices. But it could not draw a 
consensus, with the United States being most adamantly opposed.
578
On this issue, the US 
and Japan exchanged fierce criticism of each other‟s position. David Aaron, US 
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, criticized Japan for preventing the 
talks by insisting on the need for the WTO to review the enforcement of anti-dumping 
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provisions, while remaining "the greatest dumping country in the world." Hisamitsu Arai, 
MITI Vice Minister for International Affairs made the point about the growing number of 
anti-dumping legal cases worldwide which had reached, more than 900 in over 20 
countries as of the end of 1998. Putting forward Japan's position, Arai cited the need of 
some 20 other WTO member states, including developing countries, which emphasize 
"the importance of strengthening and clarifying the disciplines applicable to the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties."
579
 
 At this stage, several countries, including South Korea, Colombia and Egypt, 
favoured a review of WTO anti-dumping rules in the next round of global trade talks, 
along with Japan. However, the US had resisted any efforts to include the issue. Ahead of 
the Seattle meeting, the WTO ruled against the US on its anti-subsidies measures. The 
ruling came at a delicate time. It was extremely unpopular with the US steel industry. US 
steel makers also pressed the administration hard not to make concessions in a new trade 
round which could weaken US anti-dumping or anti-subsidy laws, and were sending a 
large contingent to Seattle.
580
  
 Even at this stage, Japan could hardly fathom EU intentions on the issue. The EU 
stance on the revision of anti-dumping rules was a key for the course of discussion 
between the US and Japan. Within the Japanese government, there were suspicions that 
the EU was leaning towards the US stance or that the EU was taking a neutral position.
581
 
In fact, the EU was also concerned about the increasing use of anti-dumping and 
protectionist measures by some countries. However, European Commissioner for Trade 
Pascal Lamy expressed mixed views concerning calls from Japan and other Asian nations 
to take up anti-dumping issues in the next round. Lamy explained the EU position as "in 
the middle of the road." It was told by Lamy that the European Union was carefully 
considering putting anti-dumping on the agenda for the WTO Seattle round to see, if the 
existing rules were being properly implemented. Lamy stated, "On one side, we'd not like 
the whole of anti-dumping regulations to be renegotiated, because this would be opening 
of Pandora's box. But on the other side, we agree that reviewing the way these rules are 
implemented is something we believe would be in our interest."
582
 Represented by this 
inarticulate comment of Lamy, the EU‟s stance on the issue of reviewing anti-dumping 
rules remained therefore vague. The EU‟s split position was demonstrated by the fact that 
it increasingly challenged other countries' dumping laws, notably those of the US, but 
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also those of developing countries.
583
 
 Despite its indecisive position on the issue of anti-dumping rules, the EU wanted 
to consolidate its relationship with Japan for the Seattle Ministerial Conference. Lamy 
urged Fukaya to come along to cement a EU-Japan understanding, adding that the two 
partners could fight together against protectionist views held by the United States.
584
 
  
3-4-2. The collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting 
 Despite talks before the Seattle meeting, WTO members stayed divided on their 
stance on anti-dumping. Japan remained most adamant that anti-dumping rules should be 
revised. However, thanks to a number of bilateral and multilateral talks, Japan managed 
to convince the EU to get closer to Japan‟s stance. The EU became more preoccupied 
with US protectionism, as the US, ahead of the meeting, toughened its anti-dumping 
policy against foreign steel imports. In Seattle, participants failed to agree on a specific 
agenda for the new round, due largely to sharp differences among the industrialized 
countries over a review of international anti-dumping rules. Therefore, Japan, backed by 
the EU and others, insisted on putting a review of anti-dumping rules on the agenda for 
the Doha round to prevent a possible US abuse of the rules.
585
 However, in the face of 
strong political pressure from the domestic steel industry and labour unions, the US 
administration of President Bill Clinton rejected the calls from the EU and Japan for a 
review of the anti-dumping rules in the Doha round.
586
 
 After the collapse of the Seattle meeting, senior officials from Japan, the United 
States, Canada and the European Union held secret talks in Ottawa from 21 June 2000 
onwards to coordinate policy toward a new round of global trade liberalization 
negotiations. Although topping the agenda for the Ottawa meeting were issues in all areas, 
the anti-dumping issue was discussed particularly intensively.
587
 Ahead of the meeting, in 
May 2000, the European Union and Japan had agreed to work together to persuade the 
United States to overhaul anti-dumping rules at a new global trade round under the World 
Trade Organization. With the US opposed to discussing the matter at the new round 
proving to be a sticking point, the EU and Japan agreed to propose a review of the 
existing WTO anti-dumping rules. European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy asked US 
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky to accept the proposal in a meeting of top 
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leaders and ministers of the US and the EU in Portugal.
588
 This kind of small meeting was 
held frequently by some WTO members in order to explore ways to get a new round of 
global trade talks off the ground.  
 Some WTO members gathered in Frankfurt on 24 January 2001. This informal 
sub-Cabinet level conference was originally proposed by Japan and proceeded under 
Japan‟s initiative. Among the topics, Japan strongly insisted that anti-dumping should be 
taken up at the new trade round. The EU and Japan held high-level bilateral talks before 
the Frankfurt conference. However, the EU and the US did not attend the Frankfurt 
conference. The US was in transition, as President-elect George W. Bush was preparing to 
take office on 20 January 2001, succeeding President Bill Clinton. However, the reason of 
the EU absence was not reported.
589
 
 In February 2001, after the WTO ruling against the US anti-dumping duties on 
Japanese hot-rolled steel, US anti-dumping and other trade remedy laws became one of 
the most sensitive issues in US trade policy. The Bush administration was about to be 
forced to ask a hostile Congress to change US anti-dumping legislation at the WTO's 
behest. The issue threatened attempts to re-launch the round in Qatar in November 
2001.
590
 
 Despite US reluctance, the WTO members agreed to discuss the review of anti-
dumping rules in the Doha round after all. Since the EU shared the concern about the 
increasing use of anti-dumping measures taken by developing countries, the US finally 
compromised on the issue. While the fact that the EU and Japan held high-level bilateral 
talks on the issue suggests their shared interest, the EU‟s absence from the Frankfurt 
conference leaves questions about the intensity of their relationship on this issue.   
 
3-5. The Byrd Amendment law 
3-5-1. US anti-dumping law to subsidise domestic steel makers  
 While the EU and Japan agreed to discuss the review of anti-dumping rules in the 
WTO, they also thought it necessary to consult each other on the issue of the Byrd 
Amendment law.
591
The case on the US Byrd Amendment law is particularly important in 
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our context, since in this case EU-Japan cooperation was much closer and pro-active. In 
2000, the US Byrd Amendment law, officially known as the United States Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, gave rise to discussion among major steel 
traders. The Byrd Amendment allowed anti-dumping tariffs collected by US authorities to 
be distributed to domestic industries.
592
 Under WTO rules, member economies were 
allowed to impose anti-dumping duties. However, there was no clause directly banning 
the practice of offering subsidies to domestic makers from anti-dumping revenues.
593
The 
Byrd Law was enacted amid persistently strong Congressional pressure for tough action 
to protect the US steel industry against a flood of cheap foreign steel products.
594
 Japan 
immediately revealed its intention to file a complaint with the WTO, if US President Bill 
Clinton signed into law a bill that would subsidize American steel makers with dumping 
tariffs imposed on foreign companies. Japan also announced that it intended to do so 
jointly with the European Union which was also considering similar actions. 
 According to this law, domestic companies were to be awarded huge amounts of 
funds, if foreign products were being dumped below cost in the US market. The EU, 
which was caught off-guard by the move, warned that the legislation violated World 
Trade Organisation rules and could trigger another trade war between the world's two 
largest economies. 
 High legal costs usually prevented smaller US companies from filing dumping 
cases. The EU and Japan‟s common concern was that the US law created an enormous 
financial incentive to start litigation. The provision could also lead to more cases being 
adjudicated. Under existing law, a case only proceeded, if supported by a majority of the 
US industry. Many US companies might agree to support dumping cases simply to be 
eligible for the windfall.
595
 The chances looked high for the companies in the EU and 
Japan to be the prime targets of such lawsuits.  
 The EU and Japan immediately took joint actions. First, Japan‟s ambassador to the 
US, Yanai, sent letters protesting the legislation to Senator, Robert Byrd, a West Virginia 
Democrat and chief sponsor of the bill, and US Trade Representative Charlene 
Barshefsky.
596In addition, jointly with the European Union‟s  ambassador to the United 
States, he sent a letter to US President Bill Clinton, urging him to veto the bill.
597
 This 
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joint action by the EU and Japan was of significant importance since it was rare for 
ambassadors from different countries and regions to send a joint letter to the US 
President.
598
 
 Despite the serious concern from the EU and Japan, President Clinton signed it 
into law on 28 October 2000, following passage in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. Although Clinton and other administration officials were opposed to the new 
anti-dumping measures, the President reluctantly enacted it so as to not kill a farm bill 
which he valued even more.
599
  
 
3-5-2. EU‟s reluctance to take the case to the WTO 
 While the EU and Japan showed a strong cooperative stance in protesting the 
subsidy bill, it was initially a different story when it came to taking the dispute to the 
WTO. Nearly six weeks after US President Bill Clinton signed the controversial anti-
dumping bill on steel trade into law, Japan had still not carried out its strongly aired threat 
to take the law to the WTO.
600
 This was because the Japanese government hesitated to 
push the US too hard, fearing negative implications for the entire global trade system.
601
 
However, Japan was not merely bluffing but trying to take concerted action with other 
WTO members, especially with the European Union. A senior official at the MITI clearly 
stated, "we want to take a united front with the 15-nation European Union on this trade 
case as much as possible." However, the EU was reluctant to take the case to the WTO 
immediately. According to a MITI official, the EU had already faced many bilateral trade 
disputes with the US and apparently wanted to take a wait-and-see attitude.
602
 
 In reaction to the reserved reaction from the EU, Japan started to consider the 
timing of filing a complaint with the WTO over the US anti-dumping law without the EU. 
In spite of the EU‟s reluctance, Japanese officials were rather optimistic that the new 
Republican administration of President George W. Bush would move quickly to rescind 
the controversial law in the Republican-controlled Congress.
603
 The EU had the same 
expectation behind its evasive stance on US anti-dumping law. This optimism of the EU 
and Japan was based on the fact that Clinton had been reluctant to sign the law, so the 
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Bush administration might be more realistic in its response.
604
 However, there was also 
speculation that it may be politically difficult for Bush to depart from the Clinton 
administration's policy, given the fact that US Congress became almost evenly divided 
between Republicans and Democrats under the Bush administration.
605
Therefore, Japan 
kept putting pressure on the US over the anti-dumping law in cooperation with opponents 
of the law from the US administration and Congress. Japan reiterated its position that the 
goal of the Japanese government was not to win a legal battle with the US over the new 
anti-dumping law at the WTO, but to have the law abolished as soon as possible.
606
 
 
3-5-3. EU-Japan joint complaint  
 Despite the inconsistency of the EU and Japan‟s position, the EU and Japan finally 
came to the conclusion of fighting together against the US law. In December 2000, the 
European Union and Japan filed a joint complaint to the World Trade Organisation over 
the new US legislation. India, South Korea and Thailand agreed to be joint signatories 
and other countries were invited to join the initiative or be involved as third parties. 
Canada, Chile, Brazil and Australia all spoke out against the US law.
607
 
 In spite of the joint complaints by the EU, Japan and other countries, the Bush 
administration made it clear that it had no intention of urging Congress to nullify the Byrd 
law. Earlier in March 2001, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick went even further 
by suggesting to a US House of Representatives committee that "safeguard" emergency 
trade curbs be used on steel imports. The rising US protectionism put the EU and Japan 
on extra-alert to the US trade policy on steel. The EU and Japan confirmed that they 
would maintain close contacts with each other over the matter.
608
 
 The case attracted great attention from all WTO members, because the number of 
co-complainants was the largest since the dispute settlement mechanism had taken effect 
in 1996. The EU and Japan sought to bring in as many countries as possible to send a 
message to the US that countries from diverse areas were clearly opposed to the Byrd 
Amendment.
609
  
 
3-5-4. The WTO ruling  
 After filing the complaint with the WTO over the Byrd Law in December 2000, 
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the EU, Japan and seven other economies held bilateral consultations with the US in early 
February 2001. Bilateral consultation is the first stage of the WTO dispute settlement 
procedures. Canada and Mexico, US partners in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), later joined the complainants by filing a separate document with 
the WTO and held separate bilateral consultations with the US in June 2001.
610
 
 Japan intended to be fully prepared for a legal battle at the WTO by carefully 
examining the implementation rules. While requesting a WTO panel appeared to be the 
last remaining option, there was still concern among some Japanese officials about a 
possible negative effect on the entire global trade system by doing so. A senior Foreign 
Ministry official mentioned that despite the chance of winning the case at the WTO over 
the Byrd law, Japan needed to be careful in deciding whether to ask for the setting-up of a 
WTO panel. Japan was concerned that if it drove the US into a corner over steel trade, it 
might become reluctant about fulfilling commitments it had made in the multilateral arena, 
even if it would not go so far as to leave the WTO. The EU also shared the same concern 
with Japan. In fact, when the WTO replaced the GATT in January 1995, some 
Congressional members had insisted that the US should exit the WTO, if it lost any three 
consecutive trade cases, calling it the "three strikes-out" principle.
611
 
 Despite their concern to put the US into a corner, the EU and Japan eventually 
decided to bring the case to the WTO with 7 other co-complaints. Bilateral consultations 
between the US and the 9 complainants including the EU and Japan did not bridge the 
gap between both sides. Accordingly, in July 2001, the EU and Japan moved on to the 
second stage of the WTO dispute settlement procedures by requesting the WTO to set up 
a neutral panel to adjudicate on the case.
612
 
 The WTO, on 23 August 2001, set up a dispute panel to rule on the complaint by 
the EU, Japan and seven other WTO members against the Byrd law. The EU and Japan 
claimed that the unprecedented joint action reflected widespread concern over the law.
613
 
On 17 July 2002, the WTO dealt a critical blow against US protection of its steel industry 
by issuing a preliminary ruling condemning the Byrd law. An interim report by a WTO 
dispute panel found that the Byrd Amendment violated multilateral rules on anti-dumping 
                                                 
610 The Japan Times, 28 December 2001 
611 The Japan Times, 28 March 2001 
612 The WTO decided to set up a panel in August 2001, and one month later, it decided to 
let Canada and Mexico join the original nine complainant economies. / The Japan Times, 
28 December 2001 
613 Facing a request from the EU and Japan to set up a neutral panel, the US blocked 
their first panel request. This was seen as US „delaying tactics‟. Under WTO rules, 
however, it cannot do so a second time.  
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and subsidies and called for its repeal. The ruling marked a victory for the EU and Japan 
which succeeded in rallying support from other affected WTO members. Having created a 
common front with the largest number of co-complainants in WTO history, the EU and 
Japan together had achieved a major victory.  
 Fighting against US protectionism provided a strong motivation for the EU and 
Japan to maintain cohesion on anti-dumping issues, despite shared concerns about 
possible negative implications for their relationship with the United States. But looking 
back at other anti-dumping dispute cases, this cohesion cannot hide the fact that there 
were also differences between the EU and Japan over their stance towards anti-dumping. 
This difference stems from the circumstance that Japan had been a target of anti-dumping 
duties (some of them imposed by the EU), while the EU was one of the main users of the 
anti-dumping measures. This is due to the structural differences between European and 
Japanese steel trade. The EU and Japan are the main exporters of steel products, while the 
EU is also a large importer of them. This structural difference came to the surface again in 
the case of opposing US safeguards which will be analysed in the following section of 
this chapter.  
 
4. Steel trade and safeguard measures 
4-1. EU-Japan reactions to Section 201 of the 1974 US Trade Act 
4-1-1. US safeguard measures 
 Alongside this EU-Japan victory over these two cases of US anti-dumping 
measures, there were other protectionist US policies which raised the question whether 
the EU and Japan would continue their cooperation against their most important ally in so 
many other policy areas. Further protectionist policies came up because the US steel 
industry remained stagnant. In August 1999, the US unveiled a "steel action plan" to 
boost its industry after the surge in cheap steel imports with the onset of the Asian 
financial crisis.
614
 This action plan became a common concern shared by the EU and 
Japan. The proposed US measures included "safeguard" actions, which could restrict 
imports of steel wire rod, they put pressure on some countries, particularly Japan, to 
reduce steel exports to the US, and established a government-backed loan guarantee plan 
for steel companies. The EU warned the US that the proposed measures by the US could 
destabilise the world market, and hinted at bringing the case to the WTO.
615
 The warning 
                                                 
614 For details, see: „Imposition of US Tariffs on steel imports‟ in The American Journal of 
International law, Vol. 96, No.4, (American Society of International Law, Oct. 2002), 
P977, 978 
615 A week after the US government revealed its plan, Sir Leon Brittan, EU Trade 
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came amid growing criticism of “Section 201 of the US Trade Act,” which allowed the 
US to set import quotas or raise tariffs on imported products, if an increase in imports was 
deemed to have caused injury to US industry.
616
 
 Import restrictions, such as Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974, are called 
safeguard measures. Safeguard measures are temporary and selective measures, such as 
increased tariffs, tariff quotas or quantitative restrictions. The WTO allows members to 
implement a safeguard mechanism to slow imports so that a specific industry can adjust 
to heightened competition from foreign suppliers.
617
 GATT Article XIX, which entitles 
"Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products," recognizes a country's right to 
withdraw or modify concessions granted earlier, or to impose new restrictions, if a 
product is "being imported in such increased quantities...as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers" and to maintain such restrictions "for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury."
618
 Exporters have a complementary right 
under the GATT not to be deprived arbitrarily of access to foreign markets. Under the 
Uruguay Round trade accord, GATT member countries strengthened safeguard rules by 
clarifying existing guidelines and tightening timetables.
619
 The duration of a safeguard 
measure is limited to a maximum of eight years. 
 US safeguard measures known as Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974 require 
the US International Trade Commission
620
 to investigate complaints formally known as 
"petitions" filed by domestic industries or workers claiming that they have been injured or 
are threatened with injury as a consequence of rising imports and to complete any such 
investigation within six months. The act states that if the US International Trade 
Commission finds that a domestic industry has been seriously injured or threatened with 
serious injury, it shall recommend to the President relief measures for the industry in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Commissioner wrote a letter to Charlene Barshefsky, US trade representative. / The 
Financial Times, 13 August 1999 
616 The Financial Times, 13 August 1999 
617 Safeguard actions are known in the United States as "escape clause" actions, and 
authority to take such actions is provided for in various US laws.  
618 From WTO homepage, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XIX: 
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#477) 
619 As for the safeguard agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round, see: Thiebaut 
Flory, „The Agreement on Safeguards‟ in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Frederique Berrod and 
Eric Gippini Fournier (eds), „The Uruguay Round Results‟, P265-271 
620 The US International Trade Commission assessed whether US industries were 
seriously injured by fairly traded imports and could recommend to the President that 
relief be provided to those industries to facilitate positive adjustment to import 
competition. Relief could take the form of increased tariffs or quotas on imports and/or 
adjustment assistance for the domestic industry. For further details, see: 
(http://www.usitc.gov/webabout.htm) 
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form of temporary import restrictions (tariffs, quotas, or tariff-rate quotas) or trade 
adjustment assistance. The President has discretion to follow the US International Trade 
Commission's recommendations on relief, which normally takes the form of increased 
duties or quantitative restrictions. Such import relief cannot exceed eight years, including 
extensions. 
 
4-1-2. EU-Japan anxiety on US move  
   US safeguard measures under Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974 became a 
concrete issue in March 2002 when they were invoked against the imports of steel 
products. Prior to the invocation of safeguard tariffs, the EU and Japan kept expressing 
their strong concerns to the United States. In August 1999, in a letter from Sir Leon 
Brittan to the US trade representative, the EU had already expressed concern about the 
prospect of the US applying any measures that could restrict imports of steel wire rod, 
one of the main categories of steel. The EU warned against pressure from the US on 
countries such as Japan to reduce steel exports to the US, because it represented a return 
to the kind of VRAs that had proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s.
621
  
 On 1 September 1999, following the EU move, Japan also revealed its concern on 
US safeguard measures by sending a letter to the US in an effort to pre-empt the 
imposition of tariffs on US imports of Japanese steel.
622
 The Japanese government 
claimed that Japanese exports of steel wire rods were not causing injury to US industry, 
since they were speciality products not manufactured in the US. The letters from the EU 
and Japan came ahead of a decision expected on September 26 by US President Bill 
Clinton on whether to impose additional tariffs on imports of steel wire rods from Japan. 
The Japanese government pointed out that US action raised concerns about further US 
trade measures that could undermine international efforts to liberalise trade. But the 
Japanese government went much further than the EU and also asked the US for bilateral 
consultations under the WTO to resolve the dispute.
623
 
 In spite of the letters from the EU and Japan revealing their concerns about the US 
                                                 
621 The EU Commissioner also urged the US President not to sign the Emergency Steel 
Loan Guarantee Act, which passed through both houses of Congress. This would provide 
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measures, on 18 October 2000, Democratic leaders in US Congress urged the Clinton 
administration to seek import restraints under Section 201, adding a powerful voice to 
demands from the US steel industry and the steelworkers' union.
624
 The industry claimed 
that unless the administration responded quickly to stem rising imports, several steel 
companies faced bankruptcy. As explained above, import restraints under Section 201 
requires the industry to prove before the International Trade Commission that imports are 
seriously hurting US producers. However, the industry was asking for immediate curbs on 
imports even from non-WTO countries.
625
 Robert LaRussa, the Undersecretary of 
Commerce for International Trade revealed that the US had urged several countries to 
restrain steel exports to the US voluntarily.
626
 
 It came as a disappointment to the EU and Japan, when on 5 June 2001, President 
George W. Bush announced that the administration would initiate a safeguard action that 
could result in import curbs after an eight month investigation and that it would seek 
international negotiations to cut steel capacity and end market-distorting subsidies.
627
The 
US move was distressing for the EU and Japan, since a safeguard action marked a 
significant shift of tone in the Bush administration's approach to trade liberalisation 
policy.
628
 Bearing in mind that safeguard measures should serve only as an emergency 
measure, WTO Director General, Supachai shared the same position as the EU and Japan 
against US safeguard measures.
629
 
 
4-1-3. US International Trade Commission investigation and EU reaction 
 The US decision to impose safeguard measures was received very negatively in 
the EU, since it was a sensitive time for the US and the EU when they were reviving 
                                                 
624 About 200 members of the House of Representatives, including Democratic leader 
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efforts to resolve a long dispute over an EU ban on imports of US beef treated with 
hormones. The two sides were reactivating negotiations to lift 116.8 million dollars in US 
sanctions imposed on EU exports because of the dispute. The two sides also hoped to 
manage the political fallout, in case the World Trade Organisation decided that the US 
foreign sales corporation tax regime still violated trade rules. The EU threatened as much 
as 2.8 billion pounds retaliation in that dispute.
630
 
 In October 2001, an investigation by the US International Trade Commission, 
initiated by the administration, found that competition from foreign producers was hurting 
the US steel industry. The finding completely ran counter to Japan‟s claim and paved the 
way for trade curbs on as much as 80 per cent of steel imports.
631
 Receiving the result of 
US International Trade Commission investigation, the Bush administration started to 
consider whether to invoke Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act to impose safeguard import 
restrictions on a wide range of foreign steel products, including some products that had 
not yet faced anti-dumping duties. Restrictions were expected to raise US manufacturing 
and construction costs and divert steel imports elsewhere, above all to Europe.
632
 
 The European Union immediately prepared itself to move swiftly to protect its 
steel market against a surge of imports, in case the US materialised its threat to impose 
trade restrictions on steel. The EU warned the US that, if Washington imposed curbs, the 
EU would withdraw immediately from talks in the OECD on cutting worldwide industry 
capacity and subsidies. The erection of barriers around the world's two largest steel 
markets risked to create turmoil in the steel sector and setting off an international chain 
reaction of protectionist measures.  
 The EU stated clearly that it had no choice but to follow suit to prevent its market 
being swamped by imports diverted from the US, if the US imposed safeguard measures. 
The EU began monitoring the steel market in order to watch closely for any sudden 
increase in imports. This EU move was to calculate what impact a range of possible US 
import barriers would have on international trade flows. The EU also immediately 
revealed a plan to challenge any US curbs in the WTO with confidence of winning. 
However, the EU was concerned that it could take about two years to get such measures 
removed, during which time the European industry would risk being weakened by a sharp 
increase in imports.
633
 
 
                                                 
630 The Financial Times, 11 June 2001 
631 The Financial Times, 24 October 2001 
632 The Japan Times, 28 December 2001 
633 The Financial Times, 22 February 2002 
187 
 
4-2. The imposition of US safeguard measures 
4-2-1. EU-Japan opposition to US safeguard 
 On 5 March 2002, Bush announced that his government invoked import restriction 
measures on imported steel products for three years to protect the domestic steel industry. 
The US move was a severe blow to its relations with the EU and Japan, the US's two 
largest economic allies, whose steel producers were expected to be hit hard. It fuelled 
suspicions, particularly in Europe, that unilateralist impulses, which other governments 
increasingly discern in US foreign policy, had spread to trade and economic policy. The 
tough action on steel went beyond what the EU, Japan and other US trade partners had 
expected. 
 Safeguard measures are emergency trade measures taken temporarily by a 
member to provide relief to its domestic industry in the situation of it getting hurt from an 
increase in imports. Normally, a member is not permitted to restrict imports into its 
territory or exports from its territory. Only under certain conditions, a member may take 
recourse to trade measures restricting its imports of a product so as to „safeguard‟ its 
domestic industry. Safeguard measures are sometimes called an „escape clause‟ as they 
enable a member to escape its obligations in specified situations.  
 The purpose of such a provision in the multilateral trading system is to lighten the 
burden on the country whose domestic industry is facing acute problems due to imports. 
The objective is to disperse the burden over all the members to enable the affected 
member to adjust smoothly to the new situation of international competition in that 
particular product line. By its very nature, safeguard measures have to be temporary and 
in support of the adjustment process. Since they are meant to provide temporary 
protection to the domestic industry to facilitate its adjustment, they are not expected to be 
used as an instrument of long-term protection.
634
  
 On 7 March 2002, the Japan Times reported that Japanese government officials 
and business leaders reacted with anger to a decision by US President George W. Bush to 
slap tariffs on imported steel. Japan unveiled its intention to conduct countermeasures 
after consulting the European Union and South Korea. Under WTO rules member 
governments are prohibited from taking retaliatory steps against a safeguard measure. 
Therefore, Japan had two choices; 1.) to ask the US to take countervailing steps by 
lowering tariffs on other import items, or 2.) to go to the WTO at once. Japan steelmakers 
faced tariffs up to 30 per cent. In 2001, Japan exported 2.2 million tons of steel to the US, 
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about 7 per cent of its total steel exports. Japan's steel exports to the US already tumbled 
to one-third of their peak, due to a spate of US anti-dumping charges. Japanese 
steelmakers reacted by shifting to exporting items not produced by US rivals, doing so in 
low volume and in a stable manner, in order to mitigate the impact of US trade 
restrictions.
635
 
 In March 2002, the European Union pledged to launch an immediate complaint 
with the WTO against new US steel tariffs, which it said represented a clear violation of 
WTO rules. In a hard-hitting statement, Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Commissioner, 
revealed his determination that the EU would take whatever measures necessary to 
protect its steel industry from an expected surge in imports as steel makers accustomed to 
exporting to the US searched for alternative markets. The EU, which supplied about one-
fifth of US steel imports, was expected to be hardest hit by the US actions. Despite efforts 
by Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative, to avoid confrontation, 
EU governments were seen to support the Commission's tough response. According to the 
Commission, the value of US steel imports fell 23 per cent in 2001, while EU imports 
were at record levels.  
 Shortly after President Bush‟s announcement, the EU, Japan and six other 
countries requested consultations at the WTO
636
 and after the consultations ended 
unsatisfactorily, they requested the establishment of dispute panels.
637
 The European 
Commission estimated that EU steel producers could lose exports of about 4 million 
tonnes to the US market and face imports totalling as much as 16 million tonnes diverted 
from the US.  
 
4-2-2. International criticism 
 Negative reaction came not only from the EU and Japan. Russia, the world's 
fourth biggest steel producer, joined the EU and Japan and called the US move unjustified 
from a legal or economic point of view. As a retaliatory move, Russia suspended imports 
of US poultry.
638
The IMF also shared the same concern with the EU and Japan and 
criticised the US for raising trade barriers. The IMF revealed its concern that the US 
action could hamper its effort to persuade developing countries to reduce their trade 
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barriers.
639Criticism on US safeguard measures came also from the US‟s closest ally in 
the EU, the United Kingdom. Patricia Hewitt, UK Trade and Industry Secretary, accused 
the US for levying 30 per cent tariffs on hot-rolled steel and flat-steel products. According 
to her, the US move led to a real risk that the British and European markets would be 
flooded with steel products from third countries, mainly in the Far East, that would 
otherwise have sold to the US.
640
 In March 2002, the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
revealed his frustration that the US ignored an intensive British lobbying campaign, 
including a letter and personal telephone call to President Bush. A strong feeling of 
discontent was found even within the US. Alan Greenspan, the US Federal Reserve 
chairman gave his rare criticism of the administration in testimony before the Senate 
banking committee. Greenspan clearly revealed his dissatisfaction with President George 
W. Bush's decision to impose temporary tariffs on imported steel.
641
 
 The alleged damage for the US market was doubted by the EU and Japan. Japan 
questioned whether the US was suffering enough to justify the import curbs under 
international trade rules of the WTO. The EU argued that world trade rules forbid the 
introduction of defensive tariffs, unless a country had suffered a sudden surge in imports. 
The European Union claimed that any US restrictions would be illegal, because imports 
into its market had been falling for several years. US steel imports had fallen steadily 
since 1999. However, the US claimed its trade restrictions complied with WTO rules, 
because imports rose strongly for about two years after the 1997 economic crisis in Asia 
and remained above pre-crisis levels.
642
 
 
4-3. The EU-Japan challenge in the WTO  
4-3-1. Demand for compensation 
 In March 2002, the EU confirmed that it would coordinate with Japan and other 
countries including China, South Korea and Brazil in preparing a case against US 
safeguard measures in the WTO. Japan claimed that it considered bringing the case to the 
WTO dispute settlement panel. Australia followed the EU and Japan in threatening a 
WTO challenge. South Korea, the world's sixth largest steel maker, pledged to support 
efforts by the EU and Japan to fight US tariffs.
643
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 While the EU claimed that it was in the EU's long-term interest not to be drawn 
into a cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation in contravention of the WTO's rules, on 7 March 2002, 
the EU launched two legal challenges in the WTO aimed at overturning the US steel 
tariffs.
644
 The European Union revealed a plan to demand that the US compensate it for 
the cost incurred by its proposed trade restrictions on steel imports. The EU asked the US 
for immediate compensation in the form of lower tariffs on other products, which could 
be worth as much as 2 billion dollars (2.3 billion euros) annually. Under Article 8 of the 
safeguards agreement in the WTO, the EU, Japan and any other countries affected by US 
measures could demand trade compensation 60 days after the curbs take effect. The 
article carried a requirement that "members concerned agree on any adequate means of 
trade compensation for the adverse effects of the measure on their trade." Although the 
rules had never been tested in practice, if the US refused, the EU was entitled to retaliate 
automatically by raising its own tariffs on some US exports. That would mark a 
significant escalation of the dispute, forcing the US to challenge the EU retaliation in the 
WTO. Japan immediately asked for third-party participation in a dispute settlement case 
filed by the European Union. Under WTO rules, member countries are entitled to take 
part in dispute settlement procedures as third parties with observer status, if relevant 
issues affected their trade policies, even though they are not directly involved in the 
dispute.
645
  
 
4-3-2. US rejection of EU-Japan demand for compensation 
 At the same time, Japan filed its own complaint with the WTO against US 
safeguard. Japan filed a request with the United States to hold bilateral talks with an eye 
toward trade compensation from the US. Japan estimated the potential losses to its steel 
makers at 168.94 million dollars. Japan's request was based on Article 12 of the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Safeguards, which obligates a WTO member wishing 
to apply or extend a safeguard measure to provide "adequate opportunity for prior 
consultations" with concerned parties. During bilateral consultations held in Washington, 
the two countries failed to narrow their divisions on the issue. The US had already 
rejected Japan's demand that it scrap tariffs on seven Japanese products, including video 
cameras and wrist watches, as compensation for the safeguard measure.
646
 
 The US also rejected EU demands for immediate compensation for the steel curbs 
in the form of lower barriers to other imports. The US insisted the EU should first prove 
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its claims in the WTO. The rejection meant the EU must decide whether to escalate the 
dispute by retaliating against US exports or await the outcome of its separate legal 
challenge to the steel curbs in the WTO. The European Union decided to take a hard-line. 
On 12 March 2002, European Union governments gave unanimous backing to the 
European Commission's uncompromising reaction to US safeguard measures. The 15 EU 
member states told the Commission to continue its approach to countering the US action. 
The Commission began the process of consultations in the WTO, which was preliminary 
to a dispute settlement panel.
647
 The delay of US response to the EU‟s request for 
compensation aroused suspicion in the EU that the US was conducting a delaying tactic in 
the hope that the EU would miss the deadlines under the safeguard measures.  
 
4-4. EU-Japan threat of retaliation  
4-4-1. US strategy to isolate the EU 
 Receiving a negative response from the US, on 15 March 2002, the European 
Union stepped up its threat to retaliate against the US safeguard measure, unless the Bush 
administration agreed to EU demands for compensation. Although the EU set no deadline 
for concluding talks with the US on compensation, the European Commission started to 
make a list of US goods worth about 2 billion dollars which could face increased EU 
tariffs as retaliation. The EU tariffs include US steel exports worth about 600 million 
dollars and textiles. This plan of retaliation by the EU on the sensitive textiles and steel 
sectors worsened the tense situation.  
 Facing a tough reaction from the EU, the US hoped to isolate the EU in the 
dispute over steel but failed to placate Japan and other countries targeted by the action, 
including Korea, China, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, which also 
demanded US compensation. Japan told the US that it wanted compensation in the form 
of increased access for Japanese-made consumer products and was prepared to retaliate if 
the US refused.
648
 
 While the US and the EU made no progress on Europe's demand for compensation, 
the US announced that it would negotiate on Japan's request for compensation. Robert 
Zoellick, US trade representative, announced that the US would enter discussions over a 
Japanese request for about 160 million dollars in compensation, which would involve the 
US lowering trade barriers on other products sold by Japan. This position was more 
conciliatory than before, when the US had said it did not believe such compensation was 
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owed. The offer came, as Japan and South Korea claimed that they would join the 
European Union in filing a complaint with the WTO over the US steel tariffs. The 
Japanese government was also threatening to impose retaliatory tariffs on US exports, if 
the US refused to pay compensation. The US announced its readiness to open the door, as 
well for negotiations over compensation with other affected parties, including the EU. 
However, the US mentioned that unlike Japan, the EU took no constructive approach.
649
 
Treating the EU and Japan differently, the US tried to divide the grouping led by the EU. 
 Ironically, immediately after the US softened its stance towards Japan, Japan's 
Economy, Trade and Industry Minister made the strongest ever comment on EU-Japan 
cooperation. Japan revealed its plan to work closely with Europe and to welcome the 
participation of other concerned countries as third parties. Despite the US effort to isolate 
the EU, Japan intended to maintain or even consolidate the close relationship it had with 
the EU and other affected nations by the US safeguard.
650
 Takeo Hiranuma called on 
other steel exporting countries to join the EU-Japan in challenging the US safeguard 
measures.
651
 
 
4-4-2. Escalation and mitigation of transatlantic tensions 
 Coinciding with the US resistance to compensate, the EU was preparing for 
retaliation. On 22 March, the European Commission distributed to EU member states a 
draft list of suggested subjects for retaliation.
652
 EU retaliation was designed to put 
maximum pressure on the US to withdraw its steel tariffs, while doing minimum harm to 
European businesses. It included citrus fruit from Florida, steel from the Midwest and 
textiles from North and South Carolina. It included products for which the EU was not 
dependent on US imports, but it targeted particular US states to be extra persuasive. The 
EU believed that President George W. Bush approved punitive tariffs on steel imports to 
help his political prospects in states such as West Virginia and Pennsylvania. These would 
be hit by EU retaliation, while targeting citrus would hit Florida, the state that ultimately 
decided the 2000 election. Florida and Brazil produced 90 per cent of the world's supply 
of processed orange juice. During its previous disputes with the EU over bananas and 
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beef produced using hormones, the US targeted those EU states which were the strongest 
defenders of the EU's policies, hitting countries such as France particularly hard.
653
 
 While tensions between the US and the EU were mounting, there were also signs 
of moderation on both sides as a result of other considerations. Firstly, some EU member 
states still remained unconvinced of the effect of retaliation, before the WTO ruled on a 
separate EU legal challenge to the US measures. Some governments, such as Germany 
and the Nordic countries, expressed concern about the implications of the commission's 
action, questioning whether unilateral sanctions would really comply with WTO rules. 
They required clear legal assurances on that point. 
 Secondly, the Bush administration was under strong pressure from US steel-users 
to scale back the import restrictions in order to meet EU objections to some extent. The 
Bush administration was concerned about a rapid rise in the domestic price of many steel 
products following the imposition of tariffs. Steel users warned Washington that shortages 
were looming. 
 Thirdly, while both the US and the EU were obliged to talk tough in order to rally 
international support, both sides had much to lose, if the steel dispute went out of control. 
The US and EU decided to prevent this sort of bilateral trade skirmishes caused by new 
regulations that had blighted transatlantic ties. As a result the US and the EU started to 
tone down their aggravated trade relations.
654
 Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, also 
had reason to act cautiously. The conflict undermined Lamy's efforts to improve 
transatlantic trade relations and cooperate more closely with his counterpart, Robert 
Zoellick. A complete breakdown would destroy ambitions to conclude a successful trade 
round. Those signals prompted both sides to consider compromise.  
 
4-5. Imposition of EU safeguard measures 
4-5-1. The impact of EU safeguard measures on EU-Japan relations 
 Running parallel with the exchange of arguments between the EU and the US, the 
EU and Japan were facing a test of the strength of their cooperation. A week after the US 
imposition of safeguard measures on 20 March 2002, the European Commission 
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immediately revealed its readiness to impose safeguard import curbs on 15 steel products 
to prevent a flood of imports from damaging its steel industry.  
 The Japanese government revealed its concern about the plan by the European 
Union to join the United States in curbing steel imports. Japan was concerned about the 
possibility that if every country invoked safeguard measures against each other, it would 
disturb the market. An abuse would have negative effects on the world's free-trade system. 
Japan asked the EU to comply with the rules of the WTO, in case the EU took this 
action.
655
 
 Despite Japan‟s concern, on 29 March 2002, the EU invoked the 200-day import 
curbs on 15 categories of steel products, which meant the imposition of tariffs of between 
14.9 and 26 per cent on all imports above set quotas. These safeguard measures were 
expected to cover imports of around 5.7 million tonnes of steel, accounting for about 40 
per cent of EU steel imports. Under the EU plan, quotas were filled on a first-come, first-
served basis, not divided between specific exporters, with some developing countries 
exempted.  
 The US revealed its plan to file a complaint with the World Trade Organisation 
against the European Union's decision to introduce these measures. Romano Prodi, 
European Commission President said the EU action was designed to abide by world trade 
rules, in contrast to the US measures.
656
 The US was swift to condemn the EU's action, by 
questioning whether the EU action on safeguards was appropriate given that there had 
been no time to determine whether there had been an increase in exports that caused 
injury. The EU believed it already had evidence of increased imports into its market, since 
President George W. Bush announced tariffs of up to 30 per cent on steel entering the US. 
The EU normally expected to import around 27 million tonnes of steel annually, but 
feared that could increase by as much as 15 million tonnes following the partial closure of 
the US market. Officials stressed the idea was to maintain imports at around current 
levels. The quotas were set by taking the average of 1999, 2000 and 2001 imports and 
adding 10 per cent.
657
  
 Japan expressed concern that the EU import curbs violated WTO rules and may 
encourage other countries to take similar import restrictions.
658
Katsusada Hirose, Vice 
Minister for Trade mentioned that "Economic damage (caused by the EU action) is not so 
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big as that caused by the US action. But we will discuss the issue with the EU since we 
can't ignore the EU action from the standpoint of the WTO trade rules."
659
 Japan‟s Trade 
Minister Hiranuma refrained from commenting on what impact the planned European 
manoeuvre would have on the EU-Japan alliance.
660
 
 
4-5-2. US tariff exclusion 
 Facing international criticism, the US suggested its intention to use the exclusion 
process to try to defuse international anger over the curbs. The US started to consider new 
requests from foreign steel makers and US importers to exclude hundreds of millions of 
dollars of steel imports from tariffs. The US was desperately trying to dampen protests 
over the steel tariffs and weaken European and Japanese efforts to form a broader 
international coalition to fight the measures in the WTO. For instance, Robert Zoellick, 
US trade representative, warned China, which said it would press on with a complaint to 
the WTO, against joining the "running dogs of European imperialism" to oppose the US 
tariffs.
661
 
 Despite the US suggestion of tariff exclusion of steel imports, Japan started to 
threaten the US with retaliation. On 11 April 2002, Japan called on the US to withdraw its 
steel tariffs or face retaliation, if Washington did not compensate it for damage caused to 
Japanese mills. Robert Zoellick, US trade representative claimed that Japan's steel 
industry was sheltered, and accused it of dumping its excess capacity on other markets. 
He pointed out that Japan had about 20 per cent overcapacity, while its domestic prices 
exceeded those for exports.
662
 
 As in Japan, political, public and media pressure was growing in Europe to strike 
back by linking the steel conflict with other issues such as a dispute over a US corporate 
tax scheme, in which the EU was threatening sanctions on as much as 4 billion dollars of 
US exports.
663
 
 The European Union's proposal to impose sanctions on US exports brought 
Brussels and Washington a step closer to their most violent showdown over trade for 
years. One hundred per cent tariffs totalling 377 million euros were planned to be levied 
on US exports of these goods to the EU. The commission drew up a longer list of 
products on which additional tariffs worth up to 626 million euros would be applied, if 
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and when the EU won a WTO dispute settlement case against the US on steel. The US 
accused the EU of having double standards; by threatening unilateral action while 
claiming to be operating fully within the rules. The US claimed that the EU must wait 
until a WTO panel ruled in its favour before taking any counter-measures.
664
 
 
4-5-3. US and EU retaliatory measures  
 The US warned the EU and Japan that applying sanctions unilaterally would 
escalate the steel dispute and undermine the multilateral trade system. The US revealed its 
determination of retaliation, if the European Union went ahead with plans to hit back at 
US safeguard measures by imposing sanctions on US exports.
665
 Receiving the US threat, 
the European Commission warned Washington that the US would violate world trade 
rules, if it carried out the threat to retaliate.  
 The US believed WTO rules entitled it to retaliate immediately against EU 
provisional trade safeguards on steel. Washington based its legal case on Article 19 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade safeguards accord, which permitted such 
retaliation when safeguards caused exporters in other countries damage that was difficult 
to repair. Brussels claimed that would be hard to prove in the case of US steel producers, 
because European sales were a very small part of US total output and the EU's safeguards 
were designed not to reduce but to cap import levels. The US also challenged the EU 
safeguards in the WTO, saying they did not meet the requirement that they be imposed in 
critical circumstances.
666
 
 Facing mounting tensions with the US, Sweden became the first country openly to 
express doubts about the proposed EU sanctions, which must be approved by EU 
governments. Gunnar Lund, Sweden's permanent representative to the EU, said that his 
government was sceptical about retaliating against the US.
667
  
 Despite the disquiet from some member states, the European Union took a further 
step towards potential quick-fire retaliation against controversial US steel tariffs. On 7 
May 2002, the 15 EU governments unanimously backed European Commission proposals 
to submit two lists of possible trade sanctions to the WTO. On the same day, the EU 
submitted its formal request for the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel on 
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the steel tariffs.
668
A week later, the European Union officially notified the World Trade 
Organisation of two lists of US products, in order to keep open the option of retaliation.
669
 
 Soon, Japan, along with Norway, joined the European Union in notifying the 
World Trade Organisation of plans to retaliate against US tariffs on steel imports. The 
moves marked a further intensification of trade hostilities over US steel policy, which 
attracted global condemnation. Japan targeted nearly 5 million dollars worth of US steel 
products on which it might slap 100 per cent tariffs from mid-June 2002. Norway's list 
targeted 5.6 million dollars in extra duties.
670
 On 22 May 2002, Japan, followed by South 
Korea, announced that they would join the European Union in calling for a WTO panel to 
rule on the legality of the US measures. Brazil and New Zealand also filed formal WTO 
complaints.
671
  
 Trade retaliation against the US safeguard was set at more than 800 million dollars 
(870 million euros) on US products by WTO members, according to sanction lists lodged 
by the EU (583 million dollars), Japan (123 million dollars), China (94 million dollars), 
Norway (6 million dollars) and Switzerland (3 million dollars). If the US tariffs were not 
withdrawn, sanctions would be imposed automatically after three years, in March 
2005.
672
The EU and Japan also said they might impose tariffs worth 364 million dollars 
and 5 million dollars respectively on a smaller list of US products in a few weeks under 
WTO provisions that allowed swift retaliation, if there had been no "absolute increase in 
imports". The US claimed that early retaliation was unjustified and threatened counter-
moves. On retaliation against the US, one of the members of the Japanese delegation 
revealed that there had been prior consultation between the EU and Japan. When 
retaliation was discussed, the EU and Japan carefully chose the items for retaliatory tariff-
imposition, so as not to harm each other‟s trade, but impose damage on the US most 
effectively. 
673
  
 At this stage, the EU, Japan and ten other countries including South Korea, China 
and Norway had demanded compensation under the WTO's safeguards agreement.
674
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Although momentum was gathering in the EU and Japan to retaliate, the EU alone 
suddenly revealed its readiness to delay retaliatory trade sanctions over US steel tariffs.
675
 
This EU move was seen as an effort to persuade Washington to ease restrictions on 
European steel imports. However, the EU clearly stated that the sanctions would be 
implemented, if the US offer would not satisfy the EU. Despite the sign of EU 
compromise, the tension between the EU and US was continuing. On the same day when 
the EU softened its stance, the US took the first formal step in a separate complaint 
against the EU that could further escalate the dispute. The US asked the WTO to form a 
dispute settlement panel to hear a complaint that the EU violated trade rules by imposing 
its own restrictions on steel imports.
676
 A few days later, the European Union was 
successful in having the WTO set up a panel to rule on US steel tariffs. Six US safeguard 
measures, including curbs on steel, were examined in the WTO
677
 and were condemned 
by the EU for allegedly breaching WTO rules.
678
 While the US and the EU had shown 
willingness to reduce the possibility of mutual retaliation, they finally decided to start the 
legal battle in the WTO.  
 After all, the EU was not satisfied with the US offer to exclude European imports 
from its safeguard tariffs as proposed in bilateral talks. The EU estimated that the 247 
product exclusions announced so far covered 330,000 tonnes of EU steel, worth about 
230 million dollars out of total EU exports of 2.3 billion dollars affected by the tariffs. 
The European Commission condemned as "manifestly insufficient" the exemptions so far 
granted by Washington from its tariffs on steel imports. However, the EU still postponed 
the decision of whether to retaliate immediately against the US.
679
 
 After seven successive announcements by the US of exemptions from the duties, 
in September 2002, the European Commission finally shelved its threat of immediate 
retaliation against US steel tariffs. The announcement of numerous exemptions from the 
US tariffs persuaded the EU to hold fire, pending the outcome of a WTO dispute 
settlement panel on the issue.
680
 This EU decision was based on its confident expectation 
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that it would obtain further concession from the US.
681
Simultaneously, the EU decided on 
a significant reduction of its safeguard measures, applying them to 7 product categories 
compared with the original 15 categories. As a result, 40 per cent of total EU steel imports 
was planned to be covered by EU safeguard measures.
682
 
 
4-5-4. WTO ruling against the US  
 On 26 March 2003, the WTO ruled that the US violated international trading rules 
with its imposition of safeguard measures.
683
 The EU, Japan and six other co-
complainants claimed full victory and threatened retaliation. They claimed in a joint 
statement that the verdict left the US with no other choice but to terminate its WTO-
incompatible safeguard measures without delay. Receiving the ruling, the US 
immediately announced its readiness to appeal.
684
  
 The European Union announced that it would levy trade sanctions against the US 
in mid-December 2003, if Washington did not lift its tariffs on steel imports. EU Trade 
Commissioner, Pascal Lamy claimed that the EU had little choice but to insist on 
compliance with the WTO rules, as the US did in previous disputes over bananas and beef 
hormones.
685
 Japan said it was also prepared to levy trade sanctions against the US. The 
US could face the largest sanctions in the history of the WTO. Pascal Lamy, the European 
Union Trade Commissioner, said that the EU would slap tariffs of 8 per cent to 30 per 
cent on 2.2 billion dollars worth of US imports.
686
 
 US steel makers recognised the tough situation which the Bush administration 
faced. They told the White House that they would accept an early removal of tariffs on 
imported steel but remained opposed to the immediate repeal demanded by the European 
Union and other trading partners.
687
 The concessions was a sharp turn away from the 
industry's original insistence that the tariffs remain in place for a full three years. The 
industry hoped the scheme might be sufficient to stave off the EU‟s and Japan‟s threats to 
retaliate by imposing tariffs on US imports. However, the EU viewed any such 
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accelerated phase-out of the US tariffs as clearly insufficient, particularly since the EU's 
case had repeatedly triumphed at the WTO. Commission officials maintained that they 
were not negotiating with Washington but instead waiting for the US to comply with the 
WTO's verdict and withdraw the tariffs.
688
 
 In the meantime, Japan became the first country which sent in a formal 
notification of retaliation.
689
 In November 2003, Japan threatened to impose 85.2 million 
dollars (71million euros) in retaliatory tariffs on US imports, in response to the US 
decision to keep its steel tariffs intact despite a WTO ruling.
690
 Tokyo officially notified 
the WTO of a list of rebalancing tariffs of up to 30 per cent on US products, including 
steel products, plastics and coal, after a finance ministry committee approved the list of 
sanctions.
691
 This was the first time Japan threatened retaliatory tariffs against its single 
largest trading partner.
692
 
 In order to avoid retaliation, the US asked the EU and Japan for more time to 
complete internal consultations. Receiving the US request, Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade 
Commissioner mentioned that, apart from the steel tariffs, the US record of compliance 
with WTO rulings had been relatively good. Based on this view, the US finally reached a 
settlement with Japan and the EU, after the EU, Japan and six other countries gave the US 
extra days to comply with the WTO ruling. By doing so, the EU and Japan played down 
the fear that the confrontation over safeguard issues would develop into a sharp 
deterioration in relations with the US.
693
 
 The WTO ruling against the US safeguard was another victory for the EU and 
Japan, which played a central role among the economies affected by the US safeguard 
measures. After all, the case of safeguard provided very important opportunities for the 
EU and Japan to work together for a common goal, but it also showed the fragility and 
incompleteness of their cooperation. This fragility stems from the structural differences in 
their steel trade. Unlike Japan - a leading steel exporter- , the EU is both a big steel 
importer and exporter and had therefore felt compelled to invoke its own safeguard 
measure to protect its steel market. 
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5. WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 As we have seen in this chapter, steel trade issues are closely related to the 
increased use of US protectionist measures and to legal battles in the WTO. Therefore, 
this part of chapter is devoted to analyse the function of the WTO, particularly its dispute 
settlement system, and to see how it affected the EU-Japan relationship. This steel chapter 
is a good example to illustrate the EU‟s and Japan‟s involvement in multilateral 
resolutions of trade conflicts. Therefore, we will go beyond the steel trade issue and 
consider the role of the WTO, particularly the DSB for the EU and Japan.  
 
5-1.Increased use of protectionist measures by the US 
 A factor which promoted EU-Japan relationships on various steel trade issues has 
been the growing protectionism in the United States, especially increased resort to 
measures  involving legal procedures for determining when firms have exported „unfairly‟ 
by selling below cost (dumping) or receiving government subsidies. These measures 
include remedies funded by AD or CVDs. The imposition of these duties constitutes a 
unilateral retrogression from WTO rules. As AD and CVD procedures have increasingly 
been used, analysts have sought to find ways of strengthening the rules to avoid 
protectionism.
694
  
 In theory, a case can be made for AD and CVD when the exporting firm intends to 
use predatory pricing to obtain monopoly control in a given market. In reality, however, 
the test for AD and CVD cases is much weaker. In the United States, for example, a 
foreign firm can be found to be dumping even if it is selling well above marginal cost or 
if it fails to provide adequate information in the time stipulated by the American 
authorities. Even different timing of the recording of sales in the home and the foreign 
market could result in a finding of dumping when sales prices were, in fact, identical. The 
harassment value of an AD or CVD suit may be considerable for the foreign firm against 
which the complaint is filed, as is evidenced by the number of times countries have 
agreed to VERs to avoid AD or CVD proceedings and penalties.
695
  
 In addition to administered protection, the tendency to negotiate bilaterally has 
increased, again especially by the United States. Since the mid-1980s, US trade policy 
become increasingly aggressive and bilateral. Even if bilateralism were confined to the 
United States, there would be cause for concern as such dealings further undermine 
support for open multilateralism, instead moving toward Regional Preferential 
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Arrangements or other mechanisms for protecting one‟s producers from the vagaries of 
administered protection and bilateral pressures.
696
 
 A number of aspects of US trade policy seemed to indicate a lack of commitment 
to the multilateral system. The United States exerted not only bilateral pressures on its 
key trading partners such as Japan without resort to the multilateral trading system, but it 
also threatened to adopt measures such as Super 301 which violate WTO principles.
697
 
 
5-2. Reinforced Dispute Settlement System in the WTO  
 Our research in this chapter revealed the fact that the establishment of the WTO, 
especially the reinforced Dispute Settlement System, promoted EU-Japan relationships by 
providing an arena for them. The WTO was assigned responsibilities additional to those 
earlier carried out by the GATT. There are also added functions in the WTO which were a 
significant improvement of the GATT trading system. 
 In 1945, when the other Breton Woods institutions were established, world 
government leaders determined that it would be necessary to create another institution 
specialising in international trade, the International Trade Organisation (ITO). However, 
the ITO did not come into force because parliaments, particularly the US Congress, 
would not approve it in the late 1940s. Therefore, its substitute, the GATT, remained 
merely a multilateral trade and tariff agreement. For this reason, although the GATT trade 
negotiations were remarkably successful, it contained some defects in its function. 
Among the defects, the weakness of Dispute Settlement System was notable.  
 The very success of the multilateral tariff negotiations conducted under the aegis 
of the GATT made the world become more interdependent at an unprecedented rate. That 
interdependence generated a number of new challenges for the international trading 
system as well as a number of trade disputes. In response to the increase in trade conflicts, 
the Uruguay Round resulted in a new treaty text on dispute settlement, the „Dispute 
Settlement Understanding‟ (DSU). For the first time, contracting parties obtained a 
substantial binding treaty text with respect to dispute settlement for the newly established 
WTO. Thus, the creation of the WTO led to significant and institutional innovations that 
allowed the disputes settlement system to gain credibility, predictability and legitimacy in 
the global trading system. 
 John H. Jackson points out that the major change in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System is the elimination of „blocking‟ of a final panel report. Blocking was a major 
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defect of the previous system in the GATT, which is no longer permitted in the WTO.
698
 
In the past, it was possible for any Contracting Party to the GATT to frustrate dispute 
settlement by blocking either the establishment of a panel or the adoption of a panel 
report.
699
 Thus, the DSU made the establishment of a panel more „automatic‟ in the event 
of a dispute, whereby reports of a dispute settlement panel and the appellate panel will 
almost always become binding.  
 Saadia M. Pekkanen argues that among the general improvements in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, the speed of dispute settlement is a major advancement.
700
 In 
the WTO dispute settlement system, unless the members of a dispute agree otherwise, the 
rules automatically preset the entire period of a dispute, from the date of establishment of 
a panel to the adoption of the reports, generally to nine months if there is no appeal, and 
to twelve months if there is one. This emphasis on speed is decidedly better than having 
the dispute drag on interminably with no end in sight, which was often the case in trade 
disputes involving the United States, Japan and the EU under the old GATT. 
 As we have seen in this chapter and also in Chapter 2, the EU and Japan 
effectively used the improved Dispute Settlement System in the WTO in order to resolve 
trade frictions between them, as well as trade disputes with the United States. Obviously, 
not only the common international trade rules of the WTO but also the reinforced 
mechanism of Dispute Settlement System encouraged the EU-Japan resort to the 
multilateral resolution of trade conflict.  
 
5-3. The EU and the DSB 
 Although the EU cooperated with Japan within the WTO on numerous occasions, 
trade imbalances dominated when it came to their bilateral relationship and forced the EU 
to share the same concern with the US. The EU reacted with anti-dumping procedures 
and other policies to prevent excessive imports from Japan, and it emphasised Japan's 
closed market to European products and services as one of the most significant problems 
between them. In this respect, European and American criticisms of Japanese economic 
practices were often similar, accusing Japan that its market was to a very high extent 
                                                 
698 John H. Jackson, „Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures‟ in Anne O. Krueger (eds), 
„the WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 
1998), P163, 164  
699 Woolcock, „European Trade Policy‟ in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, „Policy-
Making in the European Union‟ Fourth Edition, P387 
700 Saadia M. Pekkanen, „Sword and Shield – the WTO Dispute Settlement System and 
Japan‟ in Ulrike Schade and William Grimes (eds), „Japan‟s managed globalisation‟, 
(New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2003), P81 
204 
 
protected against imports by the structure of the Japanese economy and society as well as 
by the government.  
Despite the fact that the Europeans shared interest with the US in terms of opening 
the Japanese market, the Europeans were also increasingly concerned about US 
protectionism.
701
 For instance, on automobiles, the Europeans criticised the US for its 
pressure of setting numerical targets for the purchase of US vehicle parts by Japanese 
carmakers, since such import increases of US products negatively affected European 
exports to the Japanese market. Therefore, the Europeans constantly expressed concern 
and dissatisfaction with US pressure on Japan for a results-oriented approach as well as 
US unilateral measures such as Super 301.  
 Behind the European concern was the realisation that it had less influence on 
Japanese trade policy compared with the US. For this reason, although Europe 
considerably depended on the use of bilateral measures in order to cope with Japanese 
trade surpluses, there was also a strong desire on their part to strengthen multilateral trade 
rules to confine US protectionist pressure on Japan. Concerns regarding US pressure on 
Japan led not only to the motivation to support the creation of the WTO but also to 
forging closer links between the EU and Japan in view of their shared interests.
702
 
This indicates that in spite of trade frictions, the EU and Japan maintained a 
relatively good relationship, and they shared the same concern about US pressure. The 
EU‟s concern about US pressure in the steel trade dispute is remarkable and became a 
platform for EU-Japan cooperation on steel trade (See 4-4 of this chapter). As in the case 
of steel, the EU utilised the binding rules of the WTO Dispute Settlement System. This 
was in contrast to the EU‟s attitude towards the previous GATT Dispute Settlement 
System which the Europeans regarded as a political process. The EU‟s acceptance and 
utilization of a compulsory and binding legal system of Dispute Settlement System was a 
drastic change in the EU‟s trade policy.703 
 
5-4. Japan and the DSB  
 An important factor which promoted Japan‟s positive commitment in the WTO is 
the drastic change in Japan‟s trade policy. Facing result-based trade policies used by 
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Europe and the US, Japan realised that full compliance with the GATT rules could 
prevent other countries‟ use of GATT-incompatible trade measures aimed at Japanese 
export strategy and Japanese advantage related to its political economic system which 
were not regulated by the GATT. Japan‟s strategy to comply with GATT was a result of 
the Japanese experience as the passive partner in an international trade system where the 
rules were set by the US and Europe.
704
   
 From its accession to the GATT in 1955 until around the end of the Uruguay 
Round in 1994, Japan studiously tried to avoid using the GATT machinery to resolve its 
trade problems. While the GATT dispute settlement system was in effect, a total of 
twenty-three complaints were recorded against Japan. Japan, however, registered a mere 
five complaints in return across the same period of time. 
 As Saadia M. Pekkanen argues, Japan simply avoided legal embroilment in the 
GATT Dispute Settlement System, whether as complaint or defendant.
705
 Instead, Japan 
preferred to reach bilateral settlements with its trade partners behind the scenes in a 
nonconfrontational manner. Pekkanen named two main reasons for Japan‟s reluctance to 
use the GATT dispute settlement system: 1.) Japan wished to avoid drawing attention to 
its many protectionist trade measures and policies then in force; 2.) There was a 
perception within Japan that the GATT was biased against Japan, and it would not render 
fair rulings in Japan‟s favour. 
 However, Japan‟s perception and attitude towards the GATT was changed by 
some successful GATT dispute settlements in favour of Japan, such as the case with the 
EC on anti-dumping or anti-circumvention. Such favourable GATT rulings for Japan 
reinforced emerging domestic options and perceptions in favour of the use of 
international legal rules to handle trade disputes.  
 In her work „Sword and Shield‟, Saadia M. Pekkanen argues that like most other 
countries after 1995, Japan moved increasingly toward the use of the legal rules of the 
WTO as a means of resolving contentious trade conflicts and concerns.
706
 By 1995, the 
Japanese trade policy establishment was fully geared up to use the WTO rules as a 
functional strategy, which allows Japan to use the legal rules both as sword with which to 
challenge the measures and practices of its trade partners, and as a shield for domestic 
measures and practices. Anti-dumping cases with the US on the steel trade, which we 
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have seen in Chapter 4, were mentioned by Pekkanen as a good example of Japan‟s use of 
the WTO as a sword. 
 In invoking the dispute settlement processes at the WTO, Japan essentially used 
an entirely legitimate set of legal tactics to ward off foreign pressures and to try to 
preserve its domestic measures to the extent possible. The emphasis of Japan‟s trade 
diplomacy was important in allowing Japan to confront its trade partners on an equal legal 
footing. Japan‟s trade strategy made its trade partners perceive that the most important 
policy implication in dealing with Japan would be largely a matter of playing by the rules 
of the WTO. 
 However, the multilateral trading system is not completely protected against 
aggressive bilateral trade policy.
707
 Japan realises the fact that it alone cannot resist US 
protectionist and bilateral pressure. In order to restrain increasing protectionist pressure in 
the US, it is indispensable to form a coalition with other countries which share the same 
interests. 
 Besides, standing on the same side as the EU rules out the worst case that the EU 
and US team up against Japan. For example, the EU vehemently demanded to join the 
US-Japan semiconductor agreement in ministerial meetings after gaining an informal 
consent from the US.
708
 In order to avoid such a worst case, it appears to be crucial for 
Japan to keep focusing on the common interest with the EU and keep it on the same side. 
In the past, when Japan had serious trade frictions with the Europeans, Japan used the 
tactic to dilute the Community‟s authority and cohesion by insisting on including the 
United States in trade talks.
709
 This suggests that the current EU-Japan cooperation in the 
WTO might be a Japanese tactic to include the EU in trade talks between Japan and the 
US, in the expectation of using the EU‟s opposition against US protectionism for its own 
benefit. 
 
Conclusions 
  This chapter investigated EU-Japan relationships on steel trade by examining 
their reactions to various steel-related trade disputes with the United States. Following 
agricultural trade, steel trade is the most crucial for the EU and Japan, due to the size of 
their steel trade and the domestic importance of steel industry. Trade tensions caused by 
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steel trade had been looming for a long time, as steel production was hit by overcapacity. 
It became a common agenda for many steel-trading economies to promote their exports, 
while granting protection to their domestic steel industry from fierce international 
competition.   
 In steel issue, there is a significant structural difference between the EU and Japan. 
The difference is somehow the exact opposite from their structural difference in 
agricultural issue. While Japan's main interest was to promote its steel exports, the EU's 
prime interest was protecting its internal steel market. Like agricultural issues, both the 
EU and Japan are keen on protecting or promoting steel industries.  
 US protectionism on steel imports framed to a large extent the degree of 
relationship between the EU and Japan. The EU and Japan shared the same concern over 
the US threat to invoke unilateral trade remedies such as Section 301, as well as US 
bilateral pressure. Against US protectionist remedies, the EU and Japan responded by 
bringing the case into the WTO. The WTO dispute settlement system provided an arena 
for concerned economies to solve disputes in a multilateral context.  
 Once, a case is brought into the WTO, a dispute settlement occurs along 
established judicial procedures without leaving any space for political influence from 
members. This system helped the EU and Japan to avoid to some degree bilateral tensions 
with the US throughout the dispute settlement procedure. The process, as Stephen Gill 
explains with "new constitutionalism", places restraints on the democratic control of 
public and private organisation and institutions.
710
 These restraints would complement the 
discipline of market forces to constrain the policy autonomy of governments. This 
particular function of the WTO will be analyzed later in the main conclusion.  
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1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapters, we have investigated the relationship between the EU 
and Japan in the WTO. Because of the nature of WTO‟s function, which deals mainly 
with member states (with exception of the EU), the "state" remains as a main actor. 
However, it became clear that behind their relationship, various social forces significantly 
influenced the action of the EU and Japan. In this chapter, as a conclusion, we will look 
closely at social forces and investigate how social forces influenced the position of the 
EU and Japan, as well as the WTO. Besides this, we will also analyse how the function of 
the WTO has influenced the EU and Japan, and their relationship.  
 This thesis raised the question about liberal trade theory and its serious gap 
between theory and actual practices, and suggested an alternative approach to structural 
issues of the state-centric approach to world politics. While we consulted neo-liberal 
institutionalist theory to investigate the role of the WTO and its influence upon the EU-
Japan relationship, we also carefully observed the relationship of various social forces 
within the EU and Japan from a neo-Gramscian perspective.   
 The Neo-liberal institutionalist approach focuses on the role of the institution and 
its influence upon states. Since the WTO deals only with states, such a neo-liberal 
institutionalist approach was useful. While the influence of the institutions on state actors 
is important, how the state actors and various social forces within the state influence the 
institution and shape world politics is an equally important research topic, which has not 
been thoroughly researched yet.  
 Therefore, in an attempt to complement such shortcomings of the neo-liberal 
institutionalist theory, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, we tried to direct attention to 
concentrating solely on state dominance. The conceptual framework developed by neo-
Gramiscian perspectives rethinks prevalent ontological assumptions in IR due to a theory 
of hegemony that focuses on social-class forces engendered by changes in the social 
relations of production, forms of state and world order.
711
 
 
2. Summary and the examination of hypotheses    
  To summarise, this thesis introduced an alternative approach to structural issues 
of hegemony and world order to that in mainstream debates in IR. Notably, a case was 
made for a critical theory of hegemony that directs attention to relations between social 
interests in the struggle for consensual leadership rather than concentrating solely on state 
dominance.  
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 Hegemony here is understood as "the articulation and justification of a particular 
set of interests as general interests, appears as an expression of broadly based consent, 
manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, 
which is initially established by social-class forces occupying a leading role within a 
state".
712
 This concept of hegemony is a clear contrast to the conventional IR theory, 
which reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and 
military capabilities of states. Hegemony is therefore a form of dominance, but it refers 
more to a consensual order, so that 'dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition of hegemony. If hegemony is understood as an 'opinion-
moulding activity', rather than brute force or dominance, then, consideration has to turn to 
how a hegemonic social or world order is based on values and understanding that 
permeate the nature of that order.
713
  
 There are clearly a variety of neo-Gramscian perspectives dealing with a diversity 
of issues related to the analysis of hegemony/supremacy in the global political economy. 
Various neo-Gramscian perspectives provide an alternative critical theory route to 
hegemony by focusing on social classes in the social relations of production, forms of 
state and world order.
714
  
In the introduction, we have set the following hypothesis: By creating the 
conditions for the hegemony of transnational capital, utilising and strengthening the 
system or function of the WTO, social forces within the EU and Japan joined the forces 
beyond national boundaries and attempted to create international rules and norms in 
favour of their interests. In other words, depending on trade issues, various social forces 
within the EU and Japan, with the same or similar interests, have effectively utilised the 
international organisation and significantly contributed to the creation of general 
conditions of hegemony by influencing the trade policy of each government (See Table -
11). 
Our empirical research shows that the creation of the WTO facilitated 
cooperation between social forces in different countries by moulding consensus in the 
international level, although the question remains, as to if the creation of the institution 
contributed to the creation of new hegemony (or supremacy) in world economy. We have 
also witnessed that once such consensus is made in the international level within an 
international organisation, new international rules or norms may even override domestic 
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rules and will start functioning as a global standard.  
 
 
Table-11:  Main social forces in our empirical research 
Before the establishment of the WTO Automotive industry, whisky makers, 
Keiretsu group, MOFA, MITI, MOFF, etc. 
Agricultural issue in the WTO Agricultural industry, farm lobby, farmers 
union, the Ministry of agriculture in 
Japan, etc. 
Steel issue in the WTO Steel industries, US Congress, the Clinton 
administration, US International Trade 
Commission, the European Commission, 
the Iron and steel federation in Japan, 
MITI, etc. 
 
 
The agricultural case illustrates how social forces have a serious effect on a 
country‟s national trade policy. For the EU and Japan, the domestic importance of the 
agricultural sector is marginal in the overall economy of both sides. However, this 
relatively small sector prevented both economies from playing a more pro-active role in 
farm liberalisation talks in the WTO. Social forces, such as the agricultural industry and 
farm lobbies fully utilised their political clout to the national agricultural trade policy. 
National trade policies heavily influenced by particular social forces may face the 
necessity to find like-minded WTO members at agricultural talks in order to achieve their 
goals in a multilateral level. To form an ally is necessary in the multilateral level, since 
during the Uruguay Round, the EU and Japan needed to make considerable concessions 
due to the fact that a solid ally of the US and Carins Group showed a clear cooperation 
and managed to put mounting pressure on both the EU and Japan.  
In the process of forming a group or ally in the multilateral level, social forces 
often overcome the structural differences in the sector in order to achieve the highest 
common factor. For example, Japan‟s main interest in agriculture was to protect its 
agricultural market, while the EU‟s main goal was to promote its agricultural export.  To 
achieve their goals, both the EU and Japan, social forces in the agricultural sector 
managed to obscure their structural differences and created a united front under the 
common goal against farm liberalisation talks.  
The steel case showed the detailed process in which the EU and Japan utilised 
the WTO as an international organisation and its judicial function. A series of judicial 
procedures on steel products are again largely motivated by domestic social forces, 
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namely the steel industry. Like the agricultural industry, though the steel sector plays a 
marginal role in terms of world trade, domestic politicians cannot ignore the political 
influence of the steel sector. The steel case shows that the creation of the WTO facilitated 
cooperation between social forces in different countries by moulding consensus in the 
international level. Social forces in this case are mainly steel industries, trade 
representatives and politicians. Severe outcry from domestic steel makers and heavy 
government involvement in the steel industries made the steel case politically important 
also in the multilateral level.  
Both the EU and Japan, in invoking the dispute settlement processes at the WTO, 
used an entirely legitimate set of legal tactics to ward off foreign pressure (mainly 
pressure from the United States). Utilizing the WTO‟s dispute settlement system was an 
important change particularly in Japan‟s trade diplomacy, which in the past often solved 
trade frictions with the United States bilaterally. The emphasis of trade diplomacy of 
utilising an international organisation as a mean of solving conflicts allows the EU and 
Japan to confront its trade partners on an equal legal footing. Such foreign trade policy 
sends their trade partners a strong message that the most important policy implication to 
deal with the EU and Japan is to take a legal action in WTO‟s dispute settlement system.  
Such legal procedure in the WTO also facilitated the cooperation between social 
forces in the EU and Japan, since the WTO‟s judicial procedure allows other members to 
take part in a dispute as a third party. This rule allowed social forces within the EU and 
Japan to coordinate their strategy and get involved in each other‟s trade disputes. In fact, 
after the successive WTO ruling against the US anti-dumping duties, the EU and Japan 
seemed to gain more confidence with their strategy of utilising the WTO and moulding 
international opinion by rallying support from like-minded economies.  
Like the agricultural or steel industry, non-state actors such as interest groups 
and multilateral cooperation are becoming increasingly influential as social forces. Such 
social forces have effectively utilised the international organisation and significantly 
contributed to the creation of general conditions of hegemony by influencing the trade 
policy of each government. Multilateral trade rules in the WTO and its judicial system 
became an impetus and common ground for consent among various social forces in the 
multilateral level. Robert. W. Cox defined hegemony as: "the articulation and justification 
of a particular set of interests as general interests, appears as an expression of broadly 
based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources 
and institutions, which is initially established by social-class forces occupying a leading 
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role within a state".
715
 As he asserts, if hegemony is understood as an 'opinion-moulding 
activity', rather than brute force or dominance, what we have witnessed in WTO trade 
negotiations could be considered as a form of hegemony created by social forces utilising 
the international organisation. Social forces which succeeded to influence their national 
government and later regional and multilateral trade rules could be considered as the main 
actors which created hegemony as consensual order.  If so, the findings in this theory 
effectively supports my hypothesis: By creating the conditions for the hegemony of 
transnational capital, utilising and strengthening the system or function of the WTO, 
social forces within the EU and Japan joined the forces beyond national boundaries and 
attempted to create international rules and norms in favour of their interests. 
 
3. Three level approach 
 
As Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson assert, cooperative combining of social 
energies is the core of state strength.
716
 Collaborative linkage is what gives states an 
unusual capacity for effective intervention, particularly in the context of a highly 
integrated world economy. At the same time, states face strong opposition from some 
social forces domestically. What we have witnessed in agriculture and steel issues support 
this theory. Politically powerful agricultural and steel industries actively participated in 
various forms to shape national policy in favour of their interest. However, the attempt to 
reflect their interest on national policy is merely the first step for the industries. The final 
goal of the industries is for their government to make their national policies prevail 
globally in order to achieve international agreements in international institutions which 
will provide a favourable condition for themselves. Therefore, for the creation of 
hegemony of social class forces, the role of the institution is indispensable.   
 Besides, international institutions help countries overcome domestic opposition 
and conclude mutually beneficial agreements with the other countries in the world. The 
WTO has independent jurisdiction, its rules and rulings are binding on all members, and it 
has the power to impose sanctions, to overrule state and local powers, and to override 
national regulatory powers. As the WTO is the supranational institution with an 
enforcement capacity on its members, its decision has a direct impact on domestic social 
forces within states.  In this sense, the state is not unquestioningly taken as a distinct 
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institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a form of social relations through 
which capitalism and hegemony are expressed. Therefore, state should be understood, not 
just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, 
political parties, military) but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, 
media, education) through which hegemony functions. Hegemony is created by various 
social forces within the state, and once hegemony has been consolidated domestically it 
may expand beyond a particular social order to move outward on a world scale and insert 
itself through the world order. By doing so it can connect social class forces across 
different countries. 
717
  
For example, in the liquor tax dispute between the EU and Japan, Japanese 
whisky producers maintained a cooperative stance with a Scottish whisky maker, as well 
as the EU, in order to demand the Japanese government to change its liquor tax system 
(see Chapter 2). In another example, Japanese business groups, such as Keidanren (the 
Federation of Economic Organisations) also have regular contact with their European 
counterparts and with European officials, while the European Business Community in 
Tokyo lobbies actively among Japanese decision-makers. According to Atsuko Abe, such 
activities by private actors influence, or sometimes even replace, government-level 
decisions as resolutions for economic conflicts. Therefore, diversity of actors with 
different interests is an important element in deciding a country‟s foreign trade policy. 
Making matters more complicated, the agenda of WTO trade negotiations is broadening, 
bringing in new actors, such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
718
 
The complexity of the issue concerning diversified actors is even more 
conspicuous with the EU. The EU is a composite player, consisting of twenty five 
countries (as of May 2004) with various interests on various topics. Therefore, it is very 
difficult for the EU to coordinate its foreign trade policy. Between the member states, 
there are fundamental differences in trade culture, ranging from protectionism to free 
trade.
719
 Such disunity of the EC/EU was utilised in the past by Japan to deal with some 
of the trade problems with the EC/EU. Within the framework of bilateral trade relations, 
Japan often undermined the EC/EU by negotiating with European countries separately. 
For example, Japanese car makers established a friendly relationship with the British 
government through their direct investment in the UK. This helped the Japanese 
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transplant cars to be excluded from the formal agreement between the Japanese 
government and the EC. Members of the EC reacted differently towards Japan‟s trade 
policy. Japan utilised the „divide and conquer‟ strategy to deal with a non-unified EC (see 
Chapter 2).   
The WTO is essentially not concerned with the behaviour of private businesses. 
It deals only with the actions of governments, establishing disciplines on trade-policy 
instruments such as tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or state-trading. The WTO is a regulator of 
the regulatory actions of governments that affect trade and the conditions of competition 
facing imported products on domestic markets.
720
This is also the same with the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. As the WTO represents an inter-governmental agreement, 
private parties do not have legal standing before the WTO DSB. The private sector must 
go through its government.
721
 
Within the EU, individual EU member states do no longer have sovereignty over 
trade policy. This has been delegated to the Commission of the European Communities. 
Therefore, although each EU member state is also a member of the WTO, the European 
Commission now formally represents the Community and has the responsibility for 
conducting negotiations and administering trade policy instruments.
722
However, from 
time to time, members of the European Union have different opinions over various issues. 
It is therefore crucial for us to look at the differences among EU member countries, in 
case such differences become an important element in terms of the EU-Japan relationship. 
In this sense, Putnam's two level approach is not sufficient and should be developed into a 
three level approach.  
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Table-12:  Framework for Three Levels of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
 In this regard, Taeyoul Paek‟s work provides a very useful method for analysing 
our objectives. In his work, „The WTO Ruling on the Dispute between Kodak and 
Fujifilm‟, Paek attempted to analyse the conflicts between the US and Japan in the Fuji-
Kodak case disputed in the WTO.
723
 His objective was to analyse the influence of private 
sectors, such as Fuji-Kodak in the context of the international organisation. In order to 
analyse the issue, he employed an approach which he called „Three Levels of Analysis‟ 
(See Table 11).  
 His approach is unique in the way he tries to analyse the role of the international 
organisation as well as the influence of diversified domestic actors. Because of our 
purpose, it is therefore reasonable to employ the three level approach which goes beyond 
the analysis on bilateral relations between the EU and Japan and deals with domestic 
actors within the EU and Japan as well as the role of the WTO.  
 With the three levels of approach, we will first see how domestic actors are 
involved in the decision making of Japan and individual EU member countries. (Level 1). 
Second, how the EU manages to integrate various trade policies of each EU member 
country into the trade policy as the European Union. (Level 2). And finally, how the EU 
and Japan coordinate their trade policies towards WTO trade negotiations (Level 3). The 
approach will show more clearly, for instance, disarray within the EU, which might have 
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a significant influence upon the EU-Japan relationship in the WTO.  
Analysing what social forces have the most influence over making national trade 
policy or later over multilateral trade rules is a significant task. For example, in the 
agricultural case, Japanese rice producers or farm lobbies such as Nokyo first utilised 
their political influence on domestic politicians (particularly on Liberal Democratic Party) 
which depend on votes from agricultural industries. As a result, national trade policy 
became considerably protective in agriculture (Level 1). EU member countries also take 
the same process to create agricultural trade policies on the domestic-national level. 
Recipients of CAP such as France or Poland maintain their national agricultural policy 
supportive for agricultural subsidies and negotiate their stances with contributors of CAP 
such as Germany. Through internal negotiations within the EU, the EU‟s agricultural 
trade policy has been decided on national-regional level (Level 2).  In the WTO, the EU, 
Japan and other member countries with protectionist agricultural trade policy coordinate 
their stances on farm trade liberalisation talks in the WTO and create a united front on an 
inter-regional-multilateral level (Level 3). The EU and Japan fully utilised their influence 
as major WTO players and negotiated against food exporting countries such as the US, 
Carins Group, and effectively succeeded to reflect their interests in multilateral trade rules.  
In sum, each social force first works on influencing their political clout on their 
politicians to create national agricultural policy. Once their interest has been reflected in 
their national agricultural policy, WTO members find other likeminded members to 
consolidate their position in trade talks on the inter-regional or multilateral level. As a 
result, even members with completely different industrial structure (such as Japan as food 
importing country and the EU as food exporting countries) could cooperate on an inter-
regional-multilateral level.  
In the above process of Level 1, 2 and 3, there is a variance in the patterns of 
influence on each level. In case of the EU, protectionist agricultural policy could be 
weakened, when the EU members internally discuss their Common Agricultural Policy, 
since within the EU members, there are countries which are not keen on maintaining 
costly agricultural subsidies. However, once their anti-farm liberalisation stance is 
adopted on the national-regional level, it will not be so difficult to find other WTO 
members which need to protect their domestic agricultural sector. Once like-minded 
countries create groups (such as Carins Group) or make a common strategy (such as 
“Multifunctionality of agriculture”) for multilateral trade talks, the interests of each social 
force will be strengthened and amplified on the inter-regional-multilateral level. Thus, 
through the process of Level 1, 2 and 3, the interest of social force could become a global 
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standard.  
 
4. New constitutionalism 
 As referred to in the introduction chapter, on the role of international organisations, 
Stephen Gill developed his theory of new constitutionalism. He uses the term 'supremacy' 
instead of hegemony for the case when a situation of hegemony is not apparent.
724
  
According to him, the politics of supremacy are organised through two key processes; the 
new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism and the concomitant spread of market 
civilisation. Gill argues that new constitutionalism involves the narrowing of the social 
basis of popular participation within the world order of disciplinary neoliberalism. It 
involves the hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in matters of political 
economy, of a set of macro-economic policies such as market efficiency, discipline and 
confidence, policy credibility, and competitiveness. It is the move towards construction of 
legal or constitutional devices to remove or substantially insulate the new economic 
institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability.  
 In this sense, the WTO has significantly contributed to the mechanism of 
surveillance and has supported the market civilisation of new constitutionalism in mutual 
surveillance. Through our empirical research, we have seen that the WTO, as an 
international organisation effectively provided rules, norms and surveillance system in 
trade and, as a result, contributed to the condition where various social forces interact 
with each other. We have witnessed that various social forces influenced the trade policies 
of the EU and Japan and attempted to achieve their goals at the international level. In this 
sense, the outcome of our empirical research supports Gill's new constitutionalism and 
our hypotheses that: depending on trade issues, various social forces within the EU and 
Japan, with the same or similar interests, have effectively utilised the international 
organisation and significantly contributed to the creation of general conditions of 
hegemony by influencing the trade policy of each government. 
 The WTO's surveillance mechanism with its DSB has successfully contributed to 
the constitutionalisation or legalisation of world trade system. However, what we need to 
stress from the outcome of our research is that the market civilisation of new 
constitutionalism is in danger of collapse, if member countries and the social forces 
within states stop supporting its legalised system and lose faith in further trade 
liberalisation. As with agriculture or steel, when, in the process of rule-making and 
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legalisation of world trade, trade negotiations start to cover sensitive topics for key 
domestic industries, WTO member countries begin to pay more attention to the social 
forces in order to build a consensus domestically. When domestic social forces wish to 
stall trade liberalisation, it will significantly affect the country's policy for further trade 
negotiation.
725
 
 In recent years, we have been witnessing that, due to the delay in WTO trade 
liberalisation talks, some members have shifted their attention from the WTO to bilateral 
trade agreements, such as FTA. The multilateral trade system under the new 
constitutionalism and its role of maintaining market efficiency, discipline and confidence 
in world trade will be lost, if members loose faith in the multilateral trade system and opt 
for bilateral trade agreements. Adding to agriculture and steel, now the WTO is dealing 
with a number of cumbersome and challenging tasks. Therefore, on the EU-Japan 
relationship in the WTO, analysis can be pushed into further theoretical and empirical 
areas by addressing a number of other trade issues.
726
  In the WTO, where states still 
remain the main actor, non-state actors are increasingly becoming influential.  I believe 
that the neo-Gramscian perspective is an effective tool for the analysis of hegemony 
created by various social forces. Particularly investigating the social forces in the leading 
members of the WTO such as the EU, Japan the US, it will be interesting to analyse what 
social force will create the new dominance, how hegemony/supremacy will be shaped by 
them, and how new constitutionalism of multilateral trade system will be maintained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
725 Robert Gilpin, „The Political Economy of International Relations‟, (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1987), P171-P230 
726 Morton, 'Unravelling Gramsci', P134, 135 
220 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Media, Journals and Newspapers 
 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol.90, No.4, (American Society of 
International Law, Oct. 1996), P675-689 
 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol.95, No.1, (American Society of 
International Law, Jan. 2001), P147-149 
 
The American Journal of International law, „Imposition of US Tariffs on steel imports‟, 
Vol. 96, No.4, (American Society of International Law, Oct. 2002), P977, 978 
 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, „Proposed strategies for 
reducing agricultural protection in the GATT Uruguay Round –A synthesis and 
assessment‟, (Canberra, Pirie Printers, 1990) 
 
BBC News 
 
Bulletin Quotidien Europe No.8265, (29 July 2002), „WTO gives critical report of EU 
agricultural and textile policies‟ (Agence Europe) 
 
Bulletin Quotidien Europe No.8272, (7 August 2002), „Climbing Mont Blanc to support 
proposes CAP reforms‟ (Agence Europe) 
 
eBearing, Bearing Industry News, “United States Anti-dumping Act of 1916”, 
(http://www.ebearing.com/legislation/1916act.htm) 
 
The Economist 
 
EUROPA, Activities of the European Union, Summaries of legislation, „Agriculture: 
introduction‟, (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l04000.htm) 
 
 
221 
 
EUROPA, „Trade Issues, Bilateral Trade Relations with Japan‟ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/japan/index_en.htm) 
 
EUROPA, „The European Commission, „Economic Impacts of Genetically Modified 
Crops on the Agri-Food Sector‟ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/gmo/fullrep/ch5.htm)  
 
EUROPA, „trade issues, Sectoral issues, steel sector‟,  
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/index_en.htm) 
 
EUROPA, Trade Issues, „EU seeks retaliatory and protective measures in US 1916 Anti-
dumping Act dispute‟, Brussels, 22 September 2003, 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr220903_en.htm) 
 
EUROPA, European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture, „EU agriculture 
and the WTO‟, P6, 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/newround/full.pdf) 
 
EUROPA, The European Union, „Agriculture: Continuing the reform‟, 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm) 
 
European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, EU News, „The 
Third EU-Japan High Level Consultation on Consumer Policy‟, 
(http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news_en_newsobj519.php) 
 
The Financial Times 
 
FindLaw - For Legal Professionals, „Foreign Reaction To Reinstitution Of Super 301‟, 
Japan-US Trade Report Fax, 1996, (http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Feb/9/127227.html) 
 
Greenpeace European Unit, World Trade Organisation dispute on genetically engineered 
organisms, May 2006, (http://eu.greenpeace.org/downloads/gmo/WTObriefing0602.pdf.) 
 
 
 
222 
 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Bridges weekly 
trade news digest, „WTO members haggle over Ag Direction‟, 25 October 1999 
(http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story2.25-10-99.htm) 
 
International Monetary Fund, „Trends and Issues in the Global Trading System‟, (1999), 
P134 
 
JAPAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Weekly Review, No.17 – May 1, 1998, „Food aid and 
Japan‟s rice market‟, (http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR98/9817wN1.html) 
 
The Japan Times 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, „Annual Report on Food, 
Agriculture and Rural Areas in Japan Financial Year 1999 (Summary)‟, 
(http://www.maff.go.jp/hakusyo/kaigai/ehakusyo99.htm)  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, „Negotiating proposal by Japan on WTO 
agricultural negotiations‟, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, (21 December 
2000) 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, „EU-Japan joint statement on the WTO‟,  
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/fmv0001/eu-joint.html) 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, „Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial 
Conference Negotiations on Agriculture‟,  
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/min99/agri) 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, „11th Japan-EU Summit Joint press statement 
(Tokyo, 8 July 2002), (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/joint0207.html) 
 
NewScientist.com, Andy Coghlan, „Genetically modified crops: a decade of 
disagreement‟, January 2006, (http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/gm-
food/mg18925353.900-genetically-modified-crops-a-decade-of-disagreement.html) 
 
 
223 
 
NGO Steering Committee to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development, NGO background papers: World Trade, Food Production and the Diverse 
Roles of Agriculture – A discussion paper for the attention of delegates to the 
Intercessional meeting of the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD 8), 
(http://csdngo.igc.org/agriculture/agr_rspb.html) 
 
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) 
 
The OECD, „Assessing the effects of the Uruguay Round‟, 1993 
 
The OECD, „Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework‟, Paris, 2001, OECD, 
(www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/31/1894469.pdf) 
 
Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, „U.S. vs. EU: Examination of the trade issues 
surrounding genetically modified food‟, 2003 
(http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/europe.pdf) 
 
The UK Steel Association, Parliamentary briefing for November 2001, 
(http://www.uksteel.org.uk/nw82.htm)  
 
UNCTAD, „Promoting participation of developing countries in dynamic and new sectors 
of world trade‟, (iii) Steel and related specialty products, Background note by the 
UNCTAD secretariat, P3 / (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c1em28d4_en.pdf) 
 
UNCTAD, „New and dynamic sectors: Steel‟, 
(http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3561&lang=1) 
 
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, (12 September 2005), „Promoting 
participation of developing countries in dynamic and new sectors of world trade: (iii) 
Steel and related specialty products‟, Background note by the UNCTAD secretariat, 
(TD/B/COM.1/EM.28/4), P6 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), European Commission 
Directorate-General for Agriculture, EU-US and the WTO Agriculture, P3, 
(www.unece.org/trade/agr/meetings/ean/bangkog_2001_08/market%20access%20eu/eu-
us-wto.pdf )  
 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service, 
Agricultural Outlook, April 1999, „World Agriculture & Trade / Rice Tariffication in 
Japan: What does it mean for trade?‟ P1-4 
(www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/apr1999/ao260c.pdf) 
 
United States Department of State, „US Trade ,Official Outline Position on Steel, 
Agriculture‟, (16 May 2002), (http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto99/02051601.htm) 
 
The United States Mission to the European Union, October 26, 1999, „Aaron on EU, 
Japan proposal in WTO‟, Brussels, Belgium,  
(http://www.useu.be/issues/aaron1026.html) 
 
The United States Mission to the European Union, August 28, 2000, „WTO Appellate 
Body upholds panel ruling against US Revenue Act of 1916‟, 
(http://www.useu.be/Categories/Antitrust/Aug2800WTOAntidumpingUS1916.html) 
 
United States Senator of Iowa, Chuck Glassley, „Grassley Speech on Biotechnology and 
Trade‟, 2 May 2000, (http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2000/p0r5-02b.htm) 
 
World Legal Information Institute, “WTO Arbitrators Decisions – United States – Anti-
dumping Act of 1916 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes – Award of the 
Arbitrator[2001]WTOARB6(28 February 2001)”, 
(http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/WTOARB/2001/6.html) 
 
The WTO, „Agreement of Agriculture Article 20, Continuation of the Reform Process‟, 
(www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.doc) 
 
The WTO, „Agriculture fairer market for farmers‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm) 
225 
 
 
„The WTO; Agriculture negotiations: Backgrounder‟, „Phase 1: „Non-trade‟ concerns and 
„multifunctionality‟: agriculture can serve many purposes‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd10_nontrade_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XIX: Emergency 
Action on Imports of Particular Products, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#477) 
 
The WTO, „Chronological list of disputes cases‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, WTO information paper, „Trading into the future‟ 2nd edition revised in April 
1999, P5 
 
The WTO, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT NEWS BULLETINS, 20 February 2000, 
Committee on Trade and Environment's (CTE) meeting on 13-14 February 2001, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/te035_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, „Trading into the future: the introduction to the WTO – Roots from Havana to 
Marrakesh‟, (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, WTO International Trade Statistics – 2004, Table IV. 34, „Leading exporters 
and importers of iron and steel, 2004 / 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/section4_e/iv34.xls) 
 
The WTO, WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, Table IV. 1, „World merchandise 
exports by product, 1999‟, P1 
 
The WTO, WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, IV. Trade by sector, 4.1 Iron and 
steel, Table IV. 37, „Iron and steel imports of the EU and the US by supplier, 1999‟ and 
International Trade Statistics – 2001, Trade by subject, Table IV. 33, 2001, P26 
 
The WTO, WTO International Trade Statistics – 2000, 2001. World merchandise exports 
by product, 2000, 2001 
226 
 
 
The WTO, „The issue, and where we are now - Non-trade concerns: agriculture can serve 
many purposes‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd17_agri_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, „Trade Policy Review of the WTO, Japan January 1998‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp69_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, „WTO Dispute settlement: the disputes‟, index of disputes / 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, Uruguay Round Agreement, „Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, Uruguay Round Agreement, „Agreement on Safeguards‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, “Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures”, 1998, (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, „SPS Agreement Training Module Chapter 8 – 8.1 Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs)‟, 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm) 
 
The WTO, “Uruguay Round Agreement - understanding on rules and procedures 
governing the settlement of disputes”, (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-
dsu_e.htm) 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
Literatures 
 
Abe, Atsuko. „Japan and the European Union: Domestic Politics and Transnational 
Relations‟, (London, the Athlone Press, 1999), P3, P4, P56, P57, P60, P61, P106, P107, 
P114 
 
Ackrill, Robert W. „EU enlargement, the CAP and the cost of direct payments: a note‟, 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, Number 1, (Agricultural Economic Society, 
March 2003), P73-78 
 
Amyx, Jennifer A. “The Political Economy of Japanese Agriculture”, (The Australian 
National University), P59-72 (http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/GLC/00-176-Part2.pdf) 
 
Anderson, Kym. “Agriculture, WTO, and the next round of multilateral trade 
negotiations”, (Australia, School of Economics and Centre for International Economic 
Studies University of Adelaide, 1998)  
 
Andersson, Thomas. (ed.), „Japan: A European Perspective‟, (London, the Macmillan 
Press, 1993), P52, 53 
 
Axerlord, Robert M. „The Evolution of cooperation‟, (New York, Basic books, 1984), P3-
P24 
 
Babcock, Bruce A. and Beghin, John., CARD Briefing Paper 99-BP27, „Potential Market 
for Non-GMO Corn and Soybeans‟, September 1999 
 
Bagwell, Kyle. and Staiger, Robert W. „The Economics of the World Trading System‟, 
(Cambridge, the MIT Press, 2002), P1-11 
 
Baker, Michael., Giarra. Paul., and Vogel, Ezra. „Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating 
Behavior‟, (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), P41-67 
 
Baker, S.A. „The cost of the C.A.P.‟ in Journal of Economic Affairs, April 1982, Vol. 2, 
Issue 3, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1982), P178 
 
228 
 
Balaam, David N. „Agricultural trade policy‟ in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds), 
„Trade Politics, International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives‟, (London, Routledge, 
1999), P54 
 
Baldwin, Richard. and Wyplosz, Charles. „Manuscript for The Economics of European 
Integration – 8. The Common Agricultural Policy‟, (2003), P10-19, 
(http://heiwww.unige.ch/~baldwin/papers/BW/Chap8_CAP_Jul03.PDF) 
 
Baldwin, Robert. „Changes in the Global trading system: a response to shifts in national 
economic power‟, in Dominick Salvatore (ed) „Protectionism ad world welfare‟ 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
 
Beierle‚ Thomas C. „Agricultural Trade Liberalisation – Uruguary, Doha, and Beyond‟, 
Journal of World Trade 36(6), (Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002), P1089-1110  
 
Bergsten, C. Fred. „Fifty years of the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the past for strategies 
for the future‟ in the WTO Secretariat, „From GATT to the WTO: the Multilateral Trading 
System in the new millennium‟, (Hague, Kluwer law international, 2000), P50 
 
Berrod, Frederique. „The evolution of the rules affecting trade in goods: an introductory 
note‟ in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Frederique Berrod and Eric Gippini Fournier (eds), „The 
Uruguay Round Results‟, (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995), P145 
 
Bieler, Andreas and Morton, Adam David, „Images of Gramsci‟, (New York, Routledge, 
2006) 
 
Bieler, Andreas and Morton, Adam David, „Introduction: Neo-Gramscian perspectives in 
international political economy and the relevance to European integration‟ in Andreas 
Bieler and Adam David Morton (edt.), „Social forces in the making of the new Europe‟, 
(New York, Palgrave Publishers, 2001), P16, P17, P47, P54 
 
Blackhurst, Richard. „The capacity of the WTO to fulfil its mandate‟ in Anne O Kruger 
(ed), „WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1998), P32, P47 
 
229 
 
Blaker, Michael. „Evaluating Japan‟s Diplomatic Performance‟, in Gerald L. Curtis (ed), 
„Japan‟s foreign policy after the Cold War – Coping with change‟, (New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 1993), P17 
 
Blandford, David., Boisvert, Richard N. and Fulponi, Linda. „Nontrade Concerns: 
Reconciling domestic policy objectives with freer trade in agricultural products‟, 
(American Agricultural Economics Association, 2003), P668-673 
 
Bourgeois, Jacques H. J.,  Berrod, Frederique. and Fournier, Eric Gippini. (eds), „The 
Uruguay Round Results‟, (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995), P265-271 
 
Bretherton, Charlotte. and Vogler, John. „The European Union as a Global Actor‟, 
(London, Routledge, 2006), P62-88  
 
Bridges, Brian. „Hesitant superpower‟, (London, Research Institute for the Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, 1992), P5, P7 
 
Bronckers, Marco C.E.J. „Voluntary Export Restraints and the GATT 1994 Agreement on 
safeguard‟ in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Frederique Berrod and Eric Gippini Fournier (eds), 
„The Uruguay Round Results‟, (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995), P275, 
276 
 
Burca, Grainne De. and Scott, Joanne. „The EU and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional 
Issues‟, (Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2001), P2   
 
Butler, Fiona. „The EC‟s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)‟ in Juliet Lodge (ed), „The 
European Community and the challenge of the future‟, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1993), 
P112-130 
 
Carter, Colin A. and Gruere, Guillaume P., „International Approach to Labeling 
Genetically Modified Foods‟, Agricultural marketing resource centre, Agricultural Issues 
Centre University of California and Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California, Davis, March 2003 
 
 
230 
 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. „Global Formation‟, (Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1998) 
 
Conte-Helm, Marie. „The Japanese and Europe‟, (London, the Athlone Press Ltd., 1996), 
P23-46 
 
Cox, R.W. „Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory‟, Millennium Journal of International Studies Vol.10 (2) (London, London School 
of Economics, 1981), P139 
 
Cox, R.W. „Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History‟, 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1981), P126-155 
 
Czinkota, Michael R. and Woronoff, Jon. „Japan‟s Market – the distribution system‟, 
(New York, Praeger Publishers, 1986), P21-67 
 
Daniels, Gordon. „Japan in the post-war world – Between Europe and the United States‟, 
in Gordon Daniels and Reinhard Drifte, „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship since 
1945‟ (Ashfold, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986), P20 
 
Daniels, Gordon. and Drifte, Reinhard. „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship since 
1945‟, (Ashfold, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986), P15, P20, P103 
 
Das, Bhagirath Lal. „The World Trade Organisation – a guide to the framework for 
international trade‟, (London, Zed Books Ltd, 1999), P80-97, P205-224 
 
Dinan, Desmond. „Ever closer Union – an introduction to European Integration‟, (New 
York, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994), P499-501 
 
Drifte, Reinhard. „Euro-Japanese Relations: Realities and Prospects‟, in Daniels and 
Drifte (eds), „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship since 1945‟, P94, P95 
 
Drifte, Reinhard. „Japan‟s foreign policy in the 1990s: from economic superpower to what 
power?‟, (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996), P44, P89, P107, P108 
 
231 
 
Dudley, James W. „1992, strategies for the Single Market‟, (London, Kogan Page Ltd., 
1989), P46-49 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. „Hegemonic stability theories of the international monetary system‟ 
in Richard N. Cooper et al, „Can nation agree?: Issues in International Economic 
Cooperation‟, (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1989) 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. in Jamie De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), „New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995)  
 
Emmott, Bill „Japan‟s Global Reach – The influence, strategies and weakness of Japan‟s 
multinational companies‟, (London, Century Business, 1992), P135-141  
 
Featherstone, Kevin. and Ginsberg, Roy H. „The United States and the European Union in 
the 1990s-second edition‟, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), 185-188 
 
Fernandez, J. „Tariff peaks for agricultural and food products: their incidence and 
alternatives for their removal‟, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, Number 1, 
(Agricultural Economics Society March 2002), P14-24 
 
Finger, J. Michael and Winters, L. Alan. „What Can the WTO Do for Developing 
Countries?‟ in Anne O. Krueger (ed), „the WTO as an International Organization‟, 
(Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1998), P365-390 
 
Flory, Thiebaut., „The Agreement on Safeguards‟ in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Frederique 
Berrod and Eric Gippini Fournier (eds), „The Uruguay Round Results‟, P265-271 
 
Freeman, F. and Roberts, I. „Multifunctionality, a pretext for protection?‟, (ABARE 
Current issues, August 1999) 
 
Frank, Andre Gunder and Gills, Barry K. “The World System”, (New York, Routledge, 
2000) 
 
Fukuda, Haruko. „Japan and world trade – the years ahead‟, (Glasgow, Saxon House, 
1973), P41-64, P81-P94 
232 
 
 
Fukuda, Hisao., Dyck, John. and Stout, Jim. „Rice sector policies in Japan‟, (United 
States Department of Agriculture, Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic 
Research Service, 2003), P2 / (www.ers.usda.gov) 
 
Gerrit, Faber. „The concept of multifunctionality and negotiations on agriculture in the 
WTO‟, (Utrecht School of Economics, 2002), P2, P5 
 
Gill, Stephen. „American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission‟, (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
 
Gill, Stephen. 'Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations', (Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), P127, 128 
 
Gill, Stephen. „Globalization, democratization and multilateralism‟, (Tokyo, United 
Nations University Press, 1997) 
 
Gill, Stephen. „Power and Resistance in the New World Order‟, (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 
 
Gill, Stephen and Law, David. „The Global Political Economy‟, (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988), P36, P38, P39 
 
Gill, Stephen and Law, David. „Global hegemony and the structural power of capital‟ in 
Stephen Gill (eds) „Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations‟, 
(Australia, Cambridge University Press, 1993), P93, P96-104 
 
Gilpin, Robert., „The Political Economy of International Relations‟, (New Jersey, 
Princeton University, 1987), P171-230 
 
Gilpin, Robert., „Where does Japan fit in?‟, in Kathleen Newland (ed), „The International 
Relations of Japan‟, (London, Millennium Publishing, 1990), P7 
 
Gilpin, Robert., „Global Political Economy‟, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
2001), P77-102 
233 
 
 
Gonzales, Manuel Enrique. „The European Community‟s Exports to Japan‟ in European 
Economic Studies, „Euro Cooperation‟, (Paris, the Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P33-48 
 
Grieco, Joseph M. „Cooperation among nations: Europe, America and Non-tariff barriers 
to trade‟, (Cornell University Press, 1990) 
 
Guzzini, Stefano. „Realism in International Relations and International Political 
Economy‟, (London, Routledge, 1998) 
 
Guzzini, Stefano. and Leander, Anna, „Constructivism and International Relations‟, (New 
York, Routledge, 2006) 
 
Haen, Hartwig de., Johnson, Glenn L. and Tangermann, Stefan. (eds), „Agriculture and 
International Relations‟, (Basingstoke, the Macmillan Press, 1985) 
 
Hanabusa, Masamichi. „Trade problems between Japan and Western Europe‟, (London, 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979), P54-58 
 
Hanabusa, Masamichi. „The Trade Dispute: A Japanese View‟, in L. Tsoukalis and M. 
White (eds), „Japan and Western Europe‟, (London, Frances Pinter Publisher, 1982), P120 
 
Handstaff, Peter. „The Precautionary Principle, Trade and the WTO – a discussion paper 
for the European Commission Consultation on Trade and Sustainable Development‟, 
(RSPB, 2000) 
 
Harrison, Glenn W., Rutherford, Thomas F. and Tarr, David G. „Quantifying the Uruguay 
Round‟, The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No.444, (Royal Economic Society, 1997), 
P1405-1430 
 
Hathaway, Dale E. „Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the rules‟, (Washington DC, 
Institute for international economics, 1987), P72-89 
 
Hattori, Shinji. „Global-ka wo ikiru nihon nougyou‟, (Tokyo, NHK Press, 2001), P13, 
P14, P23-26  
234 
 
 
Hedstrom, Haken. „Direct EC investments in Japan‟, in European Economic Studies, 
„Euro Cooperation‟, (Paris, the Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P87-111 
 
Heidensohn, Klaus. „Europe and World Trade‟, (London and NY, Pinter, 1995), P91-102, 
P108, P109, P114, P134, P135, P157-167 
 
Hellmann, Donald C. „Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an 
American Greenhouse‟, in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, „The Political 
Economy of Japan – Volume2‟, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988), P356 
 
Higgott, Richard A. and Cooper, Andrew F. „Middle Power Leadership and Coalition 
Buliding: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations‟ „in 
International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4, (Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1990), P589-632 
 
Hill, Charles W. L. „International Business: competing in the global marketplace – Third 
Edition‟, (Boston, Mass, Irwin/McGrau-Hill, 1999), P5 
 
Hillman, Jimmye S. „Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade‟, (Boulder, Colo, Westview 
Press, 1991) 
 
Hillman, Jimmye S. and Rothenberg, Robert A. „Agricultural Trade and Protection in 
Japan‟, (Aldershot, Trade Policy Research Centre, Gower Publishing Company, 1988), 
P6-36, P60-85 
 
Hirschman, Albert O. „National Power and the Structure of foreign trade‟, (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1969) 
 
Hitiris, Theo. „European Union Economics – fifth edition‟, (Essex, Pearson Education 
Ltd., 2003), P199-200 
 
Hocking, Brian and McGuire, Steven. (eds), „Trade Politics, International, Domestic and 
Regional Perspectives‟, (London, Routledge, 1999), P59, P62, P63 
 
 
235 
 
Hoekman, Bernard. „Economic development and the WTO after Doha‟, Discussion Paper 
No.3374, (Centre for Economic Policy Research, May 2002), P9, P20 
 
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Kostecki, Michel M. „The Political Economy of the World 
Trading System – From GATT to WTO‟, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), P12, 
P24, P31, P44-46, P84 
 
Holgerson, Karen M. „The Japan-U.S. trade friction dilemma‟, (Aldershot, Ashgate 
Publishig Limited, 1998), P179-195 
 
Hook, Glenn D., Gilson, Julie., Hughes, Christopher W. and Dobson, Hugo. „Japan‟s 
International Relations – Politics, economics and security‟, (London, Routledge, 2001), 
P270, 271 
 
Ikeda, Michiko. `From GATT to the WTO (GATT kara WTO he)‟, (Tokyo, Chikuma 
Shinsho, 1996), P60-102, P192 
 
Ingersent, K. A., Rayner, A. J. and Hine, R. C. (eds), „Agriculture in the Uruguay Round‟, 
(New York, St. Martins Press, 1994), P33-P151 
 
Inoguchi, Takashi. „Japan‟s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change‟, (London, Pinter, 
1993), P85 
 
Inoguchi, Takashi. and Okimoto, Daniel I. `The Political Economy of Japan – Volume2‟, 
(Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 1988), P174, P175 
 
Ishida, Takeshi. „Political development, decision-making and foreign policy in modern 
Japan‟, in Gordon Daniels and Reinhard Drifte, „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship 
since 1945‟ (Ashfold, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986), P28 
 
Ishikawa, Kenji. „Japan and the challenge of Europe 1992‟, (London, Pinter, for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1990), P8, P12, P13, P114 
 
 
 
236 
 
Issac, Grant E. and Kerr, William A. „Genetically Modified Orgasms at the World Trade 
Organization: A Harvest of Trouble‟, Journal of World Trade 37(6), (Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), P1083-1095 
 
Itoh, Motoshige., Okuno, Masahiro., Kiyono, Kazuharu. and Suzumura, Kotaro. „Industry 
Promotion and Trade‟, in „Industrial policy of Japan‟, (Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 
1988), P258 
 
Itoh, Motoshige. and Kiyono, Kazuharu. „Foreign trade and direct investment‟, in Ryutaro 
Komiya, Masahiro Okuno and Kotaro Suzumura (eds), „Industrial policy of Japan‟, 
(Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 1988), P174 
 
Jackson, John H. „Designing and implementing effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: 
WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects‟ in Anne O. Krueger (ed), „The WTO 
as an International Organisation‟, (London, The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
P161-180 
 
Jackson, John H. „Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures‟ in Anne O. Krueger (eds), 
„the WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 
1998), P163, 164  
 
Jackson, Robert H. and Sorensen, Georg, „Introduction to International Relations‟, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), P85 
 
Jacquet, Pierre. „Trilateral Trade Relations‟, in Hanns W. Maull (ed), „Japan and Europe 
in an interdependent world‟, (Tokyo, Japan Centre for International Exchange, 1988), P94, 
P95 
 
Jones, Kent. „Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade‟, (Allen&Unwin Publishers, 
1986), P91-102, P154, P155, P157-P167 
 
Josling, Timothy. „Key Issue in the World Trade Organizaion Negotiations on 
Agriculture‟, (American Agricultural Economics Association, 2003), P663-667 
 
 
237 
 
Katzenstein, Peter J. ‟Japan, Switzerland of the Far East?‟ in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel 
I. Okimoto, „The Political Economy of Japan – Volume2‟, (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1988), P276 
 
Kaul, Inge., Grunberg, Isabelle. and Stern, Marc. „Global Public Goods„, (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 
 
Kawagoe, Toshihiko. „Deregulation and Protectionism in Japanese Agriculture‟, in Juro 
Teranishi and Yutaka Kosai, „Japanese experience of economic reforms‟, (Chippenham, 
Antony Rowe Ltd, 1993), P366-391 
 
Keohane, Robert O. „After Hegemony – Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy‟, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984), P139 
 
Klepper, Gernot. „The steel and metal industry‟ in David G. Mayes, „The European 
Challenge‟, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatheaf, 1991), P372-385 
 
Komiya, Ryutaro. „The Japanese Economy: Trade Industry, and Government‟, (Tokyo, 
University of Tokyo Press, 1990), P47, P52, P53 
 
Komiya, Ryutaro and Itoh, Motoshige. „Japan‟s international trade and trade policy, 1955-
1984‟, in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds), „The Political Economy of Japan 
Volume2‟, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988), P177, P190, P208 
 
Komuro, N. „EC Antidumping Measures against Japanese Products‟, Kobe University, 
Paper presented for the Third ECSA-World Conference held at Brussels(European 
Parliament), 1996, (http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld3/komuro.htm) 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. „Japan and the United States: Prospects for stability‟, in Inoguchi and 
Okimoto, „The Political Economy of Japan‟, (Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 
1988), P394 
 
Kruger, Anne O. „An Agenda for the WTO‟, in Anne O Kruger (ed), „WTO as an 
international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998), P8, P9, P19, 
P23, P403 
238 
 
 
Kuyper, Pieter-Jan. „The new WTO Dispute Settlement System: the impact on the 
community‟ in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Frederique Berrod and Eric Gippini Fournier 
(eds), „The Uruguay Round Results‟, (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1995), 
P92 
 
Leitch Jr., Richard D., Kato Akira. and Weinstein, Martin E. „Japan‟s Role in the post-
Cold War world‟, (Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), P113 
 
Lindsey, Brink. and Ikenson, Dan. „Reforming the Antidumping Agreement – a road map 
for WTO negotiations‟, (CATO Institute‟s Centre for Trade Policy Studies, 2002), P2-41 
 
Luciolli, Lodovico. „Japanese investments in the EC‟, in European Economic Studies, 
„Euro Cooperation‟, (The Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P67-85 
 
MacKnight, S. „Weekly Review – Japan flip-flop on rice import‟, No.2, (Japan Economic 
Institute Report, January 15, 1999) (http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9902w4.html) 
 
Macron, Jean. „Japanese Export to the EC‟ in European Economic Studies, „Euro 
Cooperation‟, (The „Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P49-65 
 
Magaziner, Ira C. and Hout, Thomas M. „Japanese Industrial Policy‟, (Berkely, Univeristy 
of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980), P17-24, P55-67  
 
Markusen, James R., Melvin, James R., Kaempfer William H., and Maskus, Keith E. 
„International Trade – Theory and Evidence‟, (Singapore, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1995), P3-5 
 
Mason, T. David. and Turay, Abdul M. (eds), „Japan, NAFTA and Europe‟, (New York, St. 
Martin‟s Press, 1995), P60,  P65, P66 
 
McDonald, Frank. „The European Union and the Triad‟, in Frank McDonald and Stephen 
Dearden (eds), „European Economic Integration – third edition‟, (Essex, Pearson 
Education Ltd., 1999), P367 
 
 
239 
 
McDonald, Frank and Dearden, Stephen. (eds), „European Economic Integration – third 
edition‟, (Essex, Pearson Education Ltd., 1999), P367-369 
 
McDonald, Frank. and Dearden, Stephen. (eds), „European Integration – forth edition‟, 
(Essex, Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), P302-324 
 
McFarquhar, Alister. „World Trade Pressures – Reform of EU Common Agricultural 
Policy and Food and Agricultural Policy in Japan‟, (Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 
1996), P19, P20 
 
McGuire, Steven. „Firms and governments in international trade‟ in Brian Hocking and 
Steven McGuire (eds), „Trade Politics, International, Domestic and Regional 
Perspectives‟, (London, Routledge, 1999), P147-161 
 
Mendl, Wolf. „Regional policies in Europe and East Asia‟, in Gordon Daniels and 
Reinhard Drifte, „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship since 1945‟ (Ashfold, Paul 
Norbury Publications, 1986), P82 
 
Messerlin, Patrick A. „Measuring the costs of protection in Europe – European 
Commercial Policy in the 2000s‟, (Washington DC, Institute for International Economics, 
2001), P29-37, P75-132 
 
Messerlin, P. A. and Reed, G. “Anti-dumping policies in the United States and the 
European Community”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 433, (Royal Economic 
Society, Nov. 1995), P1565-1575 
 
Meunier, Sophie. “TRADING VOICES – The European Union in International 
Commercial Negotiations”, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2005) 
 
Meyerson, C. C. “Domestic Politics and International Relations in Trade Policymaking: 
The United States and Japan and the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations”, 
Working paper, (Washington DC, Columbia University, International Studies Association, 
40
th
 Annual Convention, 1999) 
 
 
240 
 
Milner, Christopher. and Allen, David. „The external implications of 1992‟, in Dennis 
Swann (ed), „The Single European Market and Beyond‟, (London, Routledge, 1992), 
P167-170 
 
Milner, Helen V. & Moravcsik, Andrew. (eds), 'Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate 
actors in world politics', (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2009), P8-13, P19-21. 
P166 
 
Mitsuibussan-boueki-keizai-kennkyuuzyo, „WTO – Nihon keizai ha dou kawaruka‟, 
(Nihon-Nouritsu-Kyoukai-Management centre, 1995), P274-283 
 
Molle, Willem. „The economics of European integration – third edition‟, (Aldershot, 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997), P245-269 
 
Morton, Adam David. “Unravelling Gramsci”, (London, Pluto Press, 2007), P112-P135 
 
Movsesian, M. L. „United States: Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000‟, 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 1, (American Society of 
International Law, Jan. 2004), P150-155 
 
Murakami, Naohisa. „WTO – Sekaiboueki no yukue to Nihon no sentaku‟, (Tokyo, 
Heibonsya, 2001), P82, P132, P133, P136, P140-149 
 
Murakami, Yasusuke. and Kosai, Yutaka. (eds), „Japan in the global community‟, (Tokyo, 
University of Tokyo Press, 1986), P16-21 
 
Murphy, Sean D. „WTO decision striking down US steel safeguard measures‟ in „the 
American Journal of international law, Vol. 98, No. 1, (American Society of International 
Law, Jan. 2004), P179-180 
 
Mutoh, Hiromichi. „The Automotive Industry‟, in Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno and 
Kotaro Suzumura (eds), „Industrial Policy of Japan‟, (Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 
1988), P307-331 
 
 
241 
 
Nakakita, Toru. „Trade and capital liberalisation policies in postwar Japan‟, in Juro 
Teranishi and Yutaka Kosai, „Japanese experience of economic reforms‟, (Chippenham, 
Antony Rowe Ltd, 1993), P344, P358-360 
 
Nakamura, Youichi., „WTO ga boueki wo kaeru‟,(Tokyo, Touyou keizai shinpou sha, 
1994), P76-79 
 
Nello, Susan Senior. „The European Union – Economics, Politics and History‟, 
(Maidenhead, McGraw-Hill Education, 2005), P215-243 
 
Nester, William R. `European Power and the Japanese Challenge‟, (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1993), P177, P178, P187, P224-226, P251, P252 
 
Nevin, Edward. „The Economics of Europe‟, (London, the Macmillan Press, 1990), P146-
174 
 
Nguyen, Tiren., Perroni, Carlo. and Wigle, Randall. „An Evaluation of the Draft Final Act 
of the Uruguay Round‟, The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 421, (Royal Economic 
Society, 1993), P1540-1549 
 
Noland, Marcus. „Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR‟ in „International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No.3,(the MIT Press, Summer 1997), P368 
 
O‟Connor, Bernard. „Journal of World Trade 37(5) / A Note on the Need for More Clarity 
in the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Agriculture‟, (Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), P839-846 
 
Odell, John. and Eichengreen, Barry. „The ITO and the WTO‟ in: Anne O Kruger (ed), 
„WTO as an international organisation‟, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
P203 
 
Ohki, Hiromi. „Economic Relations between Japan and the EC‟ in European Economic 
Studies, „Euro Cooperation‟, (Paris, the Europartners‟ Group, 1992), P5-20 
 
 
242 
 
Okimoto, Daniel I. „Political Industry: The Domestic Structure of Trade‟, in Inoguchi and 
Okimoto, „The Political Economy of Japan‟, P328 
 
Olson, Mancur. in De Melo Jamie and Panagariya Arvind (eds). „New Dimensions in 
regional integrations‟ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), P119-122 
 
Oppenheim, Phillip. „Trade Wars – Japan versus the West‟, (London, Butler & Tanner 
Ltd., 1992), P8, P49-51, P62 
 
Paarberg, Robert. „Agriculture Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic 
Linkage in a Two-Level Game?‟ in International Organization, Vol. 51, No.3 (Cambridge, 
the MIT press, Summer 1997), P413-444 
 
Paek, Taeyoul. „The WTO Ruling on the Dispute between Kodak and Fujifilm: Three 
Levels of Analysis‟, in Journal of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Volume 3, No 1.(Seoul, Asia-
Pacific Research Centre Hanyang University, August 2001), P78-102 
 
Park, Jong H. „Trading Blocs and US-Japan Relations in Pacific Trade and Cooperation‟ 
in Michael Landeck (ed), „International Trade: Regional and Global Issues‟, (the 
Macmillan Press, 1994), P66 
 
Pekkanen, Saadia M. „Sword and Shield – the WTO Dispute Settlement System and 
Japan‟ in Ulrike Schade and William Grimes (eds), „Japan‟s managed globalisation‟, 
(New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2003), P77-97 
 
Pelkmans, Jacques. „European Integration – Methods and Economic Analysis – second 
edition‟, (Essex, Pearson Education Ltd., 2001), P202-222 
 
Pempel, T. J. „Policy and Politics in Japan‟, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1982), 
P47 
 
Pempel, T. J. „From exporter to investor: Japanese economic policy‟, in Gerald L. Curtis 
(ed), „Japan‟s foreign policy after the Cold War – Coping with change‟, (New York, M. E. 
Sharpe, 1993), P122 
 
243 
 
Perdikis, Nicholas., Kerr, William A. and Hobbs, Jill E. „Reforming the WTO to Defuse 
Potential Trade Conflicts in Genetically Modified Goods‟, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 
2001), P379-398 
 
Peterson, John. „Europe and America in the 1990s‟, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
1993), P15, 16 
 
Philippidis, George. and Hubbard, Lionel J. „Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP and its 
impacts on member states: a note‟, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, Number 3, 
(Agricultural Economics Society, November 2003), P479-486 
 
Puckett, A. Lynne and Reynolds, William L.  „Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under 
301: At Odds with the WTO?‟, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.90, No.4, 
(American Society of International Law, Oct. 1996), P675-689 
 
Putnam, Robert D.  'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games' in 
International Organisation 42, 3 Summer 1988, P427-P460   
 
Quintillan, Manuel Ahijado. and Guerrero, Ruben Osuna. „The European Union and 
Enlargement to the East (1999-2006)‟, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 29, No.2, (M.E. 
Sharpe Inc., Summer 1999), P74-104 
 
Qureshi, Asif H. „The World Trade Organisation – Implementing international trade 
norms‟, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), P97-107 
 
Robinson, William I, „A Theory of Global Capitalism‟, (Maryland, The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2004) 
 
Robinson, William I, „Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nationstate to Transnational 
Hegemony‟, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, „Images of Gramsci‟, (New 
York, Routledge, 2006), P174, 175 
 
Rosendorff, B. Peter „Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-dumping Procedure, and 
Domestic Politics‟ in The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (American 
Economic Association, Jun. 1996), P544-561 
244 
 
 
Rothacher, Albrecht. „Economic Diplomacy between the European Community and Japan 
1959-1981‟, (Aldershot, Gower Publishing Company, 1983), P195 
 
Rude, J. „Under the Green Box – The WTO and Farm Subsidies‟, in Journal of World 
Trade 35(5), (Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001), P1015-1033 
 
Ruggie, J.G., ‟International Regimes, Transactions and change: Embedded liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic order‟, in International Organization 36(2), (Cambridge, The MIT 
Press, 1982), P379-415 
 
Runge, C. F. and Jackson, L. A. „Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms‟, 
Journal of World Trade 34(1), (Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001), P111-122  
 
Sanderson, Fred. H. (ed), „Agricultural Protectionism in the industrialised world‟, 
(Washington DC, Resource for the Future, 1990), P184 
 
Sazanami, Yoko., Urata, Shujiro. and Kawai, Hiroki. „Measuring the costs of protection in 
Japan‟, (Washigton DC, Institute for International Economics, 1995) P1-3 
 
Scholte, Jan Aart with O‟Brien, Robert., and Williams, Marc.„The World Trade 
Organization and civil society‟ in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds), „Trade 
Politics, International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives‟, (London, Routledge, 1999), 
P163 
 
Schotter, Andrew. „The Economic Theory of Social Institutions‟, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981)  
 
Shaffer, Gregory C. „Defending Interests – Public-private partnerships in WTO litigation‟, 
(Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003), P102 
 
Siebert, Horst. „What does globalisation mean for the world trading system?‟ in the WTO 
Secretariat, „From GATT to the WTO: the Multilateral Trading System in the New 
Millennium, (Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000), P144 
 
245 
 
Silverstone, Aubrey „Anti-dumping rules – Time for Change?‟ in Journal of World Trade 
37(6), (Kluwer Law International, 2003), P1074, 1075  
 
Sinha, Radha. „Japan‟s options for the 1980s‟, (London, Croom Helm, 1982), P80-82, 
P98-102 
 
Skocpol, Theda. „States & Social Revolutions‟, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1979) 
 
Smith, Michael. „The European Union‟ in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire (ed.), 
„Trade Politics, International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives‟, (London, Routledge, 
1999), P276-289 
 
Stirk, J. Daniel. „United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel 
products from Japan: possibilities and predictions for compliance with the appellate 
body‟s report‟, in „Law and policy in international business, Vol.33‟ (2002), P683-716 
 
Strange, Susan. „The retreat of the state – the diffusion of power in the world 
economy‟,(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), P66-69 
 
Tan, Augustine H. H. „Managing Liberalisation, Regionalism and Globalisation in the 
Next 50 years‟ in the WTO Secretariat, „From GATT to the WTO: the Multilateral trading 
system in the new millennium‟, (Hague, Kluwer law international, 2000), P171 
 
Tarr, David G. „Costs and benefits to the United States of the 1985 steel import quota 
program‟ in Ryuzo Sato and Paul Wachtel (eds), „Trade friction and economic policy‟, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), P159-176 
 
Tharakan, P. K. M. „Political Economy and Contingent Protection‟, The Economic 
Journal, Vol.105, No.433, (Royal Economic Society, Nov. 1995), P1550-1564 
 
Thorning, Margo. „EU and US perspective on Climate, Trade and Bioengineering 
Policies‟, (Brussels, the ICCF, 2003), P5, 6 
(http://iccfglobal.org/pdfs/EU&US%20Perspectives071403.PDF) 
 
246 
 
Tilly, Charles, „Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-1992‟, (Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishing, 1990) 
 
Trebilcock, Michael J. and Howse, Robert. ‟The regulation of international trade – 
Second Edition‟, (London, Routledge, 1995), P53 
 
Tsuru, Shiegto. „Japan‟s Capitalism: creative defeat and beyond‟, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), P98-100 
 
Turner, Charlie G., „Japan‟s Dynamic Efficiency in the Global Market – Trade, 
investment, and economic growth‟, (Westport, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1989), P57, 
P74-77 
 
Tussie, Diana and Glover, David, „The developing countries in world trade‟, (London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 
 
Tutwiler‚ M. Ann. „Challenges Facing the World Trade Organisation Negotiations on 
Agriculture‟, American Agricultural Economics Association, (Malden, Blackwell 
publishing, 2003), P684, 685 
 
Tweeten, Luther. „Agricultural Trade – Principles and Policies‟, (London, Westview Press, 
1992), P218 
 
Underhill, Geoffrey R. D. „Conceptualizing the Charging Global Order‟ in Richard 
Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, „Political Economy and the changing global order‟, 
(Oxford, Oxford University press, 2000), P32 
 
Unsal, Fahri M. and Richard, Sandra. „European automobile markets after 1992, in 
Michael Landeck, „International Trade – Regional and Global Issues‟, (London, the 
Macmillan Press, 1994), P11-25 
 
Ushio, Mitsuhiro. „Food Safety Regulatory Issues‟, (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations & World Health Organization, 2003), 
(http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/004/Y2010E.HTM#P15_336) 
 
247 
 
van Marion, Marcel F. „Liberal trade and Japan: the incompatibility issue‟, (Heidelberg, 
Physica-Verlag, 1993), P94 
 
Vickerman, R. W. „The Single European Market – prospects for economic integration‟, 
(Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), P122-129 
 
Vines, David. „The WTO in relation to the Fund and the Bank‟, in Anne O Kruger (ed), 
„WTO as an international organisation‟, P79 
 
Wallace, Helen. and Wallace, William. „Policy-Making in the European Union – Fourth 
Edition‟, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), P391, 392 
 
Ward, H. „Science and Precaution in the Trading System‟, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
(http://www.iisd.org/pdf/sci_precaution.pdf) 
 
Weiss, Linda. and Hobson, John M. 'States and Economic Development', (Cambridge 
Polity Press,1995), P170 
 
White, Brian., Little, Richard. and Smith, Michael. „Issues in World Politics – Second 
edition‟, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001), P42 
 
Wiener, Jarrod. „Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT‟, (Aldershot, 
Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), P62-77 
 
Wiessala, Georg. „The European Union and Asian Countries‟, (London, Shefflield 
Academic Press, 2002), P107 
 
Wilkinson, Endymion. „The Economic and Non-Economic Dimensions of Euro-Japanese 
Relations‟, in Daniels and Drifte, „Europe and Japan, Changing relationship since 1945‟ 
(Ashfold, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986), P33, P43, P44 
 
Wilkinson, Endymion. „Japan versus the West – image and reality‟, (London, Penguin 
books, 1990), P229 
 
248 
 
Winham, Gilbert R. „International regime conflict in trade and environment: the Biosafety 
Protocol and the WTO‟ in World Trade Review, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003), P131-155 
 
Winters, L. Alan. „The Road to Uruguay Round‟ in The Economic Journal, Vol. 100, No. 
403, (Royal Economic Society, Dec. 1990), P1288-1303 
 
Winters, L. Alan.  „Regionalism versus multilateralism‟, in Kym Anderson and Bernard 
Hoekman, „The Global Trading System – Vol. III‟, (New York, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
2002), P302 
 
Wolfe, Robert. „The World Trade Organization‟ in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire 
(eds) „Trade politics – International, domestic and regional perspectives‟ (London, 
Routledge, 1999), P208-223  
 
Woolcock, Stephen. „Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations –Trading Partners or 
Trading Blows?‟, (Paris, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), P22. P23 
 
Woolcock, Stephan. „European Trade Policy – Global Pressure and Domestic Constraints‟, 
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds.), „Policy Making in the European Union‟, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), P373, P387 
 
Woolcock, Stephen and Yamane, Hiroko. „RIIA special paper, EC-Japanese trade 
relations: what are the rules of the game?‟, (London, the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1993), P2, P5, P6, P7, P12, P32-37 
 
Woronoff, Jon. „Japanese Targeting‟, (Basingstoke, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), 
P100-111, P205-208 
 
Yamawaki, Hideki. „The Steel Industry‟, in Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno and 
Kotaro Suzumura (eds), „Industrial Policy of Japan‟, (Tokyo, Academic Press Japan, 
1988), P281-305 
 
 
 
249 
 
Yasutomo, Dennis T. „The politicisation of Japan‟s “Post-Cold War” multilateral 
diplomacy‟, in Gerald L. Curtis (ed), „Japan‟s foreign policy after the Cold War – Coping 
with change‟, (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993), P328-346 
 
Yeager, Mary A. „Trade Protection as an International Commodity: The Case of Steel‟, 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol.40, No.1, The Tasks of Economic History (March 
1980), P 33-42 
 
Yoshimori, Masaru. „Psychological Aspect of Euro-Japanese Trade Frictions: A Japanese 
Viewpoint‟, in Gordon Daniels and Reinhard Drifte, „Europe and Japan, Changing 
relationship since 1945‟ (Ashford, Paul Norbury Publications, 1986), P51, P52, P57 
 
Zedalis, Rex J. „Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods‟, Journal of World Trade 35(2), 
(Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001), P301-347 
 
 
